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Summary	  The	  thesis	  explores	  the	  evolution	  of	  environmental	  service	  (ES)	  commercialization	  in	  the	  Ve-­‐neto’s	   mountain	   areas,	   thought	   the	   implementation	   of	   payment	   for	   environmental	   service	  (PES)	  schemes.	  Starting	  with	  the	  description	  of	  general	  theory	  beyond	  PES	  based	  on	  the	  prin-­‐cipal	   statement	   of	   the	   contract	   theory,	  we	   introduce	   the	   ES	   commercialization	   through	   the	  analysis	   of	   an	   alternative	   forest	   business,	   based	   on	   recreational	   wild	   mushroom	   picking	  (RWMP)	  that	  became	  recently	  an	  important	  income	  source	  for	  forest	  managers	  in	  mountain	  areas.	  Across	  a	  multiple	  case	  study,	  the	  role	  of	  governance	  of	  WM	  resources	  have	  been	  high-­‐light	  arguing	  the	  need	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  WM	  resources	  and	  stakeholder	  coordina-­‐tion.	  The	  case	  of	  RWMP	  has	  been	  used	  to	  introduce	  the	  concepts	  of	  ES	  user’s	  direct	  utility	  and	  ES	  commercialization	  by	  bottom	  up	   initiatives;	   scarcely	  addressed	   in	  water	   sector,	  where	  a	  top-­‐down	   approach	   by	   the	   central	   government	   prevails.	   Finally,	   an	   estimation	   of	   Veneto	  dwellers’	  willingness	   to	  pay	  (WTP)	  has	  been	  assessed	  through	  a	  choice	  experiment	  applica-­‐tion,	   to	   highlight	   key	   factors	   determining	   their	   preferences	   to	   spend	   for	   ES	   provision	   im-­‐provement.	  The	  results	  confirm	  the	  attitude	  of	  people	  to	  have	  higher	  WTP	  for	  the	  ES	  directly	  used,	  even	  if	  a	  key	  role	  is	  played	  by	  people	  knowledge	  to	  create	  ES	  demand.	  	  
Riassunto	  La	   tesi	   esplora	   l’evoluzione	   della	   commercializzazione	   dei	   servizi	   ambientali	   nelle	   foreste	  montane	   del	   Veneto,	   attraverso	   l’adozione	   di	   schemi	   di	   pagamento	   per	   servizi	   ambientali	  (PES).	  Iniziando	  con	  la	  descrizione	  della	  teoria	  dei	  PES	  basata	  nei	  principi	  cardine	  della	  teoria	  dei	   contratti,	   si	   introduce	   lo	   sviluppo	  della	   commercializzazione	  dei	   sevizi	   ambientali	   attra-­‐verso	  lo	  sviluppo	  di	  attività	  forestali	  alternative	  basate	  sulla	  raccolta	  di	  funghi	  selvatici	  ai	  fini	  ricreativi	  (RWMP),	  diventata	  oggi	  una	  importante	  fonte	  di	  reddito	  per	  i	  gestori	  della	  foresta.	  Attraverso	  un	  caso	  studio	  multiplo	  si	  evidenzia	  il	  ruolo	  della	  gestione	  delle	  risorse	  fungine	  so-­‐stenendo	  la	  necessita,	  in	  politiche	  di	  commercializzazione	  degli	  ES,	  di	  creare	  un	  legame	  diret-­‐to	  tra	  gestione	  delle	  risorse	  fungine	  e	  l’azione	  di	  coordinamento	  degli	  attori	  coinvolti.	  Il	  caso	  dei	  RWMP	  è	  stato	  utilizzato	  per	  introdurre	  i	  concetti	  di	  commercializzazione	  dei	  servizi	  am-­‐bientali	  e	  utilità	  diretta	  degli	  utilizzatori	  dei	  servizi	  ambientali;	  questi	  concetti	  sono	  stati	  scar-­‐samente	  utilizzati	  in	  altri	  casi	  di	  commercializzazione	  degli	  ES,	  come	  per	  esempio	  nel	  settore	  idrico,	   dove	  prevale	   l’approccio	  di	   imposizione	  di	   vincoli	   dal	   governo	   centrale.	   Infine,	   la	  di-­‐sponibilità	  a	  pagare	  da	  parte	  dei	  residenti	  del	  Veneto	  è	  stata	  stimata	  attraverso	  l’applicazione	  di	  un	  esperimento	  di	  scelta,	  per	  evidenziare	  i	  fattori	  determinanti	  che	  spingono	  le	  persone	  a	  esprimere	  una	  volontà	  di	  spendere	  per	  migliorare	  la	  produzione	  di	  servizi	  ambientali.	  I	  risul-­‐tati	  confermano	  l’attitudine	  delle	  persone	  ad	  avere	  una	  maggiore	  WTP	  per	  i	  servizi	  ambientali	  utilizzati,	  anche	  se	  il	  ruolo	  della	  conoscenza	  delle	  persone	  gioca	  un	  ruolo	  chiave	  nella	  creazio-­‐ne	  della	  domanda	  di	  servizi	  ambientali.	   	  
	  	   	  
1. ES	  in	  the	  real	  economy:	  from	  concept	  to	  ES	  market.	  A	  historical	  
approach 	  The	  concept	  of	  environmental	  or	  ecosystem	  service	  (ES)	  has	  become	  very	  popular	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades.	  The	   increasing	  attention	   to	   the	  environment	  has	  become	  well	  known	   issue	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  global	  society,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  rapid	  effect	  of	  the	  human	  behaviour	  af-­‐fected	  the	  “earth	  ecosystem”.	  At	  the	  root	  side	  of	  the	  present	  situation	  the	  huge	  demographic	  increment	  has	  been	  the	  main	  threaten	  of	  the	  earth	  ecosystems.	  A	  global	  review	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ES	  was	  delivered	  by	  Gómez-­‐Baggethun	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  that	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  to	  summarize	  the	  scientific	  and	  social	  patterns	  (see	  Figure	  1)	  that	  allowed	  world	  society	  to	  incorporate	  part	  of	   the	  natural	   capita	   in	   the	   real	  economy	   through	   the	  market	   for	  ecosystem	  services	   (MES)	  (Bayon	  2004).	  Hardin	   (1968)	   and	  his	   famous	  paper	   “The	  Tragedy	  of	  Commons”	   have	  been	   the	   embryo	   the	  concept	  of	  MES.	  The	   self-­‐interest	  was	   the	  main	   cause	  of	   environment	  depletion.	   In	   fact,	   the	  huge	   demographic	   boom	   after	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   triggered	   the	   demand	   of	   natural	   re-­‐sources	   exceeding	   in	   several	   places	   the	   ecosystem	   carry	   capacity.	   Together	   with	   welfare	  growth	  and	  the	  social	  demand	  change,	  people	  have	  stated	  to	  ask	  new	  commodities	  at	  cheap	  price,	  using	  the	  environment	  as	  an	  inexhaustible	  source	  of	  goods.	  The	  expanding	  need	  of	  en-­‐ergy	  for	  the	  society	  took	  Georgescu-­‐Roegen	  (1971)	  to	  consider	  the	  second	  law	  of	  thermody-­‐namics	   in	   the	   economic	   process,	   because	   any	   human	   activity	   require	   energy	   to	   work.	   The	  same	  principle	  was	  adopted	  in	  the	  same	  year	  by	  Odum	  (1971),	  father	  of	  the	  ecosystem	  ecolo-­‐gy.	  Basically,	  both	  the	  authors,	  one	  in	  economy	  and	  the	  other	  in	  ecology,	  understood	  that	  en-­‐ergy	  was	  at	   the	  basic	  mechanism	  beyond	  every	  action.	   Just	   one	  year	   later,	   in	   the	  1972,	   the	  United	   the	  Nations	  along	   the	  proclaims	  of	  Stockholm	  conference,	   the	  seventh	  point	  was	  en-­‐tirely	  incorporating	  the	  concept	  that	  humans	  act	  within	  the	  environment,	  on	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  beginning	  of	  ES	  internalization	  in	  the	  real	  economy.	  Moreover,	  the	  concept	  opened	  imme-­‐diately	   another	   debate	   about	   the	  world	   carry	   capacity.	   The	   use	   of	   finite	   resource	  within	   a	  close	  ecosystem	  as	  the	  earth,	  let	  Meadows	  et	  al.	  (1972)	  to	  develop	  the	  concept	  of	  growth	  lim-­‐its,	  basically	  the	  contrary	  perspective	  of	  the	  neoclassical	  economy.	  Few	  years	   later,	   the	   first	  oil	  crisis	  was	  a	   first	  advise	  of	   these	  global	  changes,	  confirming	  the	  scholar’s	  theoretical	  perspectives.	  In	  fact,	  the	  first	  Arabic	  oil	  embargo	  in	  the	  seventies	  was	  the	  historical	  break	  point	  that	  introduce	  the	  consciousness	  of	  earth	  limit	  and	  the	  need	  to	  seek	  a	  new	  type	  of	  world	  development	  (Sachs	  1974).	  The	  demand	  of	  a	  new	  “global	  governance”	  saw	  the	   creation	   of	   two	   different	   theoretical	   thoughts	   over	   sustainability:	   one	   side	   Daly	   (1974,	  	  1977)	  with	  the	  eco-­‐centric	  or	  strong	  sustainability	  concept	  and	  on	  the	  other	  Hartwick	  (1977)	  with	  the	  a	  strong	  opinion	  that	  economy	  as	  such	  generated	  of	  intergenerational	  equity.	  Never-­‐theless,	   the	  world	  economy	  continued	  with	   this	   last	   assumption,	  based	  on	  neoclassical	   eco-­‐nomic	  theory,	  while	  sustainability	  concept	  rise	  up	  only	  some	  year	  later	  in	  the	  real	  economy.	  The	  second	  oil	  crisis	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  political	  instability	  of	  Iranian	  government,	  ra-­‐ther	  then	  a	  market	  consequence	  of	  oil	  shortage.	  However,	  it	  helps	  to	  strengthen	  the	  concept	  of	  interdepended	  relationships	  between	  world	  economy	  and	  energy	  (Costanza	  1980),	  few	  years	  later	   (1982)	  embedded	  as	  core	  concept	  by	   the	  World	  Resource	   Institute	  (WRI).	  Founded	  as	  independent	  non-­‐governmental	  organization,	  WRI	  has	  focused	  in	  four	  main	  issues:	  i)	  energy	  and	   climatic	   change,	   ii)	   institution	   governance	   to	   raise	   environmental	   friendly	   policies;	   iii)	  market	   and	   environmental	   responsible	   enterprises;	   and	   lastly	   iv)	   environmental	   resource	  conservation.	  	  The	   lack	  of	  countries’	  environmental	   information	  and	   the	  scattered	  ES	  valuations	   led	  UN	  to	  promote	  the	  world	  commission	  on	  environment	  and	  development	  (WCED).	  The	  final	  report	  of	  the	   commission	   recognized	   the	   role	   of	   welfare	   in	   environmental	   conservation	   as	   well	   the	  
acknowledgement	  of	  the	  economic	  limits	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  any	  eco-­‐centric	  policy	  can	  have	  on	  the	  industrialized	  countries,	  by	  mean	  of	  an	  ES	  cost.	  Moreover,	  the	  need	  to	  redistribute	  the	  resources	  at	  global	  scale	  was	  the	  an	  identification	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  interdependency	  as	  a	  huge	   global	   ecosystem,	   concept	   returned	   by	   Martinez-­‐Alier	   and	   Schlupmann	   (1987).	   The	  maintenance	   of	   natural	   capital	  was	   considered	   an	   insurance	   for	   the	  whole	  world	   economy,	  both	  achieving	  welfare	  and	  sustainable	  growth	  (Costanza	  and	  Daly	  1992)	  through	  a	  taxation	  of	  the	  traditional	  economy	  in	  favour	  to	  the	  environment,	  demonstrated	  the	  most	  feasible	  solu-­‐tion	  to	  dam	  the	  environment	  depletion.	  	  The	  first	  general	  assessment	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  world	  environmental	  services	  (Costanza	  et	  al.	  1997,	  Daly	  1997)	  has	  been	  the	  wider	  econometric	  effort	  to	  prove	  the	  cost	  of	  human	  passivity	  toward	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment,	  being	  the	  environment	  the	  source	  of	  a	  seventeen	  services	  that	  worth	  in	  total	  1.8	  folds	  the	  global	  annual	  GNP.	  However,	  the	  impressive	  results	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  political	  advise	  to	  the	  global	  scale	  of	  the	  environmental	  problem	  (Farber	  1998).	  In	  the	  same	  year	  (1997),	  the	  first	  payment	  for	  environmental	  services	  (PES)	  has	  been	  created	  in	  Costa	  Rica	  for	  watershed	  market	  at	  national	  scale.	  PES,	  despite	  legal	  constrain	  on	  the	  use	  or	  on	  the	  non-­‐use	  of	  some	  ES,	  it	  binds	  the	  ES	  user	  and	  ES	  supplier	  with	  a	  contract,	  so	  the	  how	  to	  use	  the	  ES	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  parts,	  instead	  by	  the	  government.	  Driven	  by	  the	  effort	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  begin	  the	  ES	  commercialization,	  the	  PES	  schemes	  implemented	  allowed	  to	  enhance	  large	  watershed	  protection,	  while	  minimal	  effect	  have	  been	  achieved	  on	  biodiver-­‐sity	  and	  carbon	  sequestration.	  Thanks	  to	  the	  rapid	  follow	  up	  of	  PES	  schemes,	  the	  ES	  have	  been	  inserted	  in	  the	  seventh	  principle	  of	  the	  millennium	  development	  goals	  (MDG)	  (UN	  2000),	  to-­‐day	   representing	   the	   world	   driving	   principles.	   Being	   the	   loss	   of	   ES	   a	   cost	   for	   the	   society	  (Chapin	   et	   al.	   2000),	   the	   global	   accounting	   (UN	  et	   al.	   2003)	   and	   reporting	   (MA	  2005)	  have	  been	  the	  tools	  the	  suggested	  to	  promote	  the	  market	  for	  environmental	  service	  (MES),	  as	  di-­‐rect	  consequence	  of	  PES	  diffusion.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Postdam	  initiatives	  of	  the	  G8	  summit	  in	  2007	  launched	  the	  economic	  of	  ecosystem	  and	  biodiversity	  (TEEB)	  that	  was	  an	  operative	  tool	  of	  the	  society	  to	  monitor	  the	  global	  ES	  market.	  Other	  initiatives	  followed	  this	  first,	  like	  Ecosys-­‐tem	  Marketplace	  (de	  Groot	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Here	  after,	  PES	  and	  in	  general	  MES,	  has	  start	  to	  be	  a	  wide	  spread	  practice	  in	  Europe	  (Natura	  2000	  program,	  Life,	  Common	  Agriculture	  Policy	  funds	  for	  Agro-­‐Forestry	  Service)	  as	  well	  in	  other	  countries	  as	  practice	  to	  preserve	  the	  environment	  without	  an	  economic	  loss	  for	  the	  local	  society.	  Anyhow,	  ES	  market	  needs	  further	  effort	  for	  the	  civil	   society	   to	   scale	  up,	  due	   to	   the	   evidence	  of	   the	  ongoing	   global	   threat	   (Alexander	  1997)	  that	  start	  to	  affect	  also	  to	  the	  world	  economy	  (Noy	  2009,	  von	  Peter	  et	  al.	  2012)	  due	  mainly	  to	  the	  incapability	  to	  organize	  people	  and	  resources	  in	  the	  space	  and	  time.	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  ecological,	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  framework	  have	  played	  a	  major	  role	  on	  MES	  imple-­‐mentation	  (Balmford	  et	  al.	  2010),	  but	  where	  PES	  have	  been	  applied	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  real	  demand	  and	  supply,	  in	  which	  both	  the	  parties	  gain	  a	  better	  utility	  with	  regards	  their	  pre-­‐vious	  status,	  the	  success	  has	  been	  a	  guarantee.	  The	  brief	  introduction	  on	  ES	  shows	  clearly	  how	  much	  effort	  the	  scholars,	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society	   spent	   before	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   first	   national	   PES	   scheme.	  After	   the	   case	   of	  Costa	  Rica,	  several	  other	  cases	  have	  been	  recorded	  globally,	  while	  some	  decades	  have	  still	  to	  pass	  before	  a	  full	  recognition	  of	  the	  ES	  value	  in	  the	  market.	  Among	  the	  key	  ES	  traded	  biodi-­‐versity	  (especially	  in	  wetlands),	  soil	  protection,	  water	  quality,	  carbon	  sequestration	  and	  rec-­‐reation	  have	  been	  the	  most	  frequent	  traded	  ES	  since	  now.	  In	  Italy,	  the	  MES	  did	  not	  succeed	  as	  in	  other	  countries.	  Despite	  PES	  is	  a	  new	  useful	  tool	  to	  enhance	  the	  provision	  of	  ES,	  it	  still	  re-­‐mains	  linked	  to	  few	  case	  studies	  associated	  to	  legal	  acts	  of	  the	  central	  or	  regional	  government.	  Due	   to	   the	   complexity	  of	   the	   issue,	  we	   report	   a	   specific	   chapter	   that	   explains	   in	  details	   the	  main	  legislative	  changes	  occurred	  in	  the	  last	  centuries	  on	  ES	  provision.	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2. Thesis	  objectives	  and	  structure	  	  Italian	  Government	  has	  set	  up	  a	  multitude	  of	  legal	  forest	  constrains	  to	  preserve	  the	  environ-­‐ment,	  nevertheless	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  the	  command	  and	  control	  approach	  has	  triggered	  for-­‐est	  and	  land	  abandon.	  Also	  other	  concauses	  helped	  to	  diminish	  the	  land	  productivity	  for	  ex-­‐ample	   the	   heavy	   bureaucratic	   procedures,	   the	   land	   fragmentation	   or	   the	  welfare	   enhance-­‐ment,	  but	  above	  all,	  the	  lack	  equality	  distribution	  once	  legal	  constrains	  was	  implemented	  have	  to	  consider	  a	  key	  problem.	  If	  on	  one	  side	  the	  population	  benefits	  of	  the	  ES	  increment	  thanks	  the	   legal	   constrains,	  on	   the	  other,	   land	  owner	  has	   suffered	  without	  any	  compensation:	   core	  principle	  PES	  scheme	  implementation	  try	  to	  solve.	  The	  present	  work	  explores	  the	  feasibility	  of	  PES	  scheme	  implementation	  in	  Veneto	  Region	  for	  the	  main	  ES	  generated	  in	  mountains	  areas	  and	  not	  yet	  commercialized,	  like	  forest	  recreation,	  water	   quality,	   biodiversity	   conservation,	   carbon	   sequestration	   and	   aesthetic	   component	   of	  the	  landscape	  that	  are	  today	  public	  goods.	  The	  lack	  of	  financial	  means	  from	  central	  or	  regional	  government	  together	  with	  the	  increasing	  perception	  of	  a	  diminishing	  patters	  of	  ES	  availability	  has	  highlighted	  the	  possible	  creation	  of	  a	  monetary	   flow	  between	  ES	  user	  and	  ES	  suppliers,	  mainly	  located	  in	  mountain	  areas.	  Since	  now,	  subsidies	  to	  enhance	  forest	  ES	  has	  been	  calcu-­‐lated	  through	  the	  cost	  of	  provision,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  the	  cost	  the	  ES	  supplier	  (land	  owner	  or	  manager)	   has	   to	   spend	   to	   increase	   a	   given	   ES	   provision.	   Nevertheless,	   since	   the	   “power	  of	  
scarcity”	  is	  hold	  by	  the	  ES	  consumer	  (the	  demand),	  economic	  actor	  supposed	  to	  pay	  in	  a	  po-­‐tential	  PES	  scheme	  implementation,	  we	  address	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  to	  under-­‐stand	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  willingness	  to	  pay	  (WTP)	  on	  the	  forest	  services	  that	  are	  today	  free	  of	  charge.	  After	  a	  brief	   introduction	  to	  describe	  the	  case	  study	  area,	   the	   legal	   framework	  that	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  the	  ES	  in	  the	  region	  and	  the	  methodologies	  that	  might	  be	  applied	  to	  assess	  ES	  value,	  we	  present	  the	  theory	  beyond	  the	  PES	  schemes	  by	  mean	  the	  paper	  1	  entitled	  “Environmental	  
Service	  Under	  Climatic	  Change:	  Better	  Income	  From	  Forest?”.	  The	  paper	  explores	  the	  possibility	  to	  implement	  PES	  schemes	  as	  a	  new	  market	  tool	  to	  enhance	  the	  forestland	  income.	  Here,	  four	  case	  studies	  are	  presented	  and	  they	   introduce	  the	   issues	  described	   in	  the	  papers	  2,	  4	  and	  5	  (see	   Figure	   2).	   ES	   funding	   represent	   today	   the	   major	   dams	   to	   implement	   an	   efficient	   PES	  scheme.	  The	  volume	  of	  the	  economic	  transaction	  to	  provide	  ES	  may	  be	  calculated	  through	  the	  estimation	   of	   the	   “ES	  demand”	   or	   across	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   “cost	  of	  provision”.	  While	  we	  think	  the	  demand	  is	  a	  driving	  force	  for	  the	  market	  and	  it	  makes	  easer	  the	  implementation	  of	  any	  PES	  scheme,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  fund	  to	  subsidized	  the	  ES	  provision	  paid	  by	  everyone,	  hence	  also	  people	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  direct	  utility	  on	  a	  given	  ES,	  might	  have	  a	  smaller	  dimension	  and	  generally	  it	  remain	  limited	  to	  a	  local	  cases.	  These	  concepts	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  cases	  respectively	  reported	  in	  paper	  2	  and	  3	  for	  demand	  effect	  and	  in	  paper	  4	  for	  the	  supply.	  The	   paper	  2	   analyse	   the	   historical	   pattern	   that	   pushed	   the	   policy	  makers	   to	   consider	  wild	  mushroom	   (WM)	   as	   new	   commodity	   to	   be	   sold	   from	   forest	   sector.	  Wild	  mushrooms	   (WM)	  have	  been	  an	  important	  forest	  externality	  collected	  by	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  Italian	  citizen	  since	  the	  late	  ‘90s.	  The	  congestion	  over	  WM	  resources	  and	  the	  demand	  to	  increase	  the	  availability	  of	  WM	  resources	  in	  the	  forest	  allow	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  type	  of	  forest	  income	  for	  the	  forest	  manager.	  The	  assignment	  of	  specific	  property	  rights	  has	  been	  the	  first	  step	  to	  allow	  the	  com-­‐mercialization	  of	  recreational	  WM	  picking	  permits.	  Nevertheless,	   if	   in	  one	  side	  a	  new	  forest	  output	  was	  created,	  on	  the	  other	  the	  WM	  enterprises	  transfer	  their	  attention	  abroad	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  general	  decrement	  of	  the	  local	  WM	  added	  value.	  The	  paper	  3	  describes	  a	  case	  study	  from	  Eastern	  Finland	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  WM	  export	  to	  Italy.	  Despite	  WM	  are	  considered	  a	  public	  good	   in	   Finland,	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   collecting	  mechanism	   allowed	   to	   generate	   a	   new	   income	  source	  for	  rural	  population,	  unknown	  before.	  
Water	  quality	  is	  an	  important	  ES,	  especially	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  basin.	  Paper	  4	  analysed	  the	  historical	  process	  that	  allow	  to	  create	  a	  monetary	  fund	  to	  subsidies	  mountain	  forest	  owner	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  the	  cost	  of	  provision	  of	  cleaner	  water	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  alterna-­‐tive	  forest	  management	  practices.	  The	  fund	  has	  been	  generated	  by	  an	  additional	  tax	  on	  water	  bill.	  Despite	  WM,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  water	  economic	  mechanism	  remained	  limited	  due	  to	  the	  po-­‐litical	  sensitivity	  at	  political	  level,	  because	  consider	  an	  additional	  cost	  for	  the	  household,	  not	  expressly	  want	  by	  the	  population;	  in	  fact	  the	  PES	  scheme	  has	  been	  implemented	  only	  in	  three	  out	  of	  twenty-­‐one	  Italian	  regions.	  Lastly	  paper	  5	  report	  an	  application	  of	  WTP	  assessment	  for	  mountain	  forest	  ES	  in	  Veneto	  re-­‐gion.	   The	   estimation	   has	   been	   done	   applying	   a	   choice	   experiment	   analysis,	   a	   common	   ap-­‐proach	   to	   estimate	   the	  demand	  of	  non-­‐markets	   goods.	  Basically,	   the	  main	  aim	  of	   the	  paper	  was	  to	  understand	  whether	   it	  exists	  a	  WTP	  for	  biodiversity	  maintenance,	  carbon	  sequestra-­‐tion	   and	   general	   recreation	   as	   pick	   nick	   areas,	   forest	   aesthetic	   view	   and	   landscape	   beauty.	  Moreover	  a	  test	  between	  mountain	  user	  and	  non-­‐mountain	  users	  has	  been	  done	  to	  check	  the	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  utility.	  Finally,	  the	  conclusions	  wrap	  up	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  research,	  reporting	  some	  evidences	  come	  up	  in	  these	  three	  years	  of	  work.	  	  	  Figure	  2:	  Thesis	  structure	  
	  	  	   	  
3. The	  case	  study	  area	  description1 
3.1. The	  geographical	  context	  The	   Alpine	   region	   spans	   across	   eight	  countries:	   France,	   Monaco,	   Switzer-­‐land,	   Lichtenstein,2	  Italy,	   Austria,	   Ger-­‐many	   and	   Slovenia.	   It	   forms	   a	   unique	  mosaic	  of	  natural,	  agricultural	  and	  for-­‐est	   spaces	   and	   landscapes,	   character-­‐ised	   by	   high	   ecosystem	   values,	   whose	  conservation	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  signa-­‐ture	  in	  1989	  of	  the	  Alpine	  Convention.	  In	   this	   context	   Veneto	  Region,	   located	  in	  the	  North	  East	  Italy,	  represents	  a	  on-­‐ly	   small	   part	   of	   the	   Alpine	   system,	   in	  which	   anthropic	   modification	   had	   a	  huge	   pressure	   on	   the	   original	   ecosys-­‐tem.	  	  Veneto	  Region,	  represents	  quite	  a	  diversified	  area,	   in	   fact	  within	  the	  two	  hundreds	   kilometres	   of	   regional	   sur-­‐face,	   there	   are	   much	   diversified	   land-­‐scapes,	   from	   Mediterranean	   environ-­‐ments	   to	   arctic	   or	   semi-­‐arctic	   ecosys-­‐tems	   on	   the	   dolomite	   glaciers	   (see	   Fi-­‐gure	  3)	   that	  did	  not	   limit	   the	  develop-­‐ment	  of	  industrial	  district	  model	  based	  on	   small-­‐medium-­‐size	   enterprises	  (SMEs).	   Since	   the	   70s,	   this	   model	   al-­‐lowed	  a	  fast	  economic	  development	  of	  the	   Region	  modifying	   the	   land	   use	   in	  the	   whole	   plain	   and	   hilly	   areas	   especially	   along	   the	   axis	   Verona-­‐Padua-­‐Treviso,	   where	   the	  continuum	  built-­‐up	   space	  has	  become	   the	  actual	   land	  matrix	   (urbanized	   country).	  Basically	  this	  urban	  framework	  ended-­‐up	  in	  the	  so	  well	  known	  “urban	  sprawl”;	  84%	  of	  Veneto	  popula-­‐tion	  is	  living	  in	  this	  area,	  the	  main	  user	  basin	  of	  the	  local	  mountain	  resources.	  In	  the	  plain	  and	  other	  flat	  areas	  at	  intermediate	  altitude	  the	  forest	  has	  been	  almost	  completely	  removed,	  first-­‐ly	   for	   the	  conversion	  of	   land	   into	  agricultural	  uses,	  more	   recently	   (in	   the	   last	  decades)	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  urbanization	  and	   industrialization	  processes.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  mountain	  area	  with	  low	  population	  density	  –	  108	  inhabitants/km2	  (ISTAT	  2007)	  has	  maintain	  the	  typi-­‐cal	  alpine	  forest	  landscape.	  The	  economic	  situation	  is	  rather	  heterogeneous	  and	  changes	  even	  from	  one	  valley	  to	  the	  contiguous	  one.	  In	  some	  areas,	  mostly	  in	  the	  Dolomites’	  valleys,	  a	  well-­‐established	   touristic	   industry	  both	   in	   summer	  and	   in	  winter	  has	  developed;	   this	  has	  meant	  employment	  and	  revenues	  for	  local	  people	  but	  also	  environmental	  conflicts	  on	  the	  use	  of	  nat-­‐ural	  resources.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  more	  remote	  Alpine	  valleys	  are	  affected	  by	  problems	  of	  depopulation;	  unemployment	  and	  land	  abandonment	  connected	  with	  serious	  environmental	  degradation	  problems.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  mountain	  system	  was	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  Veneto	  Region	  which	  is	  considered	  ‘mountainous’	  and	  will	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  ‘case-­‐study	  ar-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  part	  has	  been	  written	  as	  introductory	  part	  of	  the	  NEWFOREX	  project	  by	  the	  thesis	  author	  and	  revised	  by	  the	  other	  co-­‐authors	  (Deliverable	  2.1).	  2	  http://www.alpconv.org	  2	  http:// .alpconv.org	  
Figure	  3.	  The	  case	  study	  area	  
ea’	  throughout	  in	  this	  work.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  work	  in	  a	  scenario	  homogenous	  in	  terms	  of	  admin-­‐istrative	   organisation,	   institutions	   and	   stakeholders,	   policies	   (forest	   policies,	   sometimes	   fo-­‐cused	  especially	  on	  mountain	  areas),	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  background.	  The	  chosen	  ar-­‐ea	   is	  relevant	   in	  terms	  of	  production	  of	  key	  externalities	   linked	  to	   forest	  and	  to	   forest	  man-­‐agement,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  define	  rather	  precisely	  options	  in	  forest	  management	  scenarios	  and	  is	  large	  enough	  to	  include	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  forest	  holdings	  on	  which	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  sur-­‐vey	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  provision	  of	  forest	  externalities	  Already	  regional	  government	  has	  tried	  to	  preserve	   the	  mountainous	   area,	   implementing	   several	   environmental	   laws.	   Since	   the	   early	  80s,	   the	   regional	   act	   40/84	   has	   introduced	   in	   Veneto	   the	   possibility	   to	   preserve	   ecological	  amenities	  by	  the	  institution	  of	  Regional	  parks.	  Nevertheless,	  due	  to	  the	  several	  complain	  gen-­‐erated	  by	  local	  dwellers,	  they	  had	  only	  spot-­‐like	  impact	  on	  ecological	  conservation.	  Later	  on,	  in	  the	  90s	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  habitat	  (92/43/CEE)	  and	  Bird	  directives	  (79/409/CEE)	  within	  the	  national	  legislative	  system	  stimulated	  a	  different	  approach	  on	  the	  ecosystem	  con-­‐servation.	  In	  fact	  it	  was	  drafted	  to	  allow	  forest	  owners	  to	  maintain	  their	  activities,	  and	  com-­‐pensating	  through	  the	  rural	  development	  plan	  those	  companies	  (mainly	  farm)	  that	  have	  high	  ecological	  impacts:	  first	  step	  toward	  green	  economy	  and	  environmental	  service	  market,	  core	  issue	  on	  the	  present	  work.	  	  
3.2. The	  case	  study	  area	  The	   case-­‐study	   area	   has	   a	   total	   area	   of	   668,130	   hectares	   and,	   according	   to	   the	   last	   Census	  (2000)	  a	  population	  of	  729,541	  inhabitants	  (ISTAT	  2007)..	  The	   largest	  part	  (84%)	  of	  this	  of	  this	   population	   lives	   in	  urban	   settlements	   (small	   towns	   and	  villages),	   located	   in	   valley	  bot-­‐toms,	  the	  remaining	  in	  hamlets	  of	  a	  few	  houses	  or	  in	  isolated	  farms.	  The	  population	  dynamics	  in	  the	  area	  are	  those	  common	  to	  the	  Italian	  mountain	  areas,	  indicating	  population	  ageing:	  the	  age-­‐index	  (ratio	  between	  population	  aged	  65	  and	  more	  and	  that	  aged	   less	  than	  14	  years)	   is	  138.6	  (whole	  Veneto	  Region:	  135.7,	  Italy:	  131.4);	  the	  rate	  of	  natural	  population	  decrease	  is	  -­‐0.6	  per	  thousand	  inhabitants	  (compared	  to	  +0.7	  for	  the	  whole	  Veneto	  region).	  This	  decrease	  is	  partially	  compensated	  by	   immigration,	  so	  that	  the	  total	  rate	  of	  population	  growth	  is	  3.6	  ‰.	  Always	  according	  to	  ISTAT	  (2007).,	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  the	  area	  is	  rather	  low	  (3.5%),	  and	   lower	   than	   that	   of	   the	  whole	  Veneto	  Region	   (4.1%):	   this	   labour	   is	  mostly	   employed	   in	  some	   rather	   important	   industrial	   activities	   (42.8%	  of	   total	   employment)	  –	  mostly	   electrical	  appliances	  and	  spectacles	  in	  the	  Province	  of	  Belluno	  –	  and	  in	  services	  (mostly	  tourism).	  How-­‐ever,	   there	   are	   rather	   relevant	   differences	   amongst	   the	   unemployment	   rates	   of	   the	   areas	  nearer	  to	  the	  plain	  (2.8%)	  and	  those	  of	  the	  inner	  valleys	  (twice	  as	  much).	  The	  Veneto	  Region	  is	   the	   leading	   Italian	   Region	   for	   number	   of	   tourists	   (about	   60	   million	   each	   year)	   and	   the	  mountain	  areas	  of	  the	  region	  benefit	  of	  this	  flow.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  accommodation	  potential	  of	  129	  units	   (hotels,	  B&B	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  accommodation)	  per	  square	  km	   in	   the	  mountain	  areas,	  which	  is	  low	  if	  compared	  with	  that	  of	  the	  whole	  Region	  (218),	  but	  high	  if	  compared	  to	  the	   average	   Italian	   situation	   (38).	   The	   recent	   inclusion	   of	   the	   famous	  Dolomites	  mountains	  (80%	  located	  in	  Belluno	  province)	  in	  the	  list	  of	  sites	  of	  the	  UNESCO	  World	  Heritage	  will	  prob-­‐ably	  contribute	  to	  increase	  the	  touristic	  flow	  in	  future.	  	  	  The	  mountain	  areas	  of	  Veneto	  are	  mostly	  characterised	  by	  agricultural	  and	   forest	  activities.	  The	  two	  are	  intimately	  connected	  (most	  of	  the	  private	  forests	  are	  within	  farms)	  and	  are	  both	  important	   in	   shaping	   the	  characteristic	  mountain	   landscape	  and	  creating	  positive	  externali-­‐ties.	  According	  to	  the	  last	  Agricultural	  Census	  (ISTAT	  2007).,	  the	  total	  UAA	  of	  the	  case-­‐study	  area	   is	   101,800	   hectares,	   distributed	   amongst	   crops,	   orchards,	   grazing	   and	   meadows	   as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.	  The	  Statistic	  Atlas	  of	  mountain	  areas	  in	  Italy	  reports	  that,	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	  area,	  there	  are	  about	  5.6	  farms	  per	  km2,	  (the	  indicator	  for	  the	  whole	  Region	  is	  10.4),	  and	  that	  
the	   average	   area	  per	   farm	   is	  10.3	  hectares	  including	   the	   forest	   area	   and	   4.0	   hectares	  considering	  only	  the	  UAA.	  	  According	   to	   the	  Veneto	  Region,	   the	   forest	  land	  of	  the	  whole	  Region	  was	  414,893	  hec-­‐tares	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century;	  the	  data	  of	  the	  more	   recent	  National	   Forest	   Inventory	  of	   2009	   show	   that	   this	   area	   has	   increased	  now	  up	  to	  446,698	  hectares	  (including	  both	  FAO	   categories	   of	   ‘forests’	   and	   ‘other	  wooded	   land’)3.	   Veneto	   contributes	   with	  4.2%	   to	   the	   total	   Italian	   forest	   area	   and	  79.5%	   of	   this	   forest	   land	   is	   located	   in	   the	  mountain,	  therefore	  in	  our	  case-­‐study	  area.	  In	   terms	   of	   composition	   the	   forest	   area	   of	  the	   Veneto	   Region	   is	   very	   rich	   of	   species	  (Figure	   5).	   Of	   the	   total	   446	   thousand	   hec-­‐tares,	   88%	   is	   forestland,	   0.6%	   plantations	  and	  11.7%	  other	  wooded	  land.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  produce	  a	  coherent	  picture	  of	   the	   forest	  situation	   in	   the	   case-­‐study	   area,	   especially	  as	   regards	   forest	   ownership	   structure,	   be-­‐cause	  we	  need	   to	   rely	  on	  different	   sources	  based	  on	  different	  definitions	  and	  perspec-­‐tives	  (for	  example,	  most	  of	   the	  data	  do	  not	  allow	   to	   distinguish	   the	   forests	   located	   in	  mountain	   areas	   from	   those	   located	   in	   the	  plain).	   The	   data	   in	   Figure	   4	   show	   that	   the	  Province	  of	  Belluno	  alone	   (which	   is	   totally	  mountainous)	   accounts	   for	  more	   than	   half	  of	   the	   whole	   forest	   area	   of	   the	   Region.	   In	  addition,	   forest	   in	  mountain	   areas	   are	   also	  located	   in	   the	   Provinces	   of	   Verona	   and	   Vi-­‐cenza.	  Table	  1	  reports	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  forest	  area	  (excluding	  the	  ‘other	  wooded	  land’)	  re-­‐ferred	  to	  the	  whole	  Veneto	  Region	  (not	  only	  mountain)	  according	  to	  type	  of	  land	  owner-­‐ship.	  It	  shows	  that	  67%	  of	  the	  forest	  land	  is	  private,	   the	   remaining	   33%	   is	   public.	   The	  private	   forestland	   belongs	   mainly	   to	   indi-­‐viduals,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  collective	  properties	  (labelled	   as	   ‘other	   private	   bodies’),	   which	  are	   the	  most	   important	   landowner	   in	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In	  Italy,	  historical	  data	  on	  forest	  and	  forest	  ownership	  structure	  are	  available	  at	  least	  from	  three	  different	  sources:	  a.	  the	  National	  and	  Re-­‐gional	  forest	  Statistics	  produced	  by	  ISTAT	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  XX	  century;	  b.	  the	  Agricultural	  Census	  (always	  published	  by	  ISTAT	  every	  10	  years	  starting	  from	  the	  years	  ‘50ies;	  the	  last	  one	  is	  of	  the	  year	  2000)	  c.	  the	  last	  National	  Forest	  Inventory	  (published	  in	  2009,	  with	  data	  from	  2005).	  Although	  the	  system	  of	  providing	  forest	  data	  has	  recently	  (i.e.	  with	  the	  last	  National	  Forest	  Inventory)	  gone	  through	  a	  reform	  process	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  coherent	  data	  amongst	  the	  different	  sources	  (especially	  harmonising	  the	  definition	  of	  forest	  area),	  there	  are	  still	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  data	  referred	  to	  time	  periods	  before	  the	  reform,	  so	  the	  figures	  are	  not	  always	  comparable.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  forest	  area	  noted	  for	  the	  Veneto	  Region	  is	  meaningful	  of	  the	  generalised	  natural	  expansion	  of	  forests	  in	  mountain	  areas	  due	  to	  depopulation	  and	  land	  abandonment	  linked	  to	  decrease	  of	  active	  agriculture. 
	  Figure	  6:	  Distribution	  of	  UAA	  (101,800	  hec-­‐tares)	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	  area	  
	  Figure	  5:	  Forests	  in	  the	  Veneto	  Region	  
	  Figure	   4:	   Distribution	   of	   forestland	  amongst	  Veneto’s	  provinces	  
Alpine	   valleys.	   The	   public	   forestland	   be-­‐longs	  mostly	   to	  Municipalities,	   while	   the	  State	   has	   a	  much	   smaller	   share	   of	   public	  forestland,	  generally	  the	  Nature	  Reserves	  and	  other	  protected	  areas.	  The	  data	  reported	  in	  Table	  2	  come	  from	  a	  different	   source	   of	   data,	   i.e.	   the	   Agricul-­‐tural	   Census	   of	   2000,	   the	   only	   source	  where	   we	   can	   find	   data	   specific	   on	   the	  forests	  of	  the	  mountain	  area	  (ref.	  footnote	  4).	   These	   data	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	  representation	   of	   the	   forest	   area	   still	  managed	   by	   the	   owner	   and	   not	   aban-­‐doned.	   Not	   considering	   the	   area	   with	  plantations,	  that	  is	  negligible	  and	  not	  sig-­‐nificantly	  contributing	  to	  the	  production	  of	  positive	  externalities,	  we	  can	  see	  that,	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	   area,	   nearly	   14,000	   forest	   holdings	   have	   been	   counted,	   managing	   a	   little	   less	   than	  158,000	   hectares	   of	   forestland.	  However,	   if	  we	   look	   only	   at	   the	   area	  with	   high	   forests,	   the	  number	   of	   forest	   holding	   decreases	   sharply	   to	   2,857	   on	   a	   forest	   area	   of	   a	   little	  more	   than	  90,000	  hectares.	  The	  data	  do	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  private	  or	  public	  landowner-­‐ship	  of	  these	  forest	  estates.	  	  	  Table	  2:	  Number	  of	  forest	  holdings	  and	  their	  forest	  area	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	  area	  
	   Number	  of	  forest	  holdings	   Forest	  area	  of	  forest	  holdings	  WITH	  FOREST	  AREA	   13,992	   157,756	  with	  high	  forest	   2,857	   91,925	  with	  Conifer	  high	  forests	   906	   69,586	  with	  Broadleaves	  high	  forests	   782	   5,325	  with	  mixed	  high	  forests	  	   1,453	   17,015	  with	  coppices	   11,983	   65,787	  with	  Mediterranean	  maquis	   12	   4.413	  WITH	  PLANTATIONS	   141	   2.556	  	  	  	  	  for	  production	  of	  Chistmas	  trees	   12	   549	  	  	  	  	  for	  17nergy	  production	   126	   1.737	  	  	  	  	  for	  industrial	  destination	   3	   270	  Source:	  ISTAT,	  2012	  	  Finally,	   Figure	   7	   shows	   clearly	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  forestland	  ownership	   in	   the	   case-­‐study	  area	   is	   based	   on	   very	   small-­‐holdings,	  being	  most	  of	  them	  in	  the	  two	  class	  sizes	  from	  2	  to	  10	  hectares.	   Only	   109	   holdings	  own	   a	   forest	   area	   larger	   than	  100	   hectares,	   respectively	   85	  with	   Conifer	   high	   forests	   and	  24	   with	   Broadleaves.	   In	   the	  case	   study	   area,	   as	   elsewhere	  in	   Italy,	   there	   is	   a	   relatively	  high	   number	   of	   diverse	   stake-­‐holders	  dealing	  with	   the	   forest	  
Table	  1:	  Distribution	  of	  Veneto	  Region	  forest	  by	  ownership	  type	  
	  
Private	  Ownership	   267.590	  Individual	  forest	  owners	   223.095	  Companies	   4.078	  Other	  private	  bodies	   31.856	  Not	  determined	   8.560	  
Private	  Ownership	   129.960	  State	   28.577	  Municipalities	   97.648	  Other	  public	  bodies	   3.735	  Not	  determined	  	   0	  Source:	  National	  Forest	  Inventory,	  2009	  
Figure	  7:	  Distribution	  of	  forest	  holdings	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	  area	  by	  class	  of	  land	  size	  
	  	  
sector.	  Their	  number	  and	  diversification	  reflect	  a	  complex	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  institutional-­‐political	   context,	   mainly	   due	   to	   a	   strong	   but	   incomplete	   decentralisation	   process	   occurred	  since	  the	  ’60-­‐70ies.	  On	  one	  hand,	  while	  in	  theory	  several	  competencies,	  included	  forest	  man-­‐agement,	  have	  been	  transferred	  from	  the	  State	  to	  the	  21	  Administrative	  Regions	  and	  Autono-­‐mous	  Provinces,	  a	  real	  power-­‐devolution	  is	  still	  lacking,	  while	  in	  addition	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  at-­‐titude	  of	  the	  regional	   forest	  authorities	  to	  keep	  under	  their	  direct	  control	  any	  forest-­‐related	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (neo-­‐centralism).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  political	  and	  social	  willing-­‐ness	  to	  maintain	  cultural	  identities	  al	  local	  level	  seems	  to	  be	  strong	  too	  (with	  for	  example	  the	  so-­‐called	  Regole,	   i.e.	  community-­‐based	  ancient	   institutions	  for	  forests	  and	  pastures	  manage-­‐ment	  in	  mountain	  areas).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  incomplete	  and	  complex	  decentralisation	  process,	  competencies	  on	   forestry	  and	   related	   sectors	  –	   like	  environment	  protection,	   game	  manage-­‐ment,	   land	  planning,	  etc.	  –	  have	  been	  split	  and	  distributed	  among	  various	  public	  authorities	  acting	   at	   different	   geographical	   and	   political	   levels	   (State,	   Regions,	   Provinces,	   Mountain	  Communities,	  Municipalities,	  National	  Parks,	  Regional	  Agencies,	  etc.),	  with	  unavoidable	  over-­‐lapping	  of	  competencies	  and	  roles	  and	  significant	  risks	  of	  potential,	  latent	  or	  real	  conflicts.	  In	   the	   case	   study	  area,	   the	  main	   role	   for	  policymaking,	   forest	   law	  enforcement,	   forest	  plan-­‐ning,	   tree	   felling	   authorisation,	   management	   of	   EU	   funds	   under	   Rural	   Development	   Pro-­‐gramme	  belongs	  to	  the	  Veneto	  Region,	  which	  is	  organised	  in	  a	  central	  technical	  structure	  –	  i.e.	  the	   “Dipartimento	   Foreste	   ed	   Economia	   Montana”	   (Department	   for	   Forestry	   and	   Mountain	  Economy)	  –	  directly	  under	  the	  Regional	  Ministry	  for	  Agriculture	  and	  Forestry	  and	  located	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Mestre-­‐Venezia	  –	  and	  seven	  peripherical	  structures,	  the	  Servizi	  Forestali	  Region-­‐ali	   (Regional	  Forest	   Services),	   one	   for	  each	  Province.	   In	  mountain	  areas,	   at	   a	  more	  detailed	  scale,	   special	   associations	   of	   mountain	   Municipalities	   called	   Comunità	   Montane	   (Mountain	  Communities	  Authority	  -­‐	  MCA)	  are	  instituted	  by	  law,	  providing	  aggregated	  technical	  and	  ex-­‐tension	  services	   in	  agricultural	  and	   forests	   to	  public	  and	  private	   forest	  owners.	   In	   the	  case-­‐study	  area	  they	  are	  19,	  at	  the	  moment.	  	  
Veneto	  Agricoltura	  is	  the	  Agency	  of	  the	  Veneto	  Region	  dealing	  with	  R&D	  in	  forest	  and	  agricul-­‐ture	  and	  managing	  directly	  (with	  its	  own	  personnel)	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  public	  forest	  estate	  be-­‐longing	  to	  the	  Veneto	  Region	  (about	  16,000	  hectares).	  Professional	   organisations	   like	  Coldiretti,	  CIA	   and	  Confagricoltura	   provide	  mainly	   extension	  services	  to	  farmers	  and	  forest	  landowners	  (however,	  given	  the	  low	  liveliness	  of	  the	  forest	  sec-­‐tor,	  they	  are	  more	  active	  in	  agriculture	  than	  in	  forestry).	  	  The	  most	  important	  landowners	  in	  the	  case	  study	  area	  are	  the	  community-­‐based	  institutions	  called	  Regole	  and	  Comunioni	  familari	  (51	  in	  Veneto,	  of	  which	  50	  in	  Belluno	  and	  1	  in	  Vicenza	  province.	  Forests,	  pastures	  and	  agricultural	   lands	  are	  commonly	  owned	  by	  the	  ancient	  resi-­‐dents	  of	  the	  mountain	  areas;	  on	  one	  hand,	  they	  have	  the	  private	  right	  to	  use	  their	  lands	  and	  related	   resources	   (e.g.	   timber,	   firewood,	   pasture,	   etc.),	   but	   they	   share	   the	   common	   duty	   to	  maintain	  or	  improve	  their	  resources	  for	  future	  generations	  by	  re-­‐investing	  in	  forest	  manage-­‐ment	  and	  implementing	  proper	  management	  practices.	  While	  few	  of	  them	  are	  characterised	  by	   a	   long	   history	   and	   strong	   traditions,	   being	   continuously	   active	   since	   centuries	   (Regole	  
d’Ampezzo),	  most	  of	   them	  have	  been	  quite	   recently	   restored	  by	   law	   (Veneto	  Region	  Law	  N.	  26/1996),	  having	   their	   forestland	  tenure	  rights	  been	  assumed	  by	   local	  Municipalities	   in	   the	  past.	  These	  recently	  restored	  Regole	  might	  be	  quite	  weak	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  and	  economic	  re-­‐sources,	   thus	   often	   lacking	   legal,	   technical	   and	   administrative	   competencies	   on	   forest	  man-­‐agement	   (and	   thus	   having	   limited	   or	   no	   capacity	   of	   innovation,	   long-­‐term	   planning,	   re-­‐investments,	  etc.).	  A	  part	  from	  the	  above	  mentioned	  community-­‐based	  ownership,	  there	  is	  a	  number	  of	  private	  forest	  owners,	  who	  are	  sometimes	  associated	   into	  consortia	  or	  similar	  organised	  structures	  (local	  associations).	  Even	   if	  only	   few	  forest	  owners	  associations	  are	  active	   in	   the	  case-­‐study	  area,	  some	  of	  them	  might	  be	  relevant	  because	  they	  are	  involving	  more	  than	  100	  small	  or	  very	  
small	  forestland	  owners	  and/or	  both	  forest	  owners	  and	  forest	  enterprises	  specialised	  in	  log-­‐ging	  or	  other	   forest	  management	  operations.	  The	  most	  relevant	  ones	  are	   located	   in	  Belluno	  province	   (Associazione	  Monte	  Grappa	  and	  COGEFOR).	  All	   the	   remaining	   single	  private	   forest	  owners	  are	  high	  fragmented	  (3.2	  ha/forest	  as	  an	  average),	  dispersed	  and	  often	  no	  longer	  in-­‐terested	   in	   their	   forestlands	   (e.g.	   because	   the	   young	   generations	  moved	   to	   urban	   areas	   for	  employment	  in	  sectors	  other	  than	  agriculture	  and	  forest	  and	  therefore	  lands	  have	  been	  aban-­‐doned).	  	  	  	  	  Chartered	  Professional	  Forests	  are	  grouped	  under	  specific	  registered	  associations	  called	  Or-­‐
dini	  dei	  Dottori	  Agronomi	  e	  Forestali,	  organised	  on	  a	  provincial	  base.	  Those	  dealing	  with	  our	  case-­‐study	  area	  are	  based	  in	  Belluno,	  Verona	  and	  Vicenza.	  Issues	   of	   sustainable	   forest	  management	   is	   dealt	  with	   by	   the	   two	  main	   Forest	   Certification	  Schemes	  active	  	  in	  the	  Region:	  PEFC	  and	  FSC	  (the	  latter	  has	  its	  main	  headquarters	  in	  Legnaro,	  at	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Agriculture).	  About	  35,000	  hectares	  of	  forests	  are	  PEFC	  certified	  at	  the	  mo-­‐ment	  in	  the	  case-­‐study	  area,	  while	  none	  is	  under	  the	  FSC	  scheme	  (even	  if	  pre-­‐feasibility	  stud-­‐ies	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  to	  assess	  the	  possibility	  to	  obtain	  also	  the	  FSC	  certification	  in	  some	  special	  forests	  like	  Cansiglio).	  The	  PEFC	  certified	  forests	  are	  mainly	  belonging	  to	  PEFC	  Veneto,	  the	   regional	   forest	  management	   certification	   initiative	   firstly	   launched	   and	   financed	   by	   the	  regional	   public	   authority;	   a	   number	   of	   the	   community-­‐based	   institutions	   called	  Regole	   are	  participating	  into	  the	  regional	  scheme.	  Finally,	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  its	  Departments	  are	   the	  main	  points	  of	   reference	  at	   regional	   level	   for	   research	  and	   teaching	   in	   the	  different	  forest	  disciplines.	  	  	  	   	  
4. The	  Legal	  framework	  on	  environmental	  resources4 The	  legal	  environmental	  framework	  is	  the	  principal	  non-­‐economic	  tool	  that	  the	  policy	  makers	  have	  set	  up	  to	  answer	  at	  the	  high	  demand	  of	  clean	  environment:	  in	  other	  words	  to	  fulfil	  the	  demand	  of	   forest	  and	  environmental	  externalities.	  The	  national	   legislative	  decree	  152/2006	  has	  been	  a	  national	  effort	  to	  clarify	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  the	  forest	  and	  environmental	  service	  users;	  however	  several	  other	  laws	  has	  set	  up	  use	  rights	  within	  several	  other	  laws,	  sometimes	  overlapping	  or	  stating	  opposite	  definition.	  Starting	  with	  the	  concept	  contained	  in	  the	  constitu-­‐tion	  we	  will	  introduce	  and	  describe	  the	  intricate	  legislative	  framework	  in	  which	  the	  potential	  roots	  of	  the	  environmental	  service	  market.	  
	  
4.1. Environmental	  rules	  and	  property	  rights The	   legal	   framework	   for	   the	   four	  considered	  externalities,	   recreation,	   carbon	  sequestration,	  water	  quality	  and	  biodiversity	  maintenance,	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  three	  national	  laws:	  the	  Con-­‐stitution,	  the	  first	  National	  Forest	  Act	  (issued	  in	  1923)	  and	  the	  Nature	  Conservation	  Act	  (is-­‐sued	  in	  1997).	  
• The	  Constitution	   (Const.),	   in	  article	  42,	   regulates	   in	  general	   terms	   the	  property	   right	  issue.	  Public	  or	  private,	   the	   land	  must	  ensure	   “public	  utilities”	  allowing	  everyone	  ac-­‐cess,	  hence	  the	  right	  to	  walk	  or	  to	  do	  other	  activities	  linked	  to	  public	  goods.	  Moreover,	  article	  41	  Const.	  and	  the	  third	  section	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code	  (C.C.)	  limit	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  pri-­‐vate	   ownership	   and	   other	   initiatives	   (profit-­‐oriented	   or	   not)	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	  public	  functions	  of	  land	  resources.	  	  
• The	  National	  Forest	  Act	  (Royal	  Decree	  3267/1923)	  was	  approved	  to	  enhance	  the	  sup-­‐ply	  of	  what	  use	  to	  be	  considered	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	   last	  century	  as	  the	  most	   im-­‐portant	   forest	   externality:	   land	   stability	   in	  mountain	  areas.	  The	  Act	  defines	  a	   special	  regime	  of	  protection	  (without	  compensation)	   for	  98%	  of	   the	   Italian	   forest	  resources,	  based	  on	   strict	   forest	  management	   rules	  and	  constraints	   to	   the	   forest	  owners.	  Other	  externalities	  were	   not	   considered	   in	   details,	   however	   the	   Act	   establishes	   that	   forest	  management	  plans	  (that	  are	  compulsory	   for	  public	   land	  and	  voluntary	   in	   the	  private	  forests),	  must	  take	  into	  account	  all	  the	  forest	  products	  and	  services	  (hence	  also	  the	  ex-­‐ternalities)	   for	   a	   wide	   set	   of	   stakeholders.	   Moreover,	   the	   forest	   law	   sets	   some	  measures	  (rarely	  implemented)	  for	  compensating	  forest	  owners	  in	  case	  the	  prescribed	  limitations	   affect	   their	   income.	   More	   recently	   the	   Act	   has	   been	   integrated	   and	   im-­‐proved	  with	  the	  aims	  to	  promote	  biodiversity	  preservation	  and	  market-­‐based	  mecha-­‐nisms	  in	  forest	  management	  (Legislative	  Decree	  227/2001,	  art.	  10-­‐12).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  concrete	  outcomes	  of	  this	  new	  regulation	  have	  been	  so	  far	  limited.	  	  
• Finally	  the	  Nature	  Conservation	  Act	  (D.P.R.	  357/1997)	  declared	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  enhance	  the	  biodiversity	  through	  specific	  actions	  aiming	  to	  the	  conservation	  of	  the	  habitats.	  Moreover,	   some	  measures	   of	   the	   recent	   Rural	   Development	   Programs	   pro-­‐vide	  compensations	  to	  the	  landowner	  for	  maintaining	  or	  improving	  the	  supply	  of	  eco-­‐system	  services.	  	  Altogether	  these	  regulations	  represent	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  for	  the	  forest	  exter-­‐nalities	  where	   the	  main	   target	   is	   to	  maintain	  and	  preserve	   the	  supply	  of	  some	  public	  goods	  without	  or	  with	  very	  limited	  compensations	  to	  the	  forest	  managers.	  	  Theoretically,	   the	  property	  rights	  of	   land	  use	  based	  externalities	  belong	  to	   the	   forest	  owner	  (art.	   820	   and	   832	   C.C.)	   as	   outputs	   associated	   to	   farm	   and	   forest	   productions.	   In	   general,	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  part	  has	  been	  written	  as	  introductory	  part	  of	  the	  NEWFOREX	  project	  by	  the	  thesis	  author	  and	  revised	  by	  the	  other	  co-­‐authors	  (Deliverable	  4.1).	  
does	  not	  matter	  if	  the	  landowner	  is	  willing	  or	  not	  to	  produce	  externalities,	  because	  the	  prop-­‐erty	  rights	  extend	  over	  the	  so	  called	  “hanging	  fruits”.	  The	  externalities	  may	  also	  be	  sold	  by	  the	  owner	  (art.	  1148	  C.C.)	  or	  exploited	  by	  any	  stakeholders	  having	  the	  use	  right	  (art.	  1021	  C.C.).	  	  Actually,	  the	  present	  property	  right	  legislation	  has	  been	  developed	  with	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  while	  there	  are	  few	  specific	  indications	  about	  forest	  externalities,	  mainly	  linked	  to	  recreational	  and	  water	  regulation	  services.	  About	  the	  first	  issue,	  the	  Civil	  Code	  and	  specific	  laws	  define	  the	  property	  rights	  of	  wild	  fauna	  and	  non-­‐timber	  forest	  products	  (NTFPs)	  use.	  	  Both	  wild	  fauna	  (mammals	  and	  birds)	  and	  NTFPs	  are	  managed	  by	  public	  authorities	  that	  set	  the	  annual	  limits	  to	  users	  and	  the	  maximum	  quantity	  allowed	  (number	  of	  game	  or	  kilogram	  of	  NTFPs).	  More	  specifically,	  the	  entire	  bird	  and	  mammal	  populations	  are	  defined	  as	  “unavaila-­‐ble	  State	  property”,	  while	  other	   living	  organisms	  are	  not	   considered	  as	   such	   (art.	  826	  C.C.).	  This	  decision	   is	   linked	   to	   the	  massive	  presence	  of	  hunters	   in	   Italy5,	   a	   strong	   lobby	   that	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  defending	  their	  rights	  to	  free	  access	  to	  game	  resources.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  problems	  of	  competition	  and	  congestion	  of	  some	  non-­‐timber	  forest	  product	  harvesting	  ac-­‐tivities,	  like	  truffles	  and	  wild	  mushroom	  picking,	  lead	  an	  unsustainable	  exploitation	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  This	  problem	  was	  partially	  solved	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  proper-­‐ty	  right	   regulations	   (Act	  752/1985	  and	  Act	  352/1993),	  where	  a	  given	  picker	  may	  purchase	  the	  right	  to	  collect	  NTFPs.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  the	  efficiency	  of	  these	  systems	  of	  property	  right	  regulation	  has	  decreased	  due	  to	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  the	  control	  system	  implemen-­‐tation.	  In	  the	  meanwhile,	  new	  market-­‐based	  initiatives	  have	  been	  put	  into	  practice	  (Pettenella	  and	  Kloehn	  2007),	  having	  a	  great	   impact	  on	   rural	   areas	   in	   terms	  of	   revenue	  generation	   for	  forest	  owners	  and	  employment	  opportunities	  creation	  along	  the	  local	  supply	  chain.	  	  A	  special	  case	  is	  the	  water	  property	  right	  regulation	  system	  that	  was	  set	  up	  in	  the	  early	  30s	  of	  last	  century	  and	  then	  reconsidered	  in	  1994	  by	  the	  Galli’s	  law6	  (Act	  36/1994).	  According	  to	  the	  law,	  the	  water	  belongs	  to	  the	  State	  except	  in	  one	  case,	  when	  the	  rain	  is	  gathered	  by	  the	  private	  owner	  in	  its	  estate	  (art.	  909	  C.C.	  and	  following	  articles).	  Anyway,	  the	  Galli’s	  law	  set	  up	  an	  im-­‐port	  issue:	  the	  indirect	  compensation	  to	  the	  forest	  owners	  through	  an	  extra	  payment	  by	  the	  drinkable	  water	   users	   included	   in	   the	  water	   bill.	   Actually,	   this	   payment	   is	   regulated	   by	   re-­‐gional	  public	  authorities	  that	  are	  responsible	  of	  transferring	  the	  payments	  to	  the	  local	  moun-­‐tain	   authorities.	   These	   authorities	   finance	   specific	   forest	  management	   activities	   in	   order	   to	  maintain	  and	  enhance	  the	  role	  of	  mountain	  forests	  located	  in	  the	  catchment	  area	  in	  water	  cy-­‐cle	  regulation	  and	   land	  erosion	  control.	  Here,	   indirectly	  the	  main	  beneficiaries	  are	  often	  the	  forest	  owners,	  because	  the	  forest	  investments	  are	  normally	  new	  infrastructures	  to	  reduce	  the	  forest	   management	   costs.	   Moreover,	   Galli’s	   law	   promotes	   the	   water	   management	   system	  driven	  by	  public	  companies	  (now	  also	  private	  ones	  after	  Act	  135/2009),	  within	  a	  single	  or	  a	  group	  of	  catchment	  basins.	   In	  the	  Veneto	  case	  study,	   the	  mechanism	  has	  been	   implemented	  just	  at	  the	  end	  of	  December	  2010	  through	  the	  Regional	  Act	  3483/2010.	  The	  first	  effect	  is	  the	  direct	   financing	  (around	  1	  M€/year)	  of	  mountain	  areas	  operations	  to	  enhance	  land	  stability	  and	  reduce	  soil	  erosion.	  Out	   of	   these	   cases,	   linked	  with	   land	  protection,	   recreational	   activities	   and	  water	   supply,	   all	  other	  externalities	  are	  not	   regulated	  by	   the	   law	  but	   they	  could	  be	   in	   theory	   traded	   through	  formal	  contracts	  between	  the	  forest	  owner	  and	  some	  economic	  agent.	  Examples	  are	  the	  con-­‐tracts	  signed	  within	  the	  CARBONMARK	  project7	  in	  the	  Veneto	  case	  study	  area,	  where	  the	  sup-­‐pliers,	  mainly	  municipal	  forest	  owners,	  sell	  carbon	  credits	  to	  small-­‐medium	  enterprises.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  the	  1970s	  the	  hunters	  represented	  3%	  of	  the	  Italians	  (i.e.	  almost	  2	  million	  people),	  while	  today	  their	  number	  has	  decreased	  to	  1%.	  	  6	  From	  the	  name	  of	  the	  main	  member	  of	  the	  Parliament	  who	  made	  the	  initial	  regulation	  proposal.	  7	  See	  www.carbonmark.org	  	  
As	   far	  as	   the	  biodiversity	  protection	  services	  are	  concerned,	   the	  high	   level	  of	   standards	   im-­‐posed	  by	  the	  ongoing	  forest	  legislation,	  based	  on	  close-­‐to-­‐nature	  silvicultural	  criteria,	  affects	  indirectly	  the	  maintenance	  of	  different	  habitats.	  Only	  quite	  recently,	  specific	  regulations	  have	  been	   implemented	   to	   define	   policies	   to	   protect	   some	   threatened	   species	   (DPR	   357/1997).	  Nevertheless,	  according	  to	  the	  present	  laws,	  the	  biodiversity	  service	  holder	  is	  again	  the	  forest	  owner,	  apart	   from	  the	   two	  already	  mentioned	  exceptions	   (mammals	  and	  birds)	   reported	   in	  the	  Civil	  Code.	  	  	  
4.2. Institutional	  Framework	  The	  Parliament	  or	  the	  Government	  may	  promote	  any	  law,	  while	  act	  proposals	  might	  be	  deliv-­‐ered	  to	  the	  Parliament	  through	  a	  draft	  law	  signed	  by	  at	  least	  fifty	  thousand	  people	  (art	  70-­‐71	  Const.).	  However,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environment	  legislation,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  and	  the	  Regional	  Governments	  have	  been	  the	  main	  promoters	  since	  now.	  In	  general,	  the	  approval	  of	  environmental	  and	  forest-­‐related	  laws	  at	  national	  level	  must	  be	  agreed	  by	  a	  State-­‐Regions	  Co-­‐ordination	  Committee.	  The	  Committee’s	  main	  tasks	  are	  the	  examination	  and/or	  the	  modifica-­‐tion	  of	  the	  drafts	  into	  a	  final	  proposal	  that	  may	  become	  law	  (art.	  72	  Const.).	  	  At	  national	  level,	  the	  environmental	  laws	  are	  generally	  promoted	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Envi-­‐ronment	  8	  or	  by	  the	  members	  of	   the	  National	  Environmental	  Council9.	  Here,	   technical	  aspects	  or	  new	  environmental	  laws	  are	  drafted	  and	  then	  delivered	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Environment	  to	  special	   Commissions	   (Environmental	   investment	   commission-­‐COVIS,	   Commission	   for	   envi-­‐ronmental	  impact	  evaluation	  or	  water	  commission),	  according	  to	  the	  competences,	  that	  give	  opinions	  about	  how	   to	   improve	  or	  modify	   the	   law.	  Once	   the	   law	  has	  been	  approved	  by	   the	  Parliament,	  the	  Regions	  have	  to	  incorporate	  it	  into	  the	  regional	  law.	  At	  this	  level,	  the	  Regional	  environmental	  commission	  (art.	  12	  regional	  Act	  33/198510)	  is	  assigned	  by	  the	  Regional	  Gov-­‐ernment	  to	  examine	  the	  national	  law,	  suggesting	  specific	  articles	  suitable	  for	  the	  local	  context	  implementation.	  Finally,	  the	  monitoring	  is	  driven	  by	  two	  different	  entities:	  Environment	  Pro-­‐tection	  Agency	  (ISPRA)	  and	  National	  Forest	  Corps	  (CFS).	  ISPRA	  is	  delegated	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  to	  collect	  information,	  develop	  guidelines	  and	  report	  the	  overall	  environmental	  law	  effects	  on	  the	  natural	  resources.	  CFS	  is	  on	  the	  contrary	  an	  effective	  forest	  police	  corps	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  law	  compliance	  in	  the	  field.	  The	  overall	  forest	  sector	  disorganization	  is	  affecting	  its	  output	  performance;	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  this	  problem	  is	  the	  lack	  private	  forest	  owner	  associations	  both	  at	  national	  and	  regional	  lev-­‐els11;	   this	   let	  the	  policy	  makers	  move	  freely	  on	  norms	  related	  to	  externality	  property	  rights.	  For	  instance,	  the	  implementation	  of	  harvesting	  mushroom	  law	  (Act	  352/1993)	  obliges	  a	  given	  picker	  to	  purchase	  the	  harvesting	  right	  (harvesting	  license)	  paying	  a	  government	  tax	  on	  the	  use	  of	  a	  private	  good	  such	  as	  wild	  mushrooms	  (WM).	  The	  revenue	  goes	  directly	  to	  the	  region-­‐al	  bank	  account	  without	  giving	  part	  of	  the	  income	  to	  the	  forest	  owners	  whether	  not	  expres-­‐sively	  requested.	  Other	  cases	  are	  referred	  to	  water	  use.	  As	  already	  mentioned	  upwards,	  water	  belong	  to	  the	  State,	  even	  though	  the	  Regions	  have	  the	  right	  to	  manage	  any	  water	  resources.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  private	  forest	  owner	  is	  only	  partially	  compensated	  in	  case	  the	  spring	  is	  used	  for	  drinkable	  water.	  The	  regional	  government	  gives	  him/her	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  money	  ac-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  http://www.minambiente.it	  -­‐	  main	  web	  page	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment.	  9	  The	  National	  Environmental	  Council	  is	  renewed	  every	  three	  years	  directly	  by	  the	  Environment	  Minister,	  and	  it	  gathers	  national	  environmental	  authorities,	  10	  regional,	  provincial	  and	  municipal	  delegates,	  15	  environmental	  NGOs,	  1	  national	  R&D	  delegate	  (CNR),	  1	  delegate	  of	  renewable	  energy	  agency	  (ENEA)	  and	  1	  delegate	  of	  the	  na-­‐tional	  energy	  company	  (ENEL)	  (http://www.minambiente.it).	  10	  http://www.consiglioveneto.it/crvportal/leggi/1985/85lr0033.html	  .	  11	  Italy	  is	  the	  only	  country	  in	  the	  EU	  without	  a	  representative	  of	  private	  forest	  owners	  within	  the	  Confederation	  of	  European	  Forest	  Owners	  (CEPF).	  
cording	   the	  surface	  covered	  by	   infrastructures	   (pump,	  water	  pipe,	  etc.),	  but	   in	  any	  case	   the	  compensation	  does	  not	  cover	  the	   loss	  of	   the	  potential	  water	  use.	  Moreover,	   the	  high	  cost	  of	  monitoring	  and	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  competences	  of	  local	  administrations	  increase	  the	  fraudu-­‐lent	  behaviour	  of	  the	  stakeholders,	  leading	  sometimes	  right-­‐right	  fights	  between	  the	  holder	  of	  local	  customary	  rights	  and	  the	  Regional	  administration.	  	  Finally,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  customary	  rights	  on	  forest	  externality	  provision	  can	  be	  brief-­‐ly	  considered.	  Customary	  rights,	  i.e.	  the	  free	  or	  partially	  free	  use	  rights	  to	  common	  goods	  by	  local	  dwellers,	  regard	  mainly	  the	  exploitation	  of	  some	  forest	  products	  like	  forage	  (grazing	  in	  the	   forests),	   fuelwood,	  NTFPs.	  Basically,	   these	  customary	  rights	  are	   in	  contrast	  with	  the	   im-­‐plementation	  of	  MBI	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  the	  right	  holders	  reduce	  the	  quantity	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  also	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  given	  forest	  externality.	  	  An	  example	  is	  the	  free	  harvest	  of	  NTFPs	  by	  the	  local	  mountain	   inhabitants,	  which	   affects	   the	   quantity	   of	   products	   available	   for	   the	   recrea-­‐tionalists	  that	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  NTFPs	  picking	  permits.	  Similarly	  the	  use	  of	  large	  amounts	  of	  water	  for	  irrigating	  mountain	  field	  affects	  the	  downstream	  water	  availability	  and	  also	  quali-­‐ty	  (for	  the	  high	  concentration	  of	  phosphate	  and	  nitrogen).	  	  
4.3. Main	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  ES	  market:	  forest	  owners	  and	  benefi-­‐
ciaries.	  
The	  suppliers.	  The	  mountain	  case	  study	  involves	  a	  wide	  group	  of	  forest	  owners.	  Nearly	  half	  of	   the	  414,894	  hectares	  of	   forest	   in	  Veneto	  region	  (22.5%	  of	   the	  total	  surface)	  are	  privately	  owned	  (single	  property,	  collective	  property,	  church	  property,	  NGOs,	  etc.)	  while	  the	  remaining	  parts	   is	   public	   (municipal,	   regional,	   State	   owned	   and	   other	   public	   and	   semi-­‐public	   institu-­‐tions),	  as	  already	  reported	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  private	  forests	  are	  fragmented	  and	  under	  a	  process	  of	  abandonment	  due	  to	  their	  low	   profitability,	   especially	   in	   the	   southern	  mountain	   part	   of	   the	   region.	   Only	   in	   collective	  properties,	   so	   called	   “Regole”	   (with	  management	  units	   ranging	   from	  some	  hundreds	   to	   few	  thousands	  hectares	  ),	  the	  forest	  owners	  have	  been	  able	  to	  maintain	  an	  active	  use	  of	  forest	  re-­‐sources,	  however	  forestland	  controlled	  by	  the	  Regole’s	  is	  quite	  limited.	  	  Public	  properties,	  covering	  the	  64%	  of	  the	  total	  regional	  forest	  surface	  (Dissegna	  and	  Carraro	  2007),	  have	  been	  more	  supported	  by	  public	  subsidies	  and,	  with	  some	  exceptions,	  are	  more	  ac-­‐tive	  in	  forest	  management,	  infrastructure	  development,	  and	  industrial	  wood	  harvesting.	  	  Only	  a	  couple	  of	  publications	  have	  examined	  in	  details	  the	  forest	  ownership	  issue	  in	  the	  case	  study	  area	  (Preto	  1985;	  Canton	  and	  Pettenella	  2010),	  and	  still	   the	  main	   information	  source	  remain	   the	  national	   statistical	   institute	   (ISTAT	  2007).	  Preto’s	   study	   investigated	   the	  change	  on	   forest	   owner	  work	   status	   from	  agriculture	   (once	   the	  48%	  of	   the	   forest	   owners)	   to	  non-­‐agricultural	  (51,6%).	  Recently,	  Canton	  and	  Pettenella	  (2010)	  describe	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Ve-­‐neto	   region	   the	   private	   forest	   owners’	  managerial	  motivations	   through	   a	   case	   study	   in	   the	  municipality	  of	  Recoaro	  Terme,	   in	   the	   southern	  part	  of	   the	  Veneto’s	  Alps.	  The	  paper	   shows	  that	  the	  forests	  are	  more	  important	  for	  their	  intangible	  values	  and	  firewood	  self-­‐consumption	  than	   for	   timber	   selling	  or	  other	   financial	   benefits.	  The	   forest	  owners	  have	  been	  grouped	   in	  three	  owner	  types	  having	  different	  motivations:	  1)	  Intangible	  Values,	  2)	  Multi-­‐objective	  own-­‐ers,	  3)	  Un-­‐interested	  owners	  (see	  Table	  3).	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  Forest	  owner	  characteristics.	  	  
Variable	   Sub-­‐variable	   Indicator	   1-­‐
Intangible	  
2-­‐Multi-­‐
objective	  
3-­‐Un-­‐
interest	  Demography	   Distance	  house-­‐forest	   mean	   18.5	   2.7	   6.9	  Age	   mean	   57.4	   50.5	   64.5	  Sons	  &	  daughters	   mean	   2.1	   1.1	   1.9	  
Employed	  	   %	   47.1	   71.4	   20	  Forest	  summer	  cot-­‐tage	   %	   50	   26.7	   0	  Land	  use	   Wood	  production	   %	   72.2	   100	   60	  Forest	  road	  mainte-­‐nance	   %	   61.1	   93.3	   30	  Reforestation	   %	   11.1	   40	   0	  Investments	   %	   22.2	   60	   0	  Main	  aims	   Forest	  road	  im-­‐provement	   %	   52.9	   80	   22.2	  Income	   %	   16.7	   53.3	   10	  Neighbour	  collaboration	  	   Good	  neighbour	  col-­‐laboration	   %	   88.9	   80	   44.4	  Information	   Regional	  forest	  ser-­‐vice	   %	   38.9	   80	   20	  Mountain	  community	  authority	   %	   33.3	   73.3	   10	  Knowledge	  about	  for-­‐est	  bureaucracy	   %	   94.4	   100	   66.7	  (Source:	  Canton	  and	  Pettenella	  2010).	  Note:	  All	  percentages	  are	  calculated	  within	  the	  forest	  owner	  group.	  	  	  The	  incentives	  to	  the	  forest	  owner	  are	  mainly	  driven	  by	  the	  forest	  measures	  of	  the	  Rural	  De-­‐velopment	  Program	  (RDP)	  of	  the	  Region	  (Pettenella	  and	  Maso	  2009)	  even	  though	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  forest	  acts	  prescribed	  a	  large	  set	  of	  specific	  actions	  (like	  those	  to	  promote	  forest	  associations	  that	  are	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  not	  supported	  by	  any	  public	  incentive	  nowadays).	  The	  main	  sources	  of	  incentives	  aimed	  to	  externalities	  provision	  are	  the	  first	  and	  second	  RDP	  axis	  where	  a	  set	  of	  specific	  measures	  have	  been	  implemented,	  such	  as	  incentives	  for:	  
• specific	  maintenance	   operations	   like	   grass	   keeping	   in	   the	   abandoned	  meadows	   (in	   order	   to	  contrast	  the	  process	  of	  forest	  expansion	  on	  abandoned	  grassland)	  	  
• forest	  selective	  cuttings;	  
• non-­‐productive	  operations	  for	  promoting	  MBM	  for	  carbon	  sequestration	  and	  biodiversity	  con-­‐servation.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  lack	  of	  awareness	  and	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  small	  private	  forest	  surface	  do	  not	  allow	  the	  access	  to	  the	  funds.	  Since	  now,	  less	  than	  10M€	  of	  the	  RDP	  funds	  have	  been	  spent	  on	   forest	  measures	   shared	  among	  300	  beneficiaries	   (~30,000€	  per	  demand	  on	  aver-­‐age).	  	  
The	  beneficiaries.	  Three	  out	  of	  four	  externalities	  have	  the	  national	  public	  as	  potential	  bene-­‐ficiary,	  and	  only	  water	  has	  a	  lower	  scale	  dimension	  (maximum	  at	  the	  level	  of	  hydrographical	  basin).	  CO2	  sink	  and	  biodiversity	  protection	  services	  can	  even	  be	  considered	  services	  with	  an	  international	  scale	  dimension,	  while	  recreation	  has	  manly	  a	  regional	  scale	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  groups	  and	  local	  associations;	  these	  consumers	  however	  can	  be	  the	  most	  accessible	  target	  to	   improve	   the	   awareness	   on	   other	   forest	   externalities.	   At	   the	  present	   situation	   the	  paying	  beneficiaries	  are	   the	  only	  ones	  mentioned	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  national	  or	  regional	  regula-­‐tions	  previously	  reported.	  	  	  	  
	   	  
4.4. Towards	  the	  market	  based	  mechanisms:	  the	  historical	  pattern	  at	  
national	  level	  The	  Mountain	  region,	  more	  than	  other	  rural	  areas,	  has	  been	  affected	  by	  a	  massive	  contraction	  of	  employment	  ratio	  as	  well	  as	  a	  general	  decrement	  of	  annual	  dwellers.	  Consequently,	  the	  ex-­‐odus	  raised	  a	  huge	  debate	  due	  to	  the	  land	  abandonment,	  main	  cause	  of	  hydraulic	   instability	  and	   forest	  disfunctionalities.	  Hence,	   local	  and	  regional	  public	  managers	  pushed	  the	  national	  government	  to	  legislate	  over	  particular	  issue	  like	  drinkable	  water	  supply,	  property	  right	  en-­‐forcement	  on	  NTFP	  use,	  and	  biodiversity	  maintenance,	  or	  roughly	  speaking,	  how	  manage	  the	  main	  forest	  externalities.	  Following	  the	  time	  order,	  the	  first	  market-­‐based	  mechanism	  imple-­‐mented	  was	  linked	  with	  the	  wild	  mushroom	  (WM)	  and	  truffle	  harvest.	  The	  welfare	  condition	  of	  the	  late	  1980s	  led	  people	  to	  spend	  a	  part	  of	  their	  free	  time	  on	  forest	  recreational	  activities	  (mostly	  in	  mountain	  areas)	  that	  rapidly	  moved	  to	  a	  generic	  congestion	  over	  specific	  common	  goods	   becoming	   scarce.	   Here,	   “right-­‐right”	   conflicts	   between	   producer	   and	   consumer12	  was	  solved	   implementing	   a	   specific	   law	   setting	   in	   both	   sides	   rights	   and	  duties	   linking	   one	   each	  other	  with	  a	  payment	  mechanism.	  The	   forest	  owner	  was	  allowed	   to	   sell	   the	   right	   to	   collect	  WM	  as	  compensation	  of	  the	  property	  right	  loss.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  “given	  picker”	  had	  to	  respect	  a	  certain	  behaviour	  reported	  firstly	  in	  the	  National	  Act	  752/1985.	  After	  almost	  three	  decades,	  the	  overall	  MBM	  output	  shows	  different	  performances,	  positive	  and	  negative,	  and	  in	  any	  case	  highlighting	  the	  general	  problem	  of	  the	  people	  fraudulent	  behaviour	  that	  difficultly	  reach	  the	  law	  compliance	  if	  no	  control	  exists.	  	  However,	  the	  top-­‐down	  approach	  imposes	  local	  administration	  to	  spend	  time	  and	  resources,	  while	  WM	  were	  not	  the	  target	  issue	  for	  their	  for-­‐ests.	   Lack	   of	   interest	   led	   consequently	   lower	   investments	   on	   WM	   issue,	   hence	   a	   general	  fraudulent	  behaviour	  of	  WM	  picker,	  like	  illegal	  harvest,	  that	  result	  on	  a	  lower	  income	  for	  the	  forest	  owners.	  Here,	  the	  difference	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  performance	  was	  linked	  singularly	  to	  human	  capital	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  the	  effort	  the	  local	  forest	  owners	  and	  managers	  put	  on	  WM	  picking	  organization.	  While	  the	  WM	  law	  implementation	  had	  a	  jeopardized	  good	  perfor-­‐mance,	   the	   local	   adoption	   of	   the	  WM	   law	   framework	   allows	   to	   build	   a	  more	   efficient	  MBM	  based	  on	  “actual	  people	  behaviour”.	  Another	  MBM	  enforced	  in	  the	  Mountain	  region	  was	  promoted	  by	  the	  Galli’s	  Act	  13/1994	  and	  its	  implementation	  at	  regional	  level.	  Basically	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach	  promoted	  by	  the	  central	  government,	   it	  was	   thought	   following	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  Mountain	   areas	   are	   “somehow”	   the	  source	  of	  water	  for	  the	  lower	  zones	  in	  plain	  area,	  hence	  worth	  to	  be	  protected.	  Due	  to	  the	  high	  operational	  costs	  of	  the	  companies	  operating	  within	  the	  mountain	  agro-­‐silvo-­‐pastoral	  system,	  principal	  mountain	  stability	  providers,	   a	   certain	  percentage	  of	   the	  user	  water	   tax13	  must	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  supplier	  identified	  on	  the	  Mountain	  Community	  Authority	  (MCA).	  Thereafter,	  the	  fund	  has	  been	  used	  to	  target	  specific	  agro-­‐silvo-­‐operations	  carried	  out	  by	  local	  entrepreneurs,	  considered	  the	  only	  one	  being	  able	  to	  enhance	  the	  stability	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  slope	  are-­‐as.	  Nevertheless,	   limitations	  of	  the	  MBM	  do	  exist	  and	  they	  are	  mainly	  related	  at	  least	  to	  two	  issue:	  first	  the	  lack	  scientific	  evidence	  of	  cause-­‐effect	  of	  the	  agro-­‐silvo-­‐operations	  and	  stability	  increment,	   second	   the	   incapability	  of	   the	  MCA	   to	  decrease	   the	   land	  abandonment.	  Anyhow,	  the	   law	  implementation	  since	  now	  is	   limited	  to	  the	  Piedmont	  Region,	  while	  the	   law	  ratifica-­‐tion	  has	  not	  occurred	  on	  the	  other	  regions	  yet.	  Thus,	  the	  lack	  of	  available	  data,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	   singular	   regional	   case	   on	   this	   issue	   and	   the	   long	   term	   orientation	   of	   the	   agro-­‐silvo-­‐operations	  do	  not	  allow	  to	  understand	  in	  practice	  the	  overall	  output	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  hence	  gather	  general	  achievable	  rules.	  In	  Italy,	  as	  well	  in	  the	  case	  study	  area,	  several	  soft	  ES	  market	  based	  mechanism	  has	  been	   introduced	   in	   the	   last	   three	  decades,	  briefly	   summarized	   in	   the	  follow	  paragraph.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Producer	  and	  consumer	  are	  considered	  the	  forest	  owners	  and	  NTFP	  pickers	  especially	  WM	  ones.	  13	  Piedmont	  Regional	  Law	  13/97	  set	  a	  percentage	  of	  5%	  of	  the	  water	  tax.	  
	  
• Taxes,	   charges,	   performance	   bonds.	   The	   general	   taxation	   on	   forest	   outcomes	   is	  based	  on	  the	  actual	  VAT	  law,	  which	  does	  not	  prescribe	  any	  particular	  form	  of	  compen-­‐sation	   for	   operation	   impacts.	  Nonetheless,	   specific	   taxes	   for	   the	   resource	  use	   impact	  are	  set	  in	  different	  national	  and	  regional	  acts.	  For	  instance,	  the	  3%	  of	  the	  water	  tariff	  are	  used	  to	  compensate	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  the	  forest	  owners.	  Moreover,	  the	  Region-­‐al	  Water	  Protection	  Plan14	  shows	  a	  possible	  tariff	  increment	  within	  the	  next	  five	  years	  due	   to	   the	   enhancement	   of	   water	   environmental	   standards	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   infra-­‐structure	   and	   financial	   investments	   (Regione	  Veneto	   2009a,	   see	   p.	   186).	   In	   practice,	  the	  actual	  cost	  per	  cubic	  meter,	  waving	  from	  0.92	  to	  2.67	  €/m3,	  will	  be	  increased	  up	  to	  the	  range	  1.63-­‐4.16	  €/m3	  (lower	  and	  upper	  tariff	  of	  drinkable	  water,	  0.49€/m3	  for	  in-­‐dustrial	   purposes)	   in	   the	  2016.	  Here,	   the	  policy-­‐maker	   targets	   clearly	   to	   the	   general	  reduction	  of	  the	  water	  use,	  an	  extremely	  valuable	  resource	  that	  at	  the	  present	  account	  for	  443M€.	  In	  addition,	  to	  the	  drinkable	  water,	  agricultural	  use	  is	  surely	  the	  sector	  that	  demands	  the	  higher	  quantity	  of	  water,	  around	  the	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  supply.	  Altogether,	  the	  marketed	  water	  economical	  value	  in	  Veneto	  region	  is	  estimated	  to	  1567M€,	  when	  just	   a	   1.1M€	  are	   used	   to	   compensate	   indirectly	   the	   forest	   owner	   in	  mountains	   area.	  Another	  taxation	  implemented	  at	  regional	  scale	  in	  Veneto,	  is	  the	  duty	  paid	  by	  the	  wild	  mushroom	  and	   truffle	   pickers	   in	   order	   to	  purchase	   the	   license15	  to	  harvest	   from	   the	  regional	  government.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   some	  cases	   the	   revenue	   from	  this	   taxation	  ex-­‐ceeds	   the	   income	  of	   the	   forest	  owner	  generated	  by	   the	  wild	  mushroom	  harvest	  per-­‐mits16.	  
• Subsidies	  and	  grants	  
o Subsides	   for	  Sustainable	  Forest	  Management.	  The	  Veneto	  region	  forest	  law	  (art.	  23,	  L.R.	  52/1978)	  prescribes	  the	  SFM	  in	  all	  the	  forest	  areas,	  even	  though	  it	  allows	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  freedom	  to	  the	  private	  forest	  owners.	  In	  general,	  the	  75%	  of	   the	   forest	  management	  plan	   (FMP)	  costs	  are	  paid	  by	   the	  region	  while	  the	   remaining	   parts	   by	   the	   local	  municipality,	   even	   if	   the	   forests	   are	   private.	  Today,	   the	   forest	   surface	   under	   a	   FMP	   has	   reached	   the	   61,8%	   (Dissegna	   and	  Carraro	  2007)	  of	  the	  total	  forested	  areas	  (see	  Figure	  8).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  Water	  Protection	  Plan	  in	  Veneto	  region	  has	  been	  implemented	  in	  2009	  according	  to	  the	  art.	  121	  of	  the	  environmental	  act	  152/2006.	  link:http://www.regione.veneto.it/Ambiente+e+Territorio/Ambiente/Acqua+e+difesa+del+suolo/Acqua/Ciclo-­‐Acqua/Pianificazione+Regionale/Piano+di+Tutele+delle+Acque.htm	  15	  The	  Wild	  Mushroom	  harvesting	  license	  costs	  29.24€	  every	  five	  years.	  16	  Local	  permits	  have	  variable	  costs	  according	  to	  the	  harvesting	  area	  and	  length	  of	  the	  permit	  itself.	  The	  daily	  harvesting	  permit	  cost	  between	  6.50	  and	  10€,	  while	  the	  annual	  one	  wave	  between	  32	  and	  77€.	  	  
	  Figure	  8.	  Forest	  under	  management	  plan.	  
	  	  Source:	  Dissegna	  and	  Carraro	  (2007).	  Note:	  green	  bars	  represents	  the	  forest	  surface	  under	  forest	  management	  plan;	  grey	  dots	  the	  number	  of	  forest	  management	  plans.	  	  
o Subsidies	   for	   regional	   parks	   and	   reserves.	   The	   regional	   government	   pro-­‐motes	   the	  regional	  parks	  and	  natural	  reserve	   in	  order	   to	  protect	  and	  enhance	  the	  environment	  and	  cultural	  patrimony.	  Being	  on	  the	  interest	  of	  all	  the	  region-­‐al	  citizens,	  Veneto	  region	  provides	  subsides	  to	  cover	  the	  administrative	  cost	  as	  well	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  nature	  conservation	  (L.R.	  40/1984).	  Moreover,	  wher-­‐ever	   it	   is	  possible,	   the	  park	  authority	  should	  stimulate	  market	  mechanisms	   to	  increase	  the	  financial	  sustainability.	  
o Subsidies	   for	  Natura	   2000	   areas.	  The	  regional	  government	   through	   the	  art.	  38	  Reg.	  CE	  1698/05	  and	  art.	  38,	  46	  Reg	  CE	  74/09	  of	  has	  built	  specific	  measures	  (mainly	  Veneto	  PSR-­‐2007-­‐2013	  measure	  213)	  to	  compensate	  farmers	  operating	  within	   the	   Natura	   2000	   areas.	   Nevertheless,	   direct	   effect	   on	   the	   potential	  132,500	  ha	  affected	  by	   the	  measure	  213,	  only	  a	  small	  part	  have	  been	  affected	  (7%	  of	  Natura	  2000	   farming	  area),	  while	   the	   forest	  measures	   (216,	  221,	  225,	  226,	  227)	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  44%	  (Regione	  Veneto	  2009b).	  
o Subsidies	   for	   forest	   consortiums.	  The	   regional	   law	  52/1978	  points	   out	   the	  need	  to	  rebuild	  the	  structure	  of	  private	  forest	  management,	  stepping	  from	  the	  self-­‐management	  to	  a	  more	  coordinated	  plan	  that	  help	  the	  cutting	  organization	  among	  the	  multitude	  of	  private	   forest	  owner.	  The	   target	   issue	  of	   this	   law	  was	  the	   increment	   of	   forest	   output	   performance,	   in	   terms	   of	   wood	   production	   as	  well	  as	  enhancement	  of	  forest	  externalities.	  	  
• Tradable	  permits.	  According	  to	  the	  national	  inventory	  report	  (ISPRA	  2010,	  p.	  258)	  all	  the	  land	  surfaces	  (grazing	  land,	  forest)	  are	  under	  a	  certain	  management	  system,	  hence	  also	  the	  carbon	  stocked	  in	  the	  abandon	  areas	  can	  be	  accounted	  in	  the	  national	  carbon	  inventory.	  This	  definition	  allows	  the	  Italian	  government	  to	  consider	  10.2	  Mt	  CO2,	  cor-­‐responding	  to	  the	  17.6%	  of	  the	  actual	  national	  target	  (the	  reduction	  of	  the	  6.5%	  from	  the	  1990	  CO2	   level	  equal	   to	  485.7	  Mt	  CO2).	  Nevertheless,	   the	   law	  120/2002	  does	  not	  consider	  any	  direct	  compensation	  to	  the	  forest	  owner	  that	  could	  be	  estimated	  to	  51M€	  considering	  a	  low	  price	  of	  5€/t	  CO2	  (Pettenella	  and	  Ciccalese	  2010).	  	  
• Offset	   schemes.	   The	   national	   law	   157/92	   sets	   the	   State	   property	   right	   over	   wild	  mammals	   and	   birds	   moving	   on	   the	   Italian	   surface.	   According	   to	   the	   civil	   code	   (art.	  2043	  and	  2052)	  and	  the	  art.	  8,	  paragraph	  “f”	  of	  the	  law	  157/92,	  the	  owner,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  State,	   is	  also	   the	  responsible	  and	  guarantor	  of	   the	  animal’s	  actions	  and	  the	  effect	  the	  animals	  have	  on	  other	  things.	  Even	  more	  specific,	  it	  is	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Cassation	  
Court	  (n.	  8953,	  2008/April/7th)	  that	  impose	  the	  national	  government,	  through	  the	  re-­‐gions,	  the	  direct	  compensation	  of	  all	  the	  wild	  animal	  damages,	  regardless	  the	  species.	  
• Mitigation	  banking.	  No	   implementation	  of	  such	  measures	  at	   the	  moment.	  The	  Lom-­‐bardy	  Region	  is	  planning	  to	  introduce	  this	  measure	  for	  compensating	  some	  new	  large	  infrastructure	  development	  works.	  
• Market	  creation	  and	  contractual	  arrangements.	  Private-­‐Public	  contracts	  have	  been	  signed	  recently	  within	  the	  CARBONMARK	  project.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  contract	  was	  the	  di-­‐rect	  compensation	  to	  the	  public	  forest	  owner	  because	  supplier	  of	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  CO2.	  The	  forest	  owner	  allows	  to	  store	  more	  carbon	  increasing	  the	  forest	  stock.	  At	  this	  level,	   it	  may	  sell	  or	   self-­‐use	   the	  carbon	  credits.	  Now	  the	   total	  number	  of	   formal	   con-­‐tracts	  is	  20,	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  in	  the	  next	  years.	  Out	  of	  this	  is-­‐sue,	  the	  example	  of	  another	  market	  creation	  is	  surely	  the	  adventure	  parks.	  Still	  quite	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  site	  number	  (6	  recorded	  sites)	  and	  managed	  surface,	  they	  are	  locat-­‐ed	  mainly	  next	  to	  the	  urban	  infrastructure	  in	  mountain	  areas.	  Much	  more	  complex,	  it	  is	  the	  Wild	  Mushroom	  harvest	  market	  scheme	  (L	  352/1993	  and	  LR	  23/1996).	  Basically,	  it	  is	  divided	  by	  land	  tenure	  right	  (public	  or	  private)	  and	  type	  of	  picker	  (forest	  owner	  or	  real-­‐right	  holder,	  pickers	   living	   in	  mountain	  areas	  and	   living	   in	  plain).	  Except	   for	   the	  local	  dwellers	  and	  private	   forest	  owners,	  all	   the	  others	  have	   to	  purchase	   the	  right	   to	  pick	  (picking	  badge-­‐license	  purchase)	  and	  then	  compensate	  the	  mountain	  forest	  own-­‐er	  through	  a	  direct	  payment	  of	  a	  picking	  permit	  to	  the	  local	  forest	  management	  author-­‐ity,	  which	  generally	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  Mountain	  Community	  or	  the	  Municipality	  Authorities	   (see	   paper	   “Comparing	  Profitability	  and	  Governance	   for	  Recreational	  Wild	  
Mushroom	  (WM)	  Picking	  in	  Forest	  and	  Timber	  Production”	   below).	  Though	   the	  policy	  maker	  built	  formally	  a	  PES	  scheme,	  which	  prescribe	  the	  revenue	  reinvestment	  of	  70%	  of	  WM	  permit	  selling,	  in	  reality	  it	  was	  not	  fully	  implemented;	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  revenues	  have	  been	  reinvest	  while	  a	  consistent	  part	  used	  for	  other	  purposes	  also	  out	  of	  the	  forest	  sector.	   In	  this	  context,	   the	  present	  scheme	  assume	  much	  more	  a	  market	  form	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  target	  investment	  on	  WM	  resources	  that	  should	  occur	  in	  a	  PES	  scheme.	  
• Auctions.	  At	  the	  moment,	  there	  are	  no	  experiences	  related	  to	  auctions	  or	  conservation	  tenders.	   There	   is	   evidence	   that	   the	   payment	   for	   the	   so-­‐called	   agro-­‐environmental	  measures	  of	  the	  RDP	  should	  be	  improved	  through	  more	  effective	  systems	  of	  financial	  support	  to	  privates	  operators,	  like	  auctions.	  
• Eco-­‐labelling,	  certification.	  The	  main	  two	  certification	  schemes	  in	  the	  case	  study	  area	  are	  FSC	  and	  PEFC.	  Nevertheless,	  due	  to	  a	  regional	  agreement	  with	  the	  Veneto	  region	  only	  the	  second	  certification	  scheme	  have	  been	  promoted	  and	   implemented	  at	   forest	  level.	  In	  concrete,	  the	  forest	  certification	  scheme	  has	  not	  improved	  the	  previous	  forest	  management	  method.	   Even	   so,	   the	   actual	   forest	   under	   PEFC	   certification	   scheme	   in	  Veneto	  region	  amount	  to	   the	  60,000	  hectares	  (1.67%	  of	   the	  total	   forest	  surface).	  An-­‐other	  certification	  scheme	  has	  also	  been	  promoted	  in	  the	  Asiago	  plateau	  within	  a	  terri-­‐torial	  marketing	   scheme.	  Among	   the	   certified	  products,	  wild	  mushrooms	  are	   consid-­‐ered	  main	  culinary	  forest	  product	  outputs,	  so	  a	  tangible	  rural	  development	  tool	  for	  the	  area.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  process	  has	  been	  put	  in	  practice.	  
• Payments	   for	  environmental	   services	   –	   schemes.	  Water	  management	  is	  only	  pay-­‐ment	   for	  environmental	  services	   fully	   implemented	   in	  Veneto	  region.	  Water	  manage-­‐ment	  is	  a	  simple	  circle	  where	  the	  water	  supplier,	  formed	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  local	  public	   authorities	   and	   province	   delegates,	   sell	   the	   water	   to	   the	   households	   and	   the	  revenue	  is	  then	  split	   in	  different	  part	  according	  to	  the	  investment	  need	  (LR	  5/1998).	  Just	  recently,	   the	  3%	  of	  the	  water	  tariff	   income	  is	  used	  for	  compensate	  the	  mountain	  
forest	   owners	   through	  public	   investment	   led	   by	   the	  Mountain	   Community	  Authority	  (DGR	  3483/2010).	  
• Eco-­‐sponsoring,	   donations.	   The	   national	   act	   113/1992	   prescribes	   the	   compulsory	  tree	   planting	   per	   each	   new	   Italian	   child.	   The	   municipalities	   must	   organize	   the	   tree	  feast	  day	  every	  year	  for	  promoting	  among	  the	  new	  generation	  a	  higher	  environmental	  awareness.  
5. Forest	  externalities	  evaluation:	  a	  step	  toward	  the	  environmen-­‐
tal	  service	  market	  	  The	  attention	  on	  the	  Alps	  has	  generated	  a	  good	  amount	  of	  literature,	  both	  grey	  literature,	  re-­‐ports	  and	  communication	  magazine,	   in	  which	  Alpine	  values	  has	  been	   targeted	  several	   time,	  especially	  biodiversity	  and	  landscapes.	  In	  parallel,	  scientific	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environ-­‐mental	  economics	  has	  developed	  too,	  with	  papers	  assessing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  main	  externalities	  in	  Alpine	  mountains	  and	  forests.	  Given	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  alpine	  ecosystem,	  these	  studies	  are	  mostly	   focused	  on	  assessing	  the	  Total	  Economic	  Value	  of	  Alpine	  ecosystems	  rather	  then	  the	  value	  of	  single	  externalities.	  When	  this	  is	  the	  case	  and	  one	  sole	  externality	  is	  the	  target	  of	  the	  study,	   this	   is	  usually	   landscape	  or	   recreation,	  while	   the	  number	  of	  works	   focused	   solely	  on	  carbon	  sequestration,	  biodiversity	  or	  watershed	  protection	  is	  rather	  limited.	  The	  choice	  to	  assess	  a	  bundle	  of	  values	  rather	  than	  single	  externalities	  implies	  also	  that	  a	  mul-­‐tiplicity	  of	  different	  economic	  methods	  can	  be	  used	  together,	  and	  this	  makes	  sometimes	  the	  distinction	   between	   ‘stated’	   and	   ‘revealed’	   preferences	  methods	   rather	   difficult	   and	   not	   al-­‐ways	  completely	  coherent.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  present	  first	  those	  papers	  using	  stated	   preferences,	   then	   those	   ascribable	   revealed	   preferences	   and,	   finally,	   those	   using	   a	  combination	  of	  different	  methods,	  benefit	  transfer	  or	  meta-­‐studies,	  aimed	  mainly	  at	  determin-­‐ing	  Total	  Economic	  Values	  rather	  then	  single	  values.	  The	  scale	  of	  the	  studies	  changes	  from	  local	  to	  regional,	  but	  none	  of	  the	  studies	  found	  takes	  in-­‐to	  consideration	  the	  Alpine	  region	  in	  its	  entirety.	  In	  terms	  of	  methodology,	  the	  approaches	  are	  rather	  homogeneous,	  but,	  seen	  the	  case-­‐specificity	  of	  the	  studies,	  cross	  comparisons	  of	  values	  is	  most	  of	  the	  time	  very	  difficult.	  
	  
5.1. Stated	  preference	  method.	  An	  interesting	  outcome	  of	  the	  ALPSCAPE	  project	  is	  a	  paper	  produced	  by	  (Grêt-­‐Regamey	  et	  al.	  2008),	  which	  presents	  a	  list	  of	  case-­‐studies	  of	  environmental	  valuation	  of	  landscape,	  biodiver-­‐sity,	  recreation	  and	  avalanche	  protection	  values	  in	  the	  Alps	  using	  stated	  preferences	  (see	  Ta-­‐ble	  4).	  	  Table	  4:	  Stated	  preference	  case-­‐studies	  in	  the	  Alps	  
Study	  	   Ecosystem	  service	  (ES)	  	   Method	   Location	  (Baumgart	  2005)	   Scenic	  beauty	  	   Discrete	  Choice	  Experiment	  	  	  Bernese	  Oberland	  (Switzerland)	  (Grêt-­‐Regamey	  et	  al.	  2007)	   Scenic	  beauty	  	   Contingent	  valuation	   Davos	  (Switzerland)	  (Jäggin	  1999)	   Biodiversity	  	   Contingent	  valuation	   Jura	  (Switzerland)	  (Getzner	  2000)	   Biodiversity	  	   Contingent	  valuation	   Hohe	  Tauern	  National	  Park	  (AU)	  	  (Hackl	  and	  Pruckner	  1997)	   Recreation	  	   Contingent	  valuation	   Kalkalpen	  National	  Park	  (Austria)	  (Gios	  et	  al.	  2006)	   Recreation	  	   Contingent	  valuation	  	   Campogrosso	  (Italy)	  (Tempesta	  and	  Thiene	  2004)	   Landscape	   Discreto	  Choice	  Experiment	  Corina’s	  Alps	  (Italy)	  (Thiene	  and	  Scarpa	  2008)	   Recreation	   Discreto	  Choice	  Experiment	  Veneto’s	  Alps	  (Italy)	  (Löwenstein	  1995)	   Avalanche	  protection	  	   Contingent	  valuation	   Hinterstein/Allgäu	  (Germany)	  Source:	  (Grêt-­‐Regamey	  et	  al.	  2008)	  modif.	  	  The	  authors	  stress	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  considerable	  variability	  among	  the	  values	  derived	  from	  the	  different	  studies,	  even	  when	  they	  deal	  with	  similar	  environmental	  services	  and	  ob-­‐
serve	  that,	  with	  the	  existing	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  ‘these	  differ-­‐ences	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  different	  preferences	  among	  people	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  due	  to	  the	  methods	  and	  the	  data	  underlying	  these	  methods’.	  	  They	  also	  discuss	  the	   feasibility	  of	  an	  overall	  estimation	  of	  all	   the	  externalities	  produced	  by	  the	  mountain	  system	  and	  stress	  the	  need	  for	  an	  interdisciplinary	  approach,	  underlining	  that	  stakeholder’s	  preferences	  are	  unpredictable	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  Using	   Contingent	   Valuation,	   Tempesta	   and	  Marangon	   (2005)	   have	   assessed	   the	   Total	   Eco-­‐nomic	  value	  of	  Italian	  forest	  landscapes	  by	  asking	  to	  respondent	  whether	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  abrogate	  a	  law	  for	  forest	  fires	  prevention	  thus	  reducing	  the	  tax	  load.	  The	  results	  estimated	  a	  TEV	  of	  722.6	  €/ha,	  with	  a	  non-­‐use	  value	  component	  of	  665	  €/ha.	  The	  authors	  compared	  their	  result	  with	  that	  of	  other	  papers	  showing	  differences	  with	  values	  obtained	  in	  neighbouring	  re-­‐gions,	  e.g.	  Goio	  et	  al.	   (2008)	  for	  Trentino	  Alto	  Adige	  and	  Marangon	  and	  Gottardo	  (2001)	  for	  Friuli	  Venezia	  Giulia,	  who	  both	  estimated	  in	  3-­‐400	  €/ha	  the	  fraction	  of	  Non-­‐use	  value	  for	  Ital-­‐ian	  forests.	  
	  
5.2. Revealed	  preference	  method	  Specific	   works	   using	   revealed	   preference	   methods	   are	   quite	   scarce	   in	   the	   last	   decades.	  Tangerini	  and	  Soguel	   (2004)estimated	   the	  whole	   landscape	  value	   in	   the	  Swiss	  Alps	   (Valais)	  using	  the	  hedonic	  pricing	  method	  adjusted	  with	  the	  MACBETH	  approach	  Bana	  et	  al.	   (1998).	  They	  found	  that	  the	  landscape	  variable	  affects	  considerably	  the	  final	  price	  of	  real	  estate	  prop-­‐erties.	  The	   results	  of	   the	   study	  highlight	   that	  positive	   changes	   in	   landscape	  are	  appreciated	  both	  by	  locals	  as	  well	  as	  tourists,	  while	  the	  presence	  of	  tourist	  infrastructures	  decreases	  the	  house	  value	  for	  the	  dwellers.	  	  
	  
5.3. Studies	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  methods	  Croitoru	  (2007)	  assessed	  the	  value	  of	  all	  Mediterranean	  forests	  including	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  Alpine	  region.	  The	  authors	  took	  into	  consideration	  the	  four	  classical	  externalities	  –	  recrea-­‐tion,	  biodiversity,	  water	  and	  carbon	  –	  and	  related	  them	  to	  TEV	  components:	  recreation	  to	  ‘di-­‐rect	  use	  values’,	   carbon	  sequestration	  and	  watershed	  protection	   to	   ‘indirect	  use	  values’	  and	  biodiversity	   to	   ‘non-­‐use	   values’.	   These	   works	   have	   provided	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   different	  components	  of	  Italian	  forests	  TEV	  reported	  in	  Table	  3	  below.	  	  Table	  5:	  Average	  estimates	  of	  Italian	  forest	  values	  (annual	  flows)	  
Average	  
value	  
Watershed	  pro-­‐
tection	   Wood	  
Net	  Incre-­‐
ment	   NWFPs	  
Hunting,	  rec-­‐
reation	   Grazing	  
Carbon	  seques-­‐
tration	  
Negative	  exter-­‐
nalities	   TEV	  €/ha	   154	   50	   37	   23	   28	   7	   7	   -­‐59	   249	  Source:	  (Croitoru	  2007)	  	  Recreation	  was	  estimated	  at	   large	  scale	  deriving	  consumer	  surplus	  from	  application	  of	  both	  Contingent	  Valuation	  and	  Travel	  Cost.	  Where	  no	  estimates	  were	  available,	   ‘actual	  payments’	  (permit	  prices,	  costs	  of	  travel)	  were	  used.	  The	  author	  stresses	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  common	  method-­‐ology	  as	  a	  significant	  limitation	  for	  comparing	  the	  different	  results	  available	  in	  literature.	  Goio	  et	  al.	   (2008)	  also	  assessed	  recreational	  values	   focusing	  mainly	   in	   the	  activities	   linked	  to	  ex-­‐tractive	  opportunities	  in	  forests,	  like	  the	  game	  values	  (trophies),	  game	  experiences	  (price	  paid	  for	   hunting	   trips)	   and	  mushroom	  picking	   activities	   (value	   of	   the	   harvest	   of	   amateur	  mush-­‐room	  pickers).	  The	  underpinning	  idea	  was	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  potential	  revenues	  accruing	  to	  forest	  owners,	  excluding	  non-­‐use	  and	  option	  values.	  
The	  ‘avoided	  damage	  costs’	  approach	  was	  used	  in	  many	  countries	  to	  evaluate	  the	  watershed	  protection	  value.	  Croitoru	  (2007)	  showed	  that	  different	  paths	  could	  be	  followed	  from	  the	  op-­‐erational	  side,	   like	  the	  avoided	  loss	  of	  productivity	   in	  nearby	  agricultural	  areas,	   the	  avoided	  costs	  of	  building	  and	  operating	  hydraulic	  works,	  the	  water	  storage	  capacity.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  author	  emphasises	  that	  estimating	  the	  value	  of	  watershed	  protection	  is	  quite	  problematic	  due	  to	   the	   difficulty	   of	   establishing	   clear	   cause-­‐and-­‐effect	   relationships	   between	   forests	   and	  downstream	  water	  services.	  The	  potential	  restoration	  cost	  approach	  is	  used	  in	  limited	  cases	  like	  high	  soil	  erosion,	  floods	  and	  landslides.	  The	  lack	  of	  data	  availability	  in	  many	  cases	  reduces	  the	   implementation	  of	  any	  approach	  so	   that	   sometimes	   the	  costs	  of	  purifying	  contaminated	  water	  or	  of	  dredging	  accumulated	  silt	  is	  used	  instead.	  Notaro	  (2001)	  used	  a	  mixed	  approach	  for	  assessing	  watershed	  protection,	  assuming	  that	  the	  value	  of	  water	  in	  rivers	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  level	  of	  fishable	  water	  fauna	  and	  the	  value	  of	  fishermen’s	  surplus.	  A	  similar	  methodology	  was	  used	  by	  Battazzi	  and	  Viaggi	  (2001)for	  assessing	  the	  recreational	  value	  of	  game	  hunting.	  Carbon	  sequestration	   is	   the	   forest	  externality	  whose	  physical	  quantification	   is	  probably	   the	  most	  straightforward.	  The	  total	  forest	  increment	  net	  of	  forest	  felling	  gives	  the	  quantity	  of	  car-­‐bon	  dioxide	  stocked	  in	  the	  forest.	  The	  price	  is	  established	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  international	  market	  price	  of	  CO2	  credits.	  Nowadays	  the	  availability	  of	  many	  scientific	  data	  on	  carbon	  se-­‐questration	  in	  soil	  and	  roots	  has	  increased	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  assessment	  of	  carbon	  seques-­‐tration,	  even	  if	  this	  has	  so	  far	  still	  limited	  implementation	  in	  the	  present	  carbon	  accountability	  (Pilli	  and	  Anfodillo	  2008).	  The	  value	  of	  biodiversity	  has	  been	  investigated	  by	  Jäggin	  (1999)	  in	  the	  Swiss	  Jura	  and	  by	  Getzner	  (2000)	  in	  the	  “Hohe	  Tauern	  National	  Park”	  in	  Austria.	  A	  detailed	  analytical	  work	  for	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  the	  Alps	  was	  led	  by	  Goio	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  who	  have	  assessed	  the	  Total	  Economic	  Value	  of	  the	  forests	  in	  the	  Province	  of	  Trento,	  i.e.	  345	  	  thou-­‐sands	  hectares	  of	  mountain	  areas.	  The	  paper	  is	  a	  meta-­‐study	  conveying,	  for	  specific	  externali-­‐ties,	  the	  results	  of	  other	  studies,	  thus	  facing	  the	  challenge	  of	  comparing	  values	  estimated	  using	  different	  methods.	  This	  is,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  a	  shortcoming,	  therefore	  the	  study	  provides	  an	  order	  of	  magnitude	  of	  the	  economic	  importance	  of	  forest	  ecosystem	  in	  mountain	  regions	  ra-­‐ther	  than	  the	  exact	  quantification	  of	  the	  total	  economic	  value	  of	  the	  study	  area.	  The	  method-­‐ologies	  utilised,	  mostly	  based	  on	  market	  approaches	  or	  revealed	  preference	  methods,	  are	  re-­‐ported	  in	  Table	  6,	  where	  the	  assessment	  methodologies	  used	  by	  Goio	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  for	  three	  types	  of	  externalities	  are	  reported.	  The	  authors	  consider	  two	  type	  of	  recreational	  use	  of	  the	  forest:	  the	  extractive	  use	  relates	  to	  the	  consumptive	  activities	  like	  non-­‐timber	  forest	  product	  harvest	  and	  game	  hunting,	  while	  the	  non-­‐extractive	  use	  concerns	  non-­‐consumptive	  uses	  like	  scenic	  view,	  existence	  value	  and	  option	  values.	  	  Table	  6:	  Externalities	  assessment:	  methodologies	  and	  indicators	  
Externality	   Assessment	  methodology	  Carbon	  sequestra-­‐tion	   Value	  of	  increment	  stock	  left	  in	  the	  forest	  (La	  Notte	  and	  Paletto	  2002)	  Watershed	  protec-­‐tion	   Planting	  and	  maintaining	  costs	  of	  meadows	  in	  efficient	  condition	  (Marangon	  and	  Gottardo	  2001)	  Recreation	  Extractive	  	  Non-­‐extractive	  
	  Price	  based	  method	  	  (license	  payment	  for	  recreational	  mushroom	  picking	  and	  game)	  Added	  value	  experience	  to	  be	  in	  the	  forest	  within	  an	  extractive	  recreation	  Source:	  Goio	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  	  Recently,	   a	   new	  approach	   to	   recreational	   assessment	   has	   been	  developed	   combining	   travel	  cost	  method	  and	  choice	  modelling	  (Scarpa	  and	  Thiene	  2005,	  Scarpa	  et	  al.	  2007,	  Thiene	  and	  
Scarpa	  2008).	  This	  combined	  method,	  based	  on	  stakeholders’	  stratification	   in	  homogeneous	  groups,	   allows	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   factors	   influencing	   personal	   choices,	   therefore	  providing	  support	   to	  policy	  decisions.	  A	   further	  progress	  was	   the	  direct	  estimation	  of	  WTP,	  avoiding	   the	   estimation	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   utility	   coefficients	   and	   then	   deriving	   the	  WTP	  distribution	  (Scarpa	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Thiene	  and	  Scarpa	  2008,	  Scarpa	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  	  
5.4. Lessons	  learned	  from	  valuation	  studies	  Lange	  (2004)	  has	  provided	  a	  good	  synthesis	  of	  the	  methodologies	  applied	  (see	  Table	  7),	  which	  is	  valid	  also	  in	  the	  Alpine	  Region.	  	   Table	  7:	  Externalities	  and	  assessing	  approach/methodologies	  	  Forest	  product	   	  Valuation	  approach/methodology	  Non-­‐wood	  forest	  goods	  	   Local	  market	  prices	  of	  same	  product	  	  	   Price	  of	  close	  substitute	  product	  	  	   Production	  cost	  Forest	  services	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Recreation	  and	  tourism	  	   Travel	  cost	  	  	   Hedonic	  price	  of	  land	  	  	   Contingent	  valuation	  method,	  33nergy33nt	  analysis	  Forest	  environmental	  protection	  services	   	  	  Carbon	  storage	  	   Carbon	  tax	  	  	   Carbon	  emission	  permit	  trading	  price	  	  	   Global	  damage	  from	  climate	  change	  averted	  Biodiversity	  and	  habitat	  preservation	   Contingent	  valuation	  method,	  33nergy33nt	  analysis	  Protective	  services	  for	  water,	  soil,	  etc.	   Damage	  cost	  (e.g.	  reduced	  productivity	  in	  non-­‐forestry	  sectors)	  	  	   Damage	  prevention	  costs	  	  	   Contingent	  valuation	  method,	  33nergy33nt	  analysis	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  (Lange	  2004)	  	  As	  already	  underlined,	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  stated	  and	  revealed	  preference	  methodol-­‐ogies	  is	  not	  possible	  throughout	  the	  literature.	  Regional	  or	  national	  studies	  have	  applied	  both	  approaches	  at	  the	  same	  time	  for	  two	  decades,	  while	  only	  recently	  a	  combination	  of	  methodol-­‐ogies	   has	   occurred,	   when	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   researchers	   has	   moved	   towards	   understanding	  stakeholders’	  behaviour	  as	  one	  root-­‐component	  of	  environmental	   services	  demand.	  The	  ex-­‐ternalities	  have	  been	  estimated	  through	  comparing	  a	  set	  of	  alternatives	  where	  people	  choose	  the	  best	  alternative	  solution.	  Choice	  Experiment	  methodologies	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  tool	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  limits	  of	  Contingent	  Evaluation.	  The	   literature	  review	  has	  also	  highlighted	   that	   there	   is	  a	  high	  variability	   in	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  studies,	  i.e.	  in	  the	  type	  of	  the	  externality	  estimated	  (some	  studies	  estimate	  TEVs,	  the	  most	  part	  estimate	   recreation	   and	   landscape,	   very	   few	   estimate	  water),	   in	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   site	   under	  study,	  and	  in	  the	  values	  obtained.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	   	  
6. Paper	  1:	  Environmental	  Services	  under	  Climate	  Change:	  Better	  
Income	  from	  Forests?	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Abstract 
Climate change is affecting the forest sector as whole. While forests are increasingly 
looked to their climate mitigation capacity, forest managers are seeking financial means to 
stimulate the adaptation of forests to climate change. Among the market-based instruments, 
payment for environmental services (PES) is likely to play a major role in sustaining new 
business opportunities in the forest sector. The chapter describes the principle of PES and pro-
vides its historical background, addressing the question  “how is a PES developed?”. To pro-
vide a comprehensible answer, there will be a focus on PES scheme implementation, looking 
at beneficiaries, providers and transaction models with particular attention to the PES refer-
ence scale considering some successful cases in the Mediterranean basin. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The economy of environmental services is a relatively new issue in the forest sector. In this 
chapter, we will focus on the rising economic role of services generated in the Mediterranean 
forestland, paying specific attention to the market based mechanism as instrument to reduce 
the gap between environmental service (ES) supplier and direct or indirect users. Due to the 
high specificity of environmental service we will consider only a few successful case studies, 
in which payment for environmental services (PES) has been promoted as a market tool to 
enhance ES provision.  
Mediterranean forests have recently undergone a slow process of environmental and social 
changes. The lack of revenues in rural areas has played a major role in the forest sector up to 
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now [3]; moreover, in the last few decades the high variability of meteorological events in 
terms of distribution and intensity has been a new challenge for the forest managers [4-6]. 
Soil erosion, loss of soil fertility, pest outbreaks, increased frequency of flash-floods and long 
summer dry periods have provided evidence of direct or indirect effects of climate change in 
the Mediterranean basin [7-9]. These effects are better known as negative environmental ex-
ternalities as they represent an additional cost for society. However, the forest sector may also 
offer several positive externalities, often the targets of new forest management practices, 
which enhance the benefits for a multitude of stakeholders. Some examples are carbon se-
questration, biodiversity conservation, water quality enhancement and the promotion of recre-
ation in forests; all well known ES that might be stimulated by specific forest management 
changes. In general an externality is an economic loss or gain by a party, generated by the 
activity of another party that supports all the cost, and in this situation the loser is not com-
pensated, leading to a market failure. Some intensive forest management practices, such as 
large clear-cuts, can produce negative effects such as soil erosion that influence, directly or 
indirectly, several forest users who are not compensated for the damage they suffer, or on the 
other hand the massive use of fossil fuel by society has increased the frequency of forest dam-
age generally borne by the forest owner. Therefore the most common solution adopted has 
been the implementation of legal constraints on the use of natural resources or more recently 
the introduction of environmental taxation on different scales to cover the costs of damage, 
protection and lack of provision of some ES in order to rebalance the relationship between the 
economic system and the environment. 
 
Box 1: Theoretical effect of international trade. 
 
                            Graph A                                                           Graph B 
 
Free trade plays an important role in environmental services provision. Considering the theory 
of comparative advantage, both parties involved in trade improve their condition by specializ-
ing in goods and services. However, the externalities are usually left aside in free trade. A 
timber producer in a closed market has a marginal private cost that is equal to the customer’s 
marginal private benefit (see graph A); hence Q* will be supplied on the market at price P*. 
The effect of a free market lets the price decrease to Pfree, hence the local producer can supply 
only Q1 while the consumer will push traders to import the remaining quantity (Q2-Q1). In the 
new market condition, the supplier will lose part of his surplus, equal to the area P*acPfree, 
while consumers will gain a surplus equal to P*adPfree. The overall net benefit of the market 
is given by the difference between supplier and consumer surplus within the new conditions 
(adc). However, considering the externalities involved in the trade (see graph B), scenarios 
may differ. In fact, the marginal social cost includes private and externality costs of timber 
production; so when timber production generates negative externalities, a given importing 
country will gain the area afbc as avoided costs for society. Examples are avoiding soil ero-
sion, biodiversity maintenance or water quality enhancement. Basically, all these costs are 
transferred to the exporter’s timber costs. Nevertheless the theoretical background might 
deeply differ from the reality; for instance the exporter rarely considers the externality cost in 
the timber price due to unclear property rights or high level of information asymmetry. 
 
In a hypothetical market, where the ES property rights are ensured and there are monetary 
transactions between ES beneficiaries and suppliers, and there is no free-riding behavior, the 
optimum level of forest goods and services, or more generally ES, might be achieved. 
Through taxation, governments and public institutions have tried to move towards the inter-
nalization of ES, especially on negative externalities, in order to mitigate the effects on socie-
ty. International trade also affects ES provision, almost like a specific forest policy (see box1). 
In the forest sector, some authors [10] have suggested the institution of an environmental 
taxation to cover the cost of ES provision, but it has rarely been put into force due to its con-
straint on timber production. Another example of taxation-based mechanism in northern Med-
iterranean countries is the common agriculture policy (CAP) paid for by the general taxation 
on European citizens. CAP has slowly introduced the compensation principle of habitat and 
biodiversity protection as well as water quality enhancement, based usually on the cost of land 
management change or cost provision. Several benefits have been provided but the cost of 
organizing the fund has been relatively high, losing efficiency in terms of social expenditure. 
While policy makers look at the ES supply side, scholars have started to collect information 
on the demand side [11-15]. Due to the general welfare increment and high economic growth 
people have abandoned many rural areas since the 1970s, especially in the northern part of the 
Mediterranean region. Hence, the demand for alternative forest products has been stimulated, 
with several problems linked to organization of the forest externality provision, compensation 
for the ES supplier (small or nil) and the lack or absence of date reporting. The description of 
these new behaviors based on people’s utility has underlined the increasing perceived scarcity 
of forest externalities such as recreation in forest, carbon sequestration, soil protection and 
water quality maintenance: potential new markets for the forest sector that need to be evaluat-
ed on both sides. 
 
2. ES estimation: basic concepts to organize ES 
provision. 
ES prices are usually left out of the official statistics, except for some cases related to recrea-
tional activities in the forest (i.e. entrance fee for nature reserves, recreational wild mushroom 
picking permit, etc.), water related services or CAP measures within the local rural develop-
ment plans (RDP) (i.e. subsidies per hectare, performance based payment, etc.). According to  
 
the type of forest good or service and its use, different valuation methods are applied (see fig-
ure 1), both related to the market and supply side as well as to the demand. Based on prices 
available on the market, ES values have been estimated through simple evaluation approach-
es. In practical cases, such as the case studies presented in this chapter, the most common ap-
proach used by policy makers to set up economic instruments for ES is the estimation of the 
minimum costs the landowner has to bear to supply ES, or in other words the sum of the 
physical work, management and transaction costs. Sometimes, the approach is integrated with 
or compared to the present and future opportunity cost the landowner has on his land, capital-
ized with a low interest rate. Instead of the traditional market analysis, the expansion of envi-
ronmental monetary evaluation techniques allowed scholars to develop methodologies to as-
sess the ES value on the demand side [16] and these are grouped in two categories: indirect 
and direct methods. The former include the hedonic price [17] or travel cost method [18] to 
assess the value of the environment based respectively on the cost of surrounding houses and 
Figure 1: Forest value types and estimation approaches 
 
the value of a given area according to the frequency of tourist visits. Where no information is 
available, direct methods have been applied, such as contingent valuation [18] or choice ex-
periment [19] methods. Here the value of a given ES is related to the consumer behavior in a 
simulated hypothetical market through a survey, in which the willingness to pay for a given 
ES is asked. However, these methods have been used more on transport policy or policy ad-
vice on program acceptability than on ES valuation as such. Several of these estimation ap-
proaches have been used to assess total forest economic values globally [20] or in a specific 
environment such as the Mediterranean area [12]. In one of the first broad assessments, Medi-
terranean ES values have been evaluated by Croitoru [21] and an inter country estimate has 
been provided considering both positive and negative forest externalities (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: ES values of the total forest production in the Mediterranean region. 
Value type Forest good & services ES Min 
value 
Max Value Approach 
Direct use 
value 
WFP removals No 5 €/ha 130 €/ha Market price 
Net growth of standing 
timber 
No 20 €/ha 75 €/ha Market price 
Losses of WFPs due to 
forest fires  
No -8 €/ha -41 €/ha Market price  
Grazing No 33 €/ha 74 €/ha Market price 
Collection of NWFPs Partially 1 €/ha 143 €/ha Market price 
Losses of NWFPs due to 
forest fires 
Partially n.a. n.a. Market price & shadow 
price 
Recreation Yes  5 €/ha 163 €/ha CVM and TCM 
Hunting Yes -4 €/ha 89 €/ha Permit price and CVM 
Indirect use 
value 
Watershed protection Yes 25 €/ha 150 €/ha Avoid costs and defence 
expenditure 
Negative externalities 
linked to water-related 
issues 
Yes n.a. 51 €/ha Restoration costs 
Carbon sequestration Yes 2 €/ha 50 €/ha Fankhouser’s and UN-
ECE/FAO approach 
Non-use 
values 
Biodiversity conservation Yes 1 €/ha 60 €/ha CVM 
Pharmaceutical value Yes n.a. 5 €/ha Rent capture technique 
Source: Croitoru [21] Modified. Note: the gap between upper and lower ES value is linked to 
the specificity of a given country; hence they are not applicable throughout the Mediterranean 
region.  
 
Surely, prices of and demand for forest goods and services have a quite static evaluation, but 
the frequency and implementation of new economic approaches may improve the estimate. 
Moreover, the application of new technological techniques on monitoring may enhance and 
speed up the estimation process.  
3. Policy Tools for Environmental Services 
While the economic evaluation of ES may be achieved by the adoption of a suitable approach, 
how this value is transferred to the real world requires several steps in order to draft a specific 
policy strategy. In addition to the neoclassical economic concept of market efficiency, the 
concept of equity on ES benefits and costs has been an important step to recognize that hu-
manity lives in a closed system, hence the need to consider the ES as part of the economy 
[22]. The Kyoto Protocol and ongoing debate on climate change is a clear example of how 
equity has been considered at global scale. Today policy makers may stimulate ES using dif-
ferent tools, which aim to motivate the supply or encourage the ES consumption in a given 
group of stakeholders. The overall effect aims to rebalance the provision costs of and user 
benefits from environmental externalities. 
The most common tools that have been implemented can be collocated in three main catego-
ries [23]: 1) information and education instruments, 2) command and control (CAC) regula-
tion and 3) economic instruments, better known as market based instruments (MBI).  
1. Investments in ES information and education are fundamental to increase the awareness 
and fill information gaps among all ES stakeholders. Researchers, policy makers and 
technicians are the main target subjects of the education tool, while the promotion of in-
formation may target a wider pool of stakeholders from ES supplier to the whole of civil 
society. The main aim is to reduce the information asymmetry during the “bargaining” 
process of ES use rights implementation, or more generally to enhance the role of civil 
society on ES rights promotion and enforcement. Education and information instruments 
also help in the implementation of other policy instruments, as they are the first step of a 
participation process.  
2. Command and control instruments are based on legal acts, enforced by the government. 
Basically, the implementation of specific ES laws set the main goals of the policy, the 
method to achieve the aims, the monitoring set-up and control system, and finally the 
fees and legal action against the non-compliant stakeholders. Among the most common 
CAC tools, the ES license, qualitative standards and access limitation are frequently used 
throughout the Mediterranean region. Moreover, they are often related to the ES property 
rights on which the CAC system regulations are built. Some examples are allowances 
(i.e. carbon emissions), prescriptions on best practices (i.e. soil protection during felling), 
limitations on polluting substance, qualitative standards (i.e. water quality standards), ES 
access rights and protection for different ES. 
3. Finally, market based instruments are economic tools that aim to stimulate consumer and 
supplier behavior though market allocation of ES. The government may have either a 
passive or active role similar to CAC, according to the ES demand, complexity and di-
mensional scale. Well-defined ES, with a clear dimension, are easier to achieve, while 
the opposite situations may require a more active effort in order to reduce some con-
straints such as transaction costs for grouping the demand or supply, measurement proto-
cols and general information access; however government has a fundamental responsibil-
ity to set up and secure ES property rights. Relatively new in southern Mediterranean 
countries, MBI appear to be a promising approach, when the inefficiency of the control 
and monitoring limits the ES provision.  
MBI have had a rapid development since the early 1990s, when “principle 16” of the Rio 
Declaration promoted the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic in-
struments, based on the “polluter-pays” principle [24]. Next to the traditional regulatory ap-
proach, economic measures have been introduced as a complementary part of a country’s en-
vironmental management system; however, the different situations and the complexity of the 
ES also introduced the concept of the “user-pays” principle in ES consumption (i.e. drinkable 
tap water), according to the ability to pay (annual user income). Nevertheless the overall fi-
nancial effect should be same. On the contrary, where there are no economic transactions for a 
given ES, marketing tools may help to develop or enhance an ES market. According to some 
authors [25-27]  the MBI may be grouped in three categories: 1) price-based, 2) quantity-
based, which might be the evolution of a CAC regulation, and 3) market friction instruments.  
1. Price-based instruments generally stimulate the provision of ES through target taxation 
or incentives. They may be either positive (grants, subsidies, soft-loans, concessions, 
auctions, etc.) or negative, charging a specific tax on a given economic activity or prod-
uct. In both cases, they have a direct effect on ES supply, though they act in different 
ways, either directly enhancing the supply (positive) or limiting the demand (negative).  
2. Quantity-based instruments limit the negative externalities by setting up a maximum 
production on a given economic activity. Each economic agent may produce a certain 
quantity according to the purchased permits and in any case the total amount of permits 
is limited according to a general agreement among the multitude of economic agents. 
Among the most common quantity-based instruments, cap-and-trade (i.e. ES market 
where a maximum limit is calculated according a reference time), off-set (or no-net-
impact) and mitigation banking have been implemented as economic tools for climate 
change mitigation (the first two) and wetland conservation (last one), in which a third 
party usually certifies the compliance with a set of standards. 
3. Lastly, market friction instruments are tools to promote or even create a new ES market. 
These tools vary from simple marketing strategies such as product differentiation and 
eco-labeling for less impacting products to more complex financial tools based on the 
environmental risk assessment of a given activity. Conservation insurance and leverag-
ing eco-investments are two examples. Some of these tools are similar to the financial 
derivatives (i.e. debt-for-conservation), where the reduction of a natural area in one area 
is compensated for by the expected creation of another one. However, in the recent 
years, thanks to demand analysis, more pressure has been put on contract-payment and 
ES market creation where payment for environmental services (PES) is just the initial 
step towards the ES market. 
According to Wunder [2], conservation approaches may be ranked on two parameters: 1) the 
directness of the approach to conserve or enhance the ES and 2) the dependency on economic 
incentives (see figure 2). ES information and education rely on incentives and public finance, 
but their cost is relatively lower than other approaches. Moreover they are not strictly linked 
to a given ES, even though they stimulate behavior changes: an indispensable step to promote 
PES. More directness is given by the implementation of CAC. The legislative system sets 
rules and a control system where the user has some constraints on ES use. It has been used to 
solve congestion problems or weak provision of ES, however the high cost of control and the 
incapacity to have constant monitoring reduce the efficiency of the system since this political 
tool is usually paid for through general taxation. In some cases it might evolve into a PES 
scheme where an equity principle between users and suppliers is considered. Environmental 
taxation is surely the most common MBI used up to now. However, due to the lack of linkage 
Figure 2: Conservation approaches rank 
 
Source: Wunder [2] modified. Note: In practice, several approaches may be combined. 
 
with the ES target, the high cost of organizing the funds and the social unwillingness to pay 
taxes, this instrument is starting to be quite inefficient and less supported by policy makers.  
Sustainable forest management (SFM) has become the pillar of the forest sector worldwide. In 
the Mediterranean basin some problems of unsustainability exist. Examples come from Alba-
nia, Montenegro and Macedonia in which parts of the forest have been overexploited trigger-
ing soil erosion and forest resource depletion [28]. Generally SFM has been introduced in 
practice throughout the Mediterranean area, but without the support of public funds it could 
be difficult to achieve. The introduction of forest certification has stimulated the adoption of 
good forest management practices by encouraging the forest owner with the possibility of 
obtaining a higher price on the market, because people generally link the certification brand 
with the provided ES when compared to other non-certified goods. The main difference be-
tween timber certification and PES is the directness of the payment, which in the case of certi-
fication is related to the extra-cost on the purchased goods. On the contrary, PES schemes are 
definitely linked to the ES provision. In general it is a bit more costly but ES provision is 
stimulated by the direct transaction between user and supplier, which does not occur in the 
certification schemes. PES may last for one year, a decade or even in perpetuity, but its dura-
tion is strictly related to the ES. Finally, land or in real right acquisition could be used to 
avoid ES depletion by negative stakeholders or to reduce the transaction costs. This is widely 
used by bottled water companies (i.e. Vittel case study – box 2) and in general in the water 
sector to protect the water catchment basin from soil erosion or pollution. To some extent, 
public land has also been forced to maintain high quality natural resources, managing their 
access and uses.  
4. The economic theory behind Payment for 
Environmental Services 
Forest externalities are rarely considered in the real economy, although they provide several 
goods and services to different stakeholders. Payment for Environmental Services (PES) has 
been developed to correct the market failure, setting up prices for given goods or services. 
Although different environmental services (ES) have been traded for a long time, even with-
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out considering it as such, historically they have been contemplated whenever there has been 
strong human pressure on nature. Already Goméz-Baggethun [16] have described the evolu-
tion concept of the environmental service economy as a slow pattern of change based on per-
ceived environmental scarcity. Since the late 1990s, there has been an effort to assess the 
global value of ES [20] and transfer the concept into policy. PES has thus become a practical 
instrument to finance ES in the real economy [29-31] through a commodification process 
[32]. PES are defined as a voluntary economic transaction (1) based on a contract between at 
least two parties, one supplier (2) and one buyer(3), that trade a certain ES (4) and its provi-
sion (5) is ensured by the provider [29] (see figure 3). While simple bilateral contracts be-
tween private individuals are rarely implemented, PES developed by intermediaries due to 
high number of buyers and suppliers are more frequent (see figure 4). Where one of the five 
parameters is not fulfilled, the PES may be called a PES-like scheme [33]; for instance, if 
buyer and supplier are interdependent public institutions or there is no voluntariness and the 
scheme is compulsorily enforced on one of the two parties, the scheme name is substituted by 
PES-like. However, a clear ES definition and additionality must be respected in both cases. 
On the contrary to the command-and-control approach; PES is an economic tool that aims to 
increase benefit equity through efficiency and efficacy for a given ES. The financial mecha-
nism might be explained in a simple graph (see figure 5). In the first scenario, business as 
usual – BAU, a forest owner gains revenue from selling wood, while the other forest stake-
holders do not receive any benefits: the normal situation for a large cut in coppice forest man-
agement or a clear-cut. The missed benefit for society can be considered a cost partially spent 
on land defense against floods, soil erosion and forest fires as well as a general loss of recrea-
tional activity and non-wood forest product (NWFP) collection. A change of forest manage-
ment based on the implementation of legal constraints, such as avoidance of clear-cuts or to 
set limits on forest road construction, may reduce the social costs (scenario “A”), where the 
forest owner has to reduce his/her revenue on wood production, while all the other stakehold-
ers enjoy the benefits of the new forest externalities produced in different areas. The policy 
maker should consider at least the unbalanced equity that limits the forest owner’s rights; in 
fact, without providing any compensation (win-lose system), the efficacy of the law may be 
limited. Subsidies have surely to be charged to the general fiscal system because the benefits 
are available for each forest stakeholder. 
Moving towards a market-based-mechanism (MBM), providers and consumers trade their 
utility to have a certain level of goods and services from forest management in exchange for a 
monetary transaction to cover the forest owner’s opportunity cost. In scenarios “B” and “C”, 
both parties have a positive net gain compared to the BAU, in terms of both environmental 
service provision and equity for the ES supplier and beneficiaries. For instance, PES might be 
implemented for target externalities (scenario “B”), where the beneficiaries pay for a specific 
forest management that provides NWFP and recreation. Even considering the most costly for-
est management system that generates the highest level of all externalities, there is a clear im-
provement on equity distribution. In this case, NWFP and recreational users will not be the 
only beneficiaries. Indeed the best theoretical scenario is “C”, where the producer is compen-
sated for all the externalities by a wider set of stakeholders; nevertheless PES schemes are 
commonly related to scenario “B”. A case study that has been a sort of reference point in the 
PES sector is surely the Vittel case study, briefly described in box 2. PES may be described 
though traditional economic curves. In figure 6, we describe a theoretical PES scheme imple-
mented in the forest sector (large scale), in which the landowner has the right to clear-cut the 
forest (like in the previous figure). The situation without direct payment or economic revenue 
to the landowner (business as usual - BAU) does not provide any traded externality, hence the 
ES is equal to Q0. This is due to the market failure, so the landowner is not stimulated to en-
hance ES. However, the state can implement a new policy (command-and-control) to limit the 
property rights of the landowner.   
Figure 5: PES schemes for target and multi environmental service provision 
 
    Source: Pagiola [1] mod. 
 
Box 2 - The water PES in France: the Vittel case study. Since a decade ago, an example of 
PES that has been considered a reference case in Europe is the case of the Vittel Company 
(Nestlé group) in France. This brand of bottled water had a high risk of spring contamination 
due to the high levels of nitrogen distribution in the fields above the water catchment area 
[34]. Scientific study has highlighted the cause-effect relationship between agricultural prac-
tices and water quality. Based on this scientific evidence, the company began a negotiation 
process mediated by a specific agency, with the farmers (26 in total) and forest owners. After 
approximately 10 years of bargaining, the parties signed the agreements setting up a PES 
scheme; in total there were four types of contract according to farm size and production. Each 
farmer received a premium of 200 €/ha/year, linked to the income loss and a set of benefits, 
such as free technical assistance for the change of their agricultural practices and a payment of 
150,000 €/ farm for infrastructure modernization; Moreover, all debts and loans related to 
land acquisition have been cancelled, while 30 years of concession was ensured to those 
farmers willing to sell their land. The overall process stimulated a cropping change from corn 
to other more environmentally friendly crops or meadows on 17,000 ha, with the positive 
consequence of nitrogen reduction in the springs. Several farmers also decided to move to-
wards organic agriculture. In the first seven years of PES enforcement, Vittel has spent nearly 
24.25 M€ (980 €/ha/year) out of 5.2 billion € business turnover (2005): 9.14 M€ for land ac-
quisition, 3.81 M€ for modernization and 11.3 M€ to directly compensate the farmers. 
 
If the policy targets the whole environment, the quantity of ES generated may increase to QN 
but without any income for the landowner; this could be the extreme case of an integral nature 
reserve, where even the landowner cannot enter, but generally it increases the ES provision. 
The introduction of a market-based mechanism, such as PES schemes, stimulates the land-
owner to change forest management practices in favor of a specific ES, delivered at quantity 
QB. To achieve this, the payment has to be set equal to the marginal costs, so the price for the 
ES is equal to PB and has to be higher than the landowner’s opportunity cost. The marginal 
costs of service provision include the landowner’s production cost, the opportunity cost for 
Figure 6: ES market: optimal provision 
 
 
alternative land use and all the transaction costs to support the scheme. Moreover, cost effec-
tiveness is maximized at PB; in fact if we set a price equal to the marginal social benefit at 
PBmax, the budget required to implement the PES scheme is equal to the area QBePBmaxQ0, 
while it is only QBaPBQ0 if we consider the landowner’s marginal cost. As mentioned before, 
if all the ES are traded on the market, the optimum ES level for society is reached at QC, the 
point where the marginal cost of ES provision is equal to the marginal social benefits at price 
PC. The improvement of ES provision from QB to QC also enhances the net benefit. It can be 
calculated as the difference of total welfare between the two market levels, equal to Q0bd mi-
nus Q0ac. Price and quantity of ES provision are just the final objective of PES scheme im-
plementation. PES is affected by several preconditions that have to be considered before be-
ing put into practice [33]. First the dimensions and characteristics of the ES are the starting 
point to draft the PES scheme. PES is generally affected by ES scale dimension. Small forest 
owners usually have one or few forest management targets. Wood production has remained 
the main aim for the landowner so far, though recreation in the forest, NWFP provision or 
carbon sequestration represent new options that might be achieved at small scale. On the con-
trary other complex ES like water quality and biodiversity are very difficult to realize within 
the average size of private forestland. To generate more complex ES, a wider scale is needed. 
Directly related to the scale dimension, ES measurability is a challenging issue especially for 
a complex service. An example is biodiversity where just a few shared indicators exist at dif-
ferent scales [35, 36]; this is basic information to evaluate the ES in economic terms [37, 38]. 
It is worth mentioning that the monitoring and data collection for a biodiversity payment 
scheme might be very costly, increasing the transaction costs between the parties or even lim-
iting the PES start-up process. 
Apart from the ES physical characteristics; other important factors to bear in mind in the PES 
design are competitiveness, cultural context and institutional framework. Since the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, carbon sequestration is the most homogeneous ES at global scale. The common units 
and the global recognition from the international community were at the base of the carbon 
credit trade. More often the scale dimension is linked to buyer utilities. Tap water quality may 
be improved introducing alternative forest management practices at watershed level, but peo-
ple living outside the area are not interested in paying extra money to improve the quality of 
water they will not use directly. The ES demand is part of the PES competiveness precondi-
tion. A large number of buyers and suppliers or demand fragmentation complicates the nego-
tiation process. To simplify the bargaining procedure, the demand organization is surely 
needed. Positive examples are often reported in a mono or oligopsony market typical of the 
water-related ES where the presence of one or few buyers reduces the negotiation and reaches 
the best agreement. Other aspects like efficiency, information symmetry, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, scalar invariance, ES provision monotonicity, buyer and supplier utility 
maximization and other aspects relying on contract theory may affect the negotiation process 
and might be difficult to assess, but are important to consider in the contract. 
Cultural context is important for PES acceptability. People may accept the concept of ES 
monetization but in other cases they see PES as a trap on their land. The commercialization of 
right of access for recreational purposes is an example. In fact, small forest owner are general-
ly unwilling to sell part of their property rights, scared by the fact that the new user will dam-
age the forest or create new privileges, while large property owners do not demonstrate ad-
verse positions. Property rights are fundamental and a clear excludability is the existence of 
“condictio” for PES scheme implementation. Despite common law, civil law systems lack 
efficiency due to their slow evolution patterns. This is typical of the majority of Mediterrane-
an countries; in fact, according to [39], the accumulation of norms, customary rights and for-
mal institutions have limited the effectiveness and coordination of policy and rule implemen-
tation. PES become more acceptable where command and control systems fail. An investment 
in a new market-based mechanism may be more economical than a law-based system, espe-
cially due to the latter’s high cost of control. Moreover, the political driving forces are in 
many cases reluctant to legislate on highly sensitive issues such as the environment and water, 
where civil society is wholly against any privatization process. Besides, two huge constraints 
to any PES implementation are the absence of forest owners’ associations and the highly 
fragmented landownership that increase the transaction costs, hence limiting the capabilities 
of an ES investor or supplier to take action. In such conditions, the role of national or local 
governments is fundamental, due to the fact that the economic agents trade firstly in rights 
[40, 41].  
Unlike the command and control approach, PES schemes usually increase the price to the ES 
end users. Local users may at first glance see a form of environmental taxation, but in the long 
run the active forest management and the capacity to create employment in rural areas makes 
PES strategic. In the next few sections we will describe some PES case studies established in 
the Mediterranean basin. 
5. Form theory to practice: PES and PES-like case 
studies in the Mediterranean basin. 
In the Mediterranean basin the PES and PES-like scheme has been promoted in the last two 
decades. Recent publications [42, 43] have tried to map and describe PES schemes imple-
mented in different nations, but the rapid evolution of the topic and wider recognition of the 
equity concept has enhanced the implementation of PES schemes making it very difficult to 
be detected and reported in scientific publications or white papers. In this brief section we will 
report some good examples of PES on three main issues: water quality, carbon sequestration 
and biodiversity. 
Case study 1: Tap-water provision in the northern 
Mediterranean basin: some cases from North Italy 
Tap-water quality has been an important topic in the Mediterranean region. Several govern-
ments have strictly regulated setting up land use constraints, being considered among the most 
strategic ES. However, some new changes have been introduced since the early 1990s in the 
northern Mediterranean countries, coordinated only in the year 2000 by the introduction of the 
Water Directive Framework, in which water for human consumption has been formally de-
clared a priority with regard to other uses2. Though it has been not specified, this assumption 
poses a sort of hierarchy on water uses, where the maintenance of the whole water catchment 
basin has been addressed (Kunk 2004) through a partial compensation for the ES generated. 
In Italy, the concept was introduced by Galli’s act (Law 36/94) that suggests the adoption of 
an extra-payment on the water bill (3-8% of the water costs) to compensate for the mainte-
nance of the upstream area (mainly forestland). The law highlights the role of local public 
authorities because of the high fragmentation of private land, which has been considered a 
major obstacle. In fact, the correct management could be very difficult without a representa-
tive surface around the catchment areas in which the forest owners are usually not represented 
by an association, increasing the transaction costs.  
Despite the law’s suggestion water-related ES payments have only been introduced in some 
local contexts based on an extra-charge on tap water bills (‘user-pay-principle’): Piedmont 
and Veneto. Piedmont Region built up a structural fund3 with 3-8% of extra-charge on water 
bills to compensate mountain areas in terms of projects or infrastructure aimed to improve the 
local forest management practices. In the same way, the Decree of Veneto Regional Council 
no. 3483 of the 10th December 2010 set up a financial tool for mountain areas (3% of the wa-
ter bill) partially covering the costs of new hydraulic infrastructure and forest operations close 
to areas of slope instability in order to protect the downstream population. The recent intro-
duction and the weak data reporting have not allowed a full understanding of the mechanism, 
due also to the large number of intermediaries and public agencies involved. Basically, the 
repartition of the fund is based on a ranking of the amelioration projects that are selected an-
nually. 
                                                
2 Water Directive Framework - Reg. 2000/60/EC 
3 Regional Act 13/1997, art. 14	  
Apart from these large-scale regional schemes, there is an additional example. It is worth 
mentioning the case of “Romagna Acque S.p.a.”, a public company owning and managing the 
entire drinkable water resources of Romagna4 sub-regional area. Started as a consortium of 
municipalities to reduce the cost of drinkable water supply in 1966, it was able to cover the 
distribution of water to the whole Romagna area in 1989 and only a few years later, in 1994, 
“Romagna Acque S.p.a.” was founded, becoming owner of the water resources in 2004. The 
most important company water source is a dam-basin, located in the central Apennines 
(Ridracoli area - municipality of Bagno di Romagna), which covers 50% of the whole Roma-
gna tap water demand (108 M m3/year) especially during the summer season. Since its con-
struction, the biggest problems have been dam sedimentation and maintenance of high water 
quality. In 1993, the company invested in research to understand the link between different 
forest managements and soil erosion as well as water quality stabilization. After four years of 
research, the clear impact has been demonstrated of forest operations such as clear-cut or for-
est conversion from coppice to high stands on soil erosion while minimal silvicultural treat-
ments or natural evolution of stands markedly reduce the soil erosion [44]. Moreover, these 
last two practices have also been demonstrated to have a positive influence on nitrogen reduc-
tion and pH stability. Acknowledging these problems, part of the revenues deriving from the 
water tariff payments (1-3%) has been used to compensate landowners in the catchment areas, 
helping them to cover the cost of changes in management practices and opportunity cost. The 
average payment to forest owners has been around 200 €/ha for the first years (2006 was the 
first), decreasing to 100€/ha after 2010. The positive impact of the PES scheme was account-
ed as a general decrease of 25% in soil erosion5, and a consistent reduction in nitrogen as well 
as pH stabilization. In terms of performance both Romagna Acque S.p.A. and the landowners 
have increased their benefits: on the one hand the company has reduced its water purification 
costs prolonging the dam life, while on the other the landowners have maintained or even in-
creased their annual forest revenue. Anyway, due to the complex bureaucratic process the 
company decided to acquire the land wherever this was possible. Moreover, part of the com-
pensation has been invested in programs to inform the public on the use of tap water and the 
effects of the positive management practices adopted in the catchment area. The positive ex-
ample of Romagna Acque S.p.A. represents a PES-like scheme built on legislative gaps6; it 
cannot be categorized as pure PES due to the overlapping between the ES supplier and con-
sumer (in some ways, they are both represented by Romagna Acque S.p.a.). 
                                                
4 Provinces of Ravenna, Forlì-Cesena and Rimini, in North-East Italy. 
5 The initial soil erosion was 40,000 m3/year while today total amount has decreased to 30,000 m3/year in the 
water catchment basin. 
6 art. 18 and 24 Act 36/1994	  
Case study 2: Watershed protection in Tunisia 
Over-grazing and intensive land use in southern Mediterranean countries have been the most 
problematic constraints on the water quality provision [7]. Traditionally, the public land ten-
ure right lets several users freely exploit the forest and grassland, without taking the real car-
rying capacity into account. Especially in the fragile mountain ecosystem the human pressure 
may result in a general depletion of the natural resources, in particular water [45]. However, 
where law prescriptions and limitations fail, the implementation of a market-based mecha-
nism such as PES may inspire the stakeholders linked to a given ES. 
A positive case comes from north-west Tunisia, in the Barbara watershed (surface 200 km2) 
as reported by Croitoru [46]. Forest covers 25% of the watershed, with the remainder7 divided 
between cropland (53%), grassland (3%), human settlements and unproductive surface that 
contain a population of 124 inhabitants/km2. Due to the higher concentration of people in the 
lower part of the watershed the demand for clean water and irrigation has increased while the 
high land pressure has resulted in soil erosion, causing landslides, river bank and bed erosion; 
corresponding to additional costs for society. In fact river and dam cleaning has been very 
expensive. Among the possible solutions to stem the erosion effects, afforestation in the gul-
lies was assessed as the best economic option. Local government decided to finance the pro-
gram through an extra-payment on water bills, as the main financial channel to maintain the 
subsidies fund. The program was based on the direct payment to convert farmland to for-
estland with afforestation. The cost was initially drafted to cover the plantation costs, but the 
high tree mortality has undermined the effectiveness of the program due to farmers’ careless-
ness after receiving the payment. Hence, the payment was linked to the number of trees plant-
ed and survived in a year. The simple cost of provision, without considering the opportunity 
costs has had a weak rate of applicants. According to Croitoru [46] the payment should fluc-
tuate between the minimum cost related to the farmer’s income loss (approximately 49 €/ha) 
and the net benefit of society (approximately 99 €/ha) as avoided cost of water cleaning and 
watershed maintenance.  
Case study 3: Forest reserve for biodiversity in Girona Province 
(Spain) 
Natural forests have become quite rare in Mediterranean countries, especially near very 
densely populated areas, where they are frequently used for recreation. Among the proposals 
for forest areas used for biodiversity the common approach undertaken by the majority of 
                                                
7 Potential water capacity of 59 Mm3 
governments is the implementation of a specific rule to protect a certain piece of land. How-
ever, the equity between civil society and forest owner is simply ignored.  A different ap-
proach has been promoted in the Girona area, where the provincial council aimed to maintain 
at least 1% of province forestland with over-mature trees through a program named “Pro-
grama Selvana”. The general idea was to preserve some pieces of land, where old forest will 
be set aside from the regular forest management and left to evolve naturally for the next 25 
years with no silvicultural treatment. The involved actors have been mainly forest owners, 
both private and public, and their associations; while the agent responsible for the scheme has 
been the provincial council. Since the beginning the main problems have been related to find-
ing a sufficient number of people who would like to enter to the scheme. Based on the princi-
ple of “supplier compensation”, the level of payments has been differentiated according to the 
landowner’s opportunity cost of the more remunerative forest income alternative. Attracted by 
higher income opportunities, forest owners started to apply for the scheme voluntarily wheth-
er or not they fulfilled the minimum requirements based on some graded criteria (see table 2). 
In order to achieve at least a minimal competitiveness among the applicants, the total score of 
each application is listed and this represents the order of priority for funding. 
 
Table 2: Eligible criteria 
Criteria Eligibility level 
Slope Less than 60% 
Species  Presence of native species 
Additional scores have been given to rare and climax tree spe-
cies 
Presence of fauna and flora of mature forests 
Land size Minimum 2.5 ha 
Number of mature trees 0-50 units/ha (grading score) 
Genetic quality Trees from natural regeneration have higher score despite old 
sprouting stems 
Stand type Higher score has been given to multi-level and multi-age stands 
Soil structure Higher score to soil with well-developed O-A-B layer. 
 
Once the agent has checked the eligibility of the different stands, they will be listed in an offi-
cial bulletin and there will be funding for the first on the list onwards until the budget is fin-
ished (250,000 €/year half for private and half for public forests). Whether or not the forest 
owner accepts the contract condition, he/she will receive 80% of the total subsidies for the 
whole 25 years just by presenting a plan for a change in forest management, with the remain-
ing 20% after signing the contract. However, a pilot area in the Montseny Natural Park was 
fundamental to test the feasibility of the scheme, improving weak parts such as contract with-
drawal and monitoring. In fact, in the case where there have been some forest management 
activities, the subsidies have to be sent back to the council, while in the case of forest fire 
damage only part of the money has to be given back according to the damage.  Since the first 
half of 2011, 62 forest owners have been found scattered in 51 different places in the Girona 
area, accounting for 670 hectares, 0.34% of the total forest cover in the province [23, 47]. The 
future target will be to reach 1% of total forestland, however the dependency on private fund-
ing is related to the economy constraint and trend, hence difficult to maintain in a period of 
crisis. 
 
Case study 4: Structuring carbon schemes in Veneto and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia Regions (North Italy) 
Carbon markets are generally divided into two branches: the large Institutional (Kyoto-
related) market and the Voluntary Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. While the Institutional 
market has historically limited credits generated from land-use greenhouse gas mitigation ac-
tivities, the OTC market has long been a steady innovation platform for ecosystem services 
generated by the forestry and agriculture sectors [48]. In 2011, $576 million were transacted 
on the voluntary carbon market (average price of $6.2/t), 30% of which were forestry and ag-
riculture based credits [49]. Most of the forestry-offset projects are afforestation/reforestations 
and REDD+ (Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Forest Degradation) developed 
mostly in South and North America and Asia.  
The Mediterranean basin has seen few forest compensation projects so far. One of the most 
interesting case studies is CARBOMARK8, a regional program encouraging local land-based 
reductions. The project was initiated by the EU LIFE Program and has established a pilot 
trading program in two regions in Italy (Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia). Enterprises oper-
ating in the two regions can, based on monitoring and reduction plans, directly purchase 
through public auctions credits generated by four project types – improved forest management 
(IFM), urban forestry, long-lived wood products and bio-char [49]. CARBOMARK has been 
developing its own methodologies based on Verified Carbon Standard and CarbonFix ap-
proaches for IFM and biochar credits. 
Four public landowners (municipalities) have so far endorsed the setting-aside of an addition-
al part of the wood increment available for harvesting in the business as usual scenario. As of 
2012 300 tCO2 have been sold at a price ranging between €30-40 per tCO2. In the upcoming 
5 years the program is expecting to place roughly 15,000 credits on the market and to track 
them thanks to an internal registry.  
                                                8	  www.carbomark.org 
The process of monitoring, reduction and compensation is controlled by internal verifiers 
while carbon accounting methodologies, transactions and registry keeping is run by Veneto’s 
Directorate for Forests and Mountain Economy, and Friuli VG’s Central Department of Agri-
cultural, Natural and Forest Resources and Mountains acting as independent “Kyoto Observa-
tories”.  
Even if CARBOMARK has an outstanding and innovative approach for lowering transaction 
costs and ensuring the quality of offset projects, all the same it is facing high risks of double 
counting of credits. In fact, under article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol forest management is par-
tially accounted under the national reporting. Indeed, Italy is already heavily relying on forest 
management sequestration to meet the Kyoto targets (24% of the whole European amount 
under art. 3.3 and 3.4). Under these conditions, and with the new incoming monitoring refer-
ence levels for forest management in the Post-Kyoto agreement, the challenges facing the 
credibility of CARBOMARK are likely to increase. 
 
6. Cross comparison 
The case studies we have described may be summarized according to the [29] definition (see 
table 3). Although all the case studies have a clear definition of the traded ES, based on a vol-
untary system where conditional transactions occur, only three out of the four may be consid-
ered true PES schemes. The case of “Romagna Acque S.p.a.” has been reported to underline 
the effect of an inflexible legislative system on ES provision. Unlike the other cases, where 
there were clear definitions of buyers and sellers, here the sellers could only be publicly 
owned forests, due to the legal impossibility of direct economic transactions between public 
companies (Romagna Acque S.p.a.) and private agents (private forest owners. Apart from the 
carbon sequestration case, all the others work in a monopsony market where there is only one 
buyer. According to Bougherara [50] an ES market is more stable if buyers and sellers are 
concentrated, especially if there is a high risk of free riding on the demand side; in this sense 
monopsony represents an optimal situation.  
 
Table 3: PES parameters in the case studies 
 Catchment compensation 
for tap water supply: Ro-
magna Acque S.p.a. 
Catchment compensa-
tion for soil erosion 
reduction in Tunisia 
Biodiversity scheme 
for mature forest in 
Girona 
CARBONMARK project: 
Carbon sequestration in 
forest  
ES definition Forest cleaning service and 
erosion mitigation service. 
Erosion mitigation ser-
vice afforestation pro-
gram 
Forest aging for biodi-
versity maintenance 
Additional carbon stock 
increase through forest man-
agement, biochar, wood 
products and urban forestry. 
Buyer/s Romagna Acqua S.p.a. Water authority (govern-
ment) 
Private bank and pro-
vincial government 
Private enterprises 
Seller/s Public forest owner within Private landowners Public and private Forest owners, public urban 
the catchment area (while 
only indirectly private)  
(mainly farmers) forest owner within 
Girona Province 
area with trees, private 
wooden houses and private 
agriculture land 
Voluntariness 
of the parties 
Full voluntariness Full voluntariness Full voluntariness Full voluntariness 
Conditionality From intensive coppicing 
(actual BAU) towards close 
to nature silviculture 
Farmland (actual BAU) 
afforestation with acacia 
trees maintained alive for 
the first year 
Forest management 
from  wood production 
(actual BAU) to natu-
ral evolution. 
Increase in carbon stock 
following carbon accounting 
methodologies despite the 
actual removals (BAU) 
Principle  User-pay-principle  User-pay-principle User-pay-principle Polluter-pay-principle 
PES type PES-like True PES True PES True PES 
 
Cross comparison among case studies highlights other important issues about PES. The need 
to understand whether PES achieve economic and social aspects has been stressed by some 
authors [51]. [43] has addressed some simple PES parameters to provide more information on 
the scheme effectiveness (see table 4), in other words how far target ES provision is achieved. 
 
Table 4: Case study comparative analysis: the state of implementation 
PES parameter Catchment compensation 
for tap water supply: 
Romagna Acque S.p.a. 
Catchment compensation 
for soil erosion reduction 
in Tunisia 
Biodiversity scheme 
for mature forest in 
Girona 
Carbon sequestration in 
forest  
Start-up Romagna Acque S.p.a. Local public authorities Girona provincial 
government  
EU LIFE+ Project 
Scale  Spring catchment basin or 
dam basin 
Spring catchment basin Girona province Forest management unit 
level, urban forestry level 
within the Region 
Ecosystem 
benefits  
Water is filtered by forest 
with less nitrogen transport 
in the dam basin. Moreo-
ver, the avoided soil ero-
sion lengthens the dam life.  
Reduction of soil erosion 
and landslides to enhance 
water quality 
Over-mature forest 
maintenance for biodi-
versity purposes  
Increase of carbon stock in 
forest, agriculture soils and 
wood products. 
Risks Risk of losing additionality 
in the long term. Once the 
forest reach the climax 
status no environmental 
improvements may be 
added  
High risk of losing the new 
plantation due to summer 
drought and landslides 
Forest fires Forest fires and double 
counting of carbon credits 
derived from forest manage-
ment due to potential over-
lapping with art. 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Measurement Water quality on nitrogen 
content and pH. Soil ero-
sion is calculated annually 
according to the water 
volume traded and precipi-
tation. 
Variation of floods and 
landslide frequency 
Presence/absence of a 
set of native species 
Variation of carbon stock in 
forest or trees and volume of 
timber stock in houses  
Constraint Instable legal framework Lack of ES suppliers who 
want to change their land 
use 
Lack of ES suppliers 
who want to set aside  
Lack of ES buyer 
Directness  Direct payment between 
ES user and supplier 
One intermediary (gov-
ernment) drives payment 
between ES user and sup-
plier 
One/two intermediar-
ies (government and 
forest owners’ associa-
tion) drive payment 
between ES user and 
supplier 
Direct payment between ES 
user and supplier 
Payment 
source 
Percentage of water bill (1-
3%) 
Percentage of water bill Percentage of private 
bank revenue 
Voluntary monitoring, reduc-
tion and compensation of 
CO2 emissions by local 
enterprises. 
Payment mode 
and amount  
Direct payment to the 
forest owner  (100-200 
€/ha). Total amount 0.5-
1M€/year 
Direct payment to the land 
owner  (50-100 €/ha) when 
he ensures seedling life for 
at least a year.  
Public auction with 
immediate payment 
for the ES provided to 
the winner. Total 
amount 0.25M€/year 
Public inverse-auction. Car-
bon credits have been sold on 
40 €/CO2t (30 was the mini-
mum price). Consider that 
the average world price of a 
carbon credit is around 2-5 €/ 
CO2t 
Opportunity 
cost 
Price of dam-bed cleaning Downstream defensive 
infrastructure  
Price of forest wood 
production  
Price of cubic meter of tim-
ber for forest management 
methodology. 
PES Contract 
and length 
Annual or multiannual 
agreement based on a 
formal contract  
Potentially 20 years con-
tracts 
25 years of commit-
ment based on a for-
mal contract 
5 year commitment period 
for enterprises based on a 
formal contract and mini-
mum of 20 year commitment 
period for landowners. 
Supplier exit 
possibility 
Yes, without clause No available information Yes, with clause. 
Basically forest own-
ers have to give back 
the money 
Yes, with clause. Basically 
forest owners have to give 
back the money 
Payment revi-
sion and flexi-
bility 
The revision takes place 
every year according to the 
forest operation needed, 
and the water quality pa-
rameter and the soil ero-
sion effect  
No available information No revision No revision 
ES Monitoring  Romagna Acque S.p.a. 
monitors the water quality 
parameter hence indirectly 
the forest performance.  
The soil erosion is estimat-
ed according to the annual 
water quantity processed at 
the purifying facilities 
(according to annual rain-
fall) 
Annual check of tree 
growth 
Annual check of tree 
presence: no silvicul-
ture activities shall be 
done 
Internal verification system. 
Carbon accounting method-
ologies, transactions and 
registry keeping is run by 
independent “Kyoto Ob-
servatories”. 
ES Reporting Annual report within the 
accountability report for 
the traded ES. 
No available information Quarterly bulletin  Internally managed registry. 
 
Key actors have usually been the public government and agencies, due to the uneasy dialog 
providers and suppliers have to undertake for the bargaining process. The ES reference scale 
depends on the ES characteristics, and generally CO2 can be traded globally, while the others 
are linked to local or provincial scale. The risk of losing the ES can be grouped in two main 
categories: physical and methodological risks. The first consist of forest fires, storm damage 
or other catastrophes; however, they also include some social aspects such as acceptability of 
the PES (i.e. a forest fire might be triggered in the neighborhood and affect the forest where 
PES is in place). The second risk category is related to the methodology by which a given ES 
is measured. Forest carbon stock, water quality, and volume of soil erosion are costly meas-
urements that must be guaranteed. Especially in a carbon sequestration scheme the problem of 
double counting can occur where lack of coordination and reporting exists, hence it may nulli-
fy the PES scheme effectiveness. Moreover, an unstable legal framework may affect the actu-
al PES existence. For instance, a change in property rights or variation of the parameters for 
ES definition may enhance or withdraw the PES. Other constraints generally concern the 
presence of PES buyers and supplier. There are various motivations, but lack of information 
and education about the ES could be more relevant than economic aspects. Nevertheless, the-
se last constraints may be partially overcome by increasing the directness between parties. 
Moving on to the technical side of the PES, payment source, mode and amount and how it is 
calculated comparing alternative management opportunities are the basic features of the 
scheme effectiveness. Payment source also determines the price maker in the bargaining pro-
cess. In the case of carbon, companies’ willingness to compensate make them the weak fig-
ures in the PES. In fact they hold the scarcity dimension that lets them decide, especially 
when they have no return in terms of image. However, in all the cases presented here, the for-
est or land owner is the ES supplier. The way the payment is transferred from ES buyers to 
supplier is based on a direct agreement where only two actors are involved or a public auction 
where there are more than two. In the last few years, inverse auction has been promoted in 
order to stimulate a fairer price on the supply side [52], where a given ES supplier sets the 
minimum price for the auction as in the case of CARBONMARK. Opportunity cost has been 
considered as the minimum compensation price that may stimulate a forest owner to take ac-
tion. All these technical aspects are introduced in the contract with different binding level. In 
fact, exit possibility and revision of the payment amount may facilitate both parties involved 
in the scheme. Finally monitoring and reporting are annual activities that describe the perfor-
mance of the PES scheme for both parties. However, in most cases data and information are 
included in the accountability, hence are quite difficult to obtain.  
7. Conclusion 
Human behavior has affected the whole forest ecosystem. The increased perceived scarcity of 
certain ES and the evidence that forests provide a multitude of goods and services mean that 
forest stakeholders must address the challenging question as to whether forests should contin-
ue to maximize timber production. Despite the proliferation of norms and rules for managing 
forests that did not usually consider the equity principle, quantity based or market friction 
MBI have demonstrated the capacity to achieve better results where traditional approaches 
fail. PES schemes are an example and they represent the first step towards a market for eco-
system services. The rapid change in the demand has stimulated new sources of income for 
the forest sector. Water PES is an example. Among the Mediterranean case studies, water PES 
are more frequent, because it is relatively easy to define ES buyers and suppliers linked to 
water quality or quantity. Moreover, where a group of buyers builds up a monopsony condi-
tion this helps PES to be realized. The need to build a critical mass of land (suppliers) or ES 
demand (buyers) is the first step towards the success of a PES scheme. Landowners’ associa-
tions could substantially decrease the transaction costs on the supply side, but the hugest ef-
fort should be made to increase the awareness of ES, de facto, the real engine of the green 
economyPES or PES-like schemes could probably substitute subsidy-based mechanisms in 
order to operate existing schemes more dynamically especially in the Mediterranean area, but 
they are so far linked to specific situations, while applications of large schemes are still unre-
corded. However, several companies and public administrations prefer land acquisitions and 
land rents instead of PES implementation due to the lower transaction costs and the certainty 
of obtaining the needed ES (full land rights acquisition). In fact, also in the case of Vittel or 
Romagna Acque S.p.a. land acquisition was the first step prior to PES implementation. PES 
are useful when property rights are fully recognized by the forest owner, hence expropriation 
is difficult; a simple commercialization may consequently avoid social problems. A clear def-
inition of property rights is in fact a fundamental condition for implementing any MBI, hence 
PES. Finally, the future role of external trade should be considered, where not only goods are 
exchanged, but the price also covers the ES value. 
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Abstract: In Italy, the recreational wild mushroom picking (RWMP) has become an important income 
source for forest managers, reaching a social and economic dimension at national scale. While timber 
production has shown a general decrement in terms of economic values and quantity output in the last three 
decades, the welfare growth has modify the forest product demand. Since the late ‘70s, recreational RWMP 
have attracted the attention of the policy makers. The over-demand of this forest activity affected 
dramatically the wild mushroom (WM) availability for industrial and local processors. While the market has 
immediately reacted with a massive import of WM to fulfil the demand of local enterprises unable to 
purchase enough rough material, policy makers have faced into the problem to regulate the collection of a 
public good, the WM. Only the early 90s, policy makers set up a law based picking limits, on licenses and 
picking permit fees; nevertheless, forest managers have rarely introduced the silviculture techniques to 
enhance WM in forest. By means of a multiple case-study approach, the paper analyses the experiences of 
RWMP after a decade of license and permit fee implementation in the province of Vicenza (North-East 
Italy), comparing different approaches of RMWP management. The more complex and well structured is the 
organizational management system, such as for recreation based on wild mushrooms picking, instead than 
only for timber production, shown higher capacity of local forest managers to keep their forest under control 
while getting better levels of profitability. A final comparison is carried out between the income generation 
based on timber production and the one based on wild mushroom picking, with a common indicator of 
profitability [€/ha]. We found that RWMP may account for 0.39-0.57 M€/year according WM availability in 
the forest, adding a 7 - 21% economic value the timber production in the province of Vicenza. 
 
Introduction 
 
The collection of wild mushrooms (WM) have been recorded at global scale as a extensive forest human 
activities in forest areas (Boa 2004). However, WM picking affect several other fields od interests like 
multilevel trade, law and property rights, rural economy, social science and lastly as forest tourism. 
Especially in the northern hemispheres, several works studied the role of commercial WM picking as first 
step to fulfil the international demand of WM (Chang 2006, Yang et al. 2008) or to meet the needs of local 
consumption and traditions (Pieroni et al. 2005, Winkler 2008, Voces et al. 2012), as well to study the 
extraction of particular chemical for medicinal reasons (Shu Ting 1999, Ikekawa 2001, Dai et al. 2009). The 
commoditization process of WM has been the consequence the massive market demand in several very 
densely populated areas. Core countries for the international “WM market demand”, like Italy (Sitta and 
Floriani 2008), and Japan (Redhead 1997), have established similar economic patters to meet the request of 
their WM industry, unable to have sufficient rough material in the internal market since early nineties 
(McLain and Jones 1991, Schlosser and Blatner 1995). This was due to the rapid welfare growth that 
changed working condition on rural areas, moving people out from agriculture and forest sector. Whether on 
one side the lack of professional WM pickers caused the deficiency of WM availability for industrial 
processors, it allowed, on the other, the creation of a new forest demand based on recreational wild 
mushroom picking (RWMP): a rather new type of forest request for forest managers core issue of the present 
work. 
WM picking brought also problems for the policy makers. Since commercial WM picking appeared, several 
countries started to argue about the picking sustainability, as well the implementation of a legal system to 
regulate forest access rights. (Dyke and Newton 1999) reported the effect of WM picking on the Scottish 
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forest, where WM were collected in private and public land regardless WM ownerships, practically belonged 
by the land owner, but considered a commons goods by the picker side. The missed benefit transfer, 
generated several conflicts, as (McLain et al. 1998) similarly described the situation in the US Pacific 
Northwest. Moreover, another important issue has been the knowledge and habits transfer during the 
migration. The massive Italian and Chinese emigration flows to California brought a new habit that 
combined with the better standards sparked the RWMP (Arora 2008). The state was forced to introduce 
picking permit fee and legal constrains to stem the huge mass of Italian-American and Chino-Americans 
pickers enforced since nowadays. Though in the common law countries was relatively easy to modify the 
WM pickers access right because of the full recognition of land rights, in the countries where civil code 
system was enforced it has been rather difficult to implement any property right changes. According to the 
limits set up by the one’s national Constitution, property rights might recognize the full land property right or 
just a part. The political sensitivity, together with the great number of people involved, has been a major 
constrain for the policy makers reluctant to change WM property rights. The variety of the each national 
legal streams addressing to this issue is enormous and it changes form place to place (Merlo and Rojas 
Briales 2000), waving from pure public goods in the northern countries, where everyman’s rights on WM 
picking (Saastamoinen 1999), to full private land rights as in Italy and Spain, when forest owner “express” 
(generally with labels along property edge) “the will” to extend the property rights also on a specific forest 
externality such as WM and general non wood forest products (NWFP). Despite the complexity of each legal 
system, the concept of “expressed will” has been used by forest administration several times to avoid any 
monetary transfer because nobody do it, especially here WM picking permit fee is establish. On the other 
hand, this mechanism allowed forest owners to draw up contracts or sell private permit fees to WM pickers, 
either professional or recreational. Some examples have been recorder in Italy, along the Val Taro Valley, 
and Spain where some land owners built up WM reserves2; in general infrequently implemented in the forest 
sector with regards the most common practice: the free WM picking. 
While legislation has evolved slowly towards the recognition of WM picking as a forest output (Alexander 
and Roger 2003), a new market approach has started to appear among forest managers willing to stimulate 
forest revenues by enhancing WM income. Based on the direct link between the WM picking permit fee and 
the improvements of forest management practices suitable to enhance WM production in forest, in British 
Columbia (Canada) or in Borgotaro Valley (Italy), forest managers built up a market-based mechanism to 
ensure high productivity standard on its forests (Berch et al. 2007, Pettenella and Kloehn 2007). Thanks to 
the results of a particular WM silviculture, forest managers were able to increase WM productivity in the 
forest and fulfil at the same time the increasing demand of commercial and RWMP. Moreover, the high 
quality WM production generated withi this approach since the past, allowed to the WM of Borgotaro Valley 
to be labelled with European protected geographical indication (PGI). Thought they represent a sort of limit 
cases, they helps to understand the ratio that legitimate WM picking permit fee, as potential revenue for the 
forest owner willing to step into WM production. 
Estimation of forest management costs and the assessment of WM pickers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 
WM forest improvement allow to move the attention from legal and political aspects to active WM 
management, based on an economic dialog between the parties. Since forest WM production have been 
studied with some good results, for example on specific scot pine silviculture for Lactarius deliciosus and 
Boletus edulis (Giovannetti et al. 1998, Bonet et al. 2004, Martínez-Peña et al. 2012) or the enhancement of 
Tricholoma magnivelare production through forest cutting and litter regulation (Luoma et al. 2004, Luoma et 
al. 2006), the assessment of costs and benefits analysis have been improved considering the introduction of 
specific forest management techniques (Alexander et al. 2002, Palahi et al. 2009). On the demand side, 
several methodologies may be applied. Studies coming from Spain estimated RWMP access costs to forest 
(de Frutos et al. 2009) and WTP (Brey et al. 2007) to understand the pickers utility once a new WM 
management is enforced with an additional cost. The same approaches might be use to improve actual WM 
management once is already implemented (Tempesta 1996) helping the policy maker to redefine the WM 
picking fee base on the probability to have successful picking and time spent in forest. Other approaches 
have been used by (Cai et al. 2011) to assess the fear selling price by commercial WM pickers involved in 
the WM industry. Nevertheless where any WM picking activity is formally organized and recorded, the 
simple accountability may highlight trends and actual value of WM economy as reported in this paper. 
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Forests management, legal system, multi scale market, and cultural knowledge are all factors involved a 
simple but extensive forest activity like WM picking. Unfortunately, the lack of data is another factor that 
characterized this sector and it has limited the study of wider perspective on the future outcomes. 
The paper will focus on the wood market as proxy to identify trends and changes on WM market in Italy. 
Moreover a comparison between RWMP income and traditional wood gross production will be addressed 
through six case study in the province of Vicenza (North East Italy) over the last decade, in order to highlight 
the effect of different governance mechanism over the RWMP income. Aside the general introduction on 
WM picking and the conclusions sections, the paper is organized in four parts. The first describe briefly the 
methodologies and protocols we develop to collect the information. In the second part, the Italian timber 
production trends over the last 60 years are presented. The third part introduces the Italian WM sector and 
the changes transformed the sector in the last three decades: the market and the WM demand, as driving 
force of the change, the legal system implemented to manage the WM pikers and the implementation within 
the Veneto WM regional law of the national principle. In the forth part, some preliminary results are 
presented to compare some case-studies studied in Vicenza province about RWMP, in terms of profitability 
for the forest manager. 
 
Methodology 
 
The ratio beyond this work have been developed to explain the behaviour change among the Italian WM 
pickers, moving from a commercial toward a recreational WM piking. Basically, we investigated in three 
main aspects: i) trends and dimension of timber and firewood production as capital source for WM and in 
general NWFP production; ii) trends of commercial WM production and import; iii) and finally the 
economic dimension of RWMP in Vicenza province generated thought different WM governance approach. 
The first two aspects involved the simple trend description of the main forest indicators (Forest Europe 
UNECE and FAO 2011) like forest surface, timber and firewood production, gross marketable production 
and forest productivity, based on the data series of Italian forest sector (ISTAT 2012). WM import series has 
been built with of (Eurostat 2012), merging quantity data from six commodities (see Table 1) according to 
previous studies (Zuchegna 2005, Stevens et al. 2008). 
Table 1: Commodity code for WM import 
 CN8 – HS8 Codes 
Commodity Valid from 1988 to 2001 Valid from 2002 to 2050 
Fresh and Chilled Chanterelles 07.09.51.30 07.09.59.10 
Fresh and Chilled Flap Mushrooms (ceps) 07.09.51.50 07.09.59.30 
Other WM 07.09.51.90 07.09.59.90 
Dry mushrooms 07.12.30.00 07.12.39.00 
Dry Auricularia spp.  07.12.32.00 
Dry Tremella spp.  07.12.33.00 
Source: (Eurostat 2012) 
Moreover, several information has been also collected informally during filed work, from local WM 
processors and traders, which help to interpretation and confirm of the WM market trends. 
Moving to the third part, the study was carried out in the Province of Vicenza in each Mountain Community 
Authority3 (six in total) (see ), North East Italy. Characterized by large forested upland and humid valleys, 
the mountain areas have been always subject to WM harvesting due to the large population, accounting for 
0.87 million dwellers. Since a regional WM law4 implementation in Veneto region, few studies have 
addressed RWMP population. Being part of the sensitive information, Regional, Provincial, (MCA) and 
Municipal administrations ask to create a formal data collection protocol, to fulfil the requirements of 
privacy law.  
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Basically, we send 27 formal requests to the 
Regional Government, the Provinces (7 in total) 
and the MCA (19 in total) asking their forest and 
WM accountability and the list of pickers5. From 
their first feedbacks we forward the same request 
to the municipalities (21 in total) or private forest 
owner (1 in total) that managed directly the WM 
resources. Due to the large number of RWMP 
recorded (more then 0.2 million in Veneto 
Region) and the missing information about WM 
and forest revenues accountability, we decide to 
scale down at provincial level and pick up the 
most significant case: Vicenza province. Insofar, 
just one private real estate have applied for WM 
reserve, but due the limited quantity of WM 
produced and the WM management of the owner 
based on self WM collection , we decided to 
leave it out from the present work. Finally, the 
data have been grouped at MCA level basically 
the most common WM resources manager. 
The data collected have been used to compare 
the traditional forest income (gross revenues 
from wood production) with WM income by 
selling RWMP permits. In order to be compared, all the income data (gathered in real value) have been 
transformed in “current value” according to the methodology suggested by (ISTAT 2012). Moreover, the 
RWMP municipal density have been calculated and mapped to highlight potential linkages between RWMP 
and forests: basic knowledge to address new WM policy advise. 
 
The timber production in the Italian context: trends from the Fifties to nowadays  
 
The decrease of traditional forest profitability is not a recent issue in Italy as well as in other European 
countries.  Rural depopulation, together with the drop in wood prices, have triggered land abandon with the 
dramatic reduction of forest management practices, with negative consequences for rural areas over the mid-
to-long-term especially in the Mediterranean countries (Forest Europe UNECE and FAO 2011). The need of 
innovative economic opportunities based on forest output differentiation and coordination continues to be a 
touchstone for many scholars (Rametsteiner et al. 2006). Nevertheless, this key-issue still triggers the debate 
in the Italian academic and professional communities due, on the one hand to the continue decrement of 
timber value, and on the other hand, to the specificities of Italian context (Gatto et al. 2009). In Italy, 
possible innovative solutions to the decreasing profitability of forest activities have often crashed into the 
current institutional and legal framework, basically built over a stiff top-down “command and control” 
approach where the public institutions play a relevant direct role in managing forest resources – thus leaving 
limited room to private-leaded initiatives or alternative forest management system as in the central Europe. 
The low effectiveness of multi-level, multi-sector and multi-actor coordination is an important limiting factor 
in the forest sector development and its financial viability within the country (Pettenella and Romano 2010). 
Here, the shift from government to governance in timber and NTFPs management, harvesting and 
commercialisation would be needed for rebalancing the use and management of forest resources among 
stakeholders (private and public). 
Looking at the Italian forestry sector, these aspects come up immediately. Italy has approximately 30% of 
the total land area covered by forest (depending on the source of data, the range is between 9.1 to 10.4 M ha) 
(ISTAT 2009, FAO 2010), mainly (95%) concentrated in mountain and hilly areas. Slowly increasing since 
the II post-World War (Figure 2), the extent of forest is one of the key factors to understand forestry in the 
Italian peninsula. Between the two World Wars the households low income and the lack of job opportunities 
forced the exploitation of many remote areas, leading a general forest conversion mostly into grassland by 
the continue coppicing of broadleaf forest, extensive pasture and agricultural activities. At the same time, the 
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Figure 1:Maps of the case study area: Vicenza 
Province and the six Mountain Community 
Authorities 
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Italian autarkical program stimulated the domestic timber production, introducing also specific and rigid 
limitations to the use of forest in order to reduce the risks of floods, landslides and soil erosion, especially in 
deep mountain areas. The process ended up after the II World War, when general government reorganization 
and the Marshall’s plan allowed the creation of alternative job opportunities and the Italian economic 
development. In the years, the growth of industry and building sectors, together with the demographic 
growth and urbanization processes, resulted in rural area abandonment and forest natural expansion. Also the 
progressive reduction of agricultural profitability and the lack of welfare enhancement in rural areas lead to 
an increment of 20% of the forest area in Italy in the last 60 years (ISTAT 2012). The migration from rural to 
urban areas did contract also the timber production (see Figure 3), especially on the private land due to the 
highly fragmented real estates (Canton and Pettenella 2010) split from large latifundium after the second 
post war. Nevertheless, thanks to the compulsory management of public land, timber production decrease 
mainly in economic value, while fuelwood production has stated again a constant growth since the first oil 
crisis during the early seventies. On the contrary, the gross marketable production (see Figure 4) as well as 
productivity (see Figure 5) got negative trend. The foundation of the European Economical Community 
(EEC) and the liberalization of the international market, together with the growth of wood industry (based on 
in furniture production and export), the micro-scale private forest ownerships and the rigid legislation on 
forest protection for reducing the hydro-geological risks, stimulated the roundwood and fuelwood imports, 
pointing out the structural inefficiency of the forestry sector. By looking at the GMP (see Figure 4) as an 
indicator of the economic pattern of forestry in Italy, three main peaks, corresponding to the economic crises 
in the Seventies, Eighties and Nineties, can be identified. Nevertheless, the general trend is clearly negative, 
especially in two macro-regions, North-East (NE) and North-West (NW), leaders in terms of productivity, 
GMP and specialized in roundwood production, but unable to compete with increasing competition coming 
from the international market. The Central (C) and South (S) macro-regions, less specialized in high added 
value timber products, were able to maintain and even enhance the level of their production based on 
firewood. Thanks to the mechanization of coppice forest management and harvesting practices (Picchio et al. 
2009, Zimbalatti and Proto 2009) and the upsurge of oil (fuel) price, they have the highest share both in 
productivity and GMP (see Figure 4, Figure 5). 
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Figure 2: Forest area (M ha) in Italy, 1950-2006 by macro regions (NUTS1) 
	  
Figure 3: Timber and firewood production (Mm3) in Italy, 1950-2006 by 
macro regions (NUTS1) 
	  
Figure 4: Gross Marketable Production (GMP) (M€) in Italy, 1950-2006, by 
macro regions (NUTS1) 
 
Figure 5: Forest productivity (€/ha)  in Italy, 1950-2006, by macro-regions 
(NUTS1) 
 
Note for Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5. North-West (NW) = Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria; North-East (NE) = Trentino-Alto-Adige, Veneto, Friuli, 
Emilia-Romagna; Central (C) = Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio; South (S) = Abruzzi, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Campania, Calabria; Islands (I) = Sicily, Sardinia. Source: our 
elaboration based on (ISTAT 2012) 
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The limited capacity of policy-makers to have a long-term overview, the historical deep-roots of the Italian 
forest law oriented to soil and hydro-geological protection and other country-specific characteristics made 
the unprepared Italian forestry system unable to catch new opportunities. Among the key-factors in 
determining the current situation it is worth to mention at least: (i) the decentralization process began in 
1977, when the central government let the 21 Italian Regions to lay down their own local forest laws within 
an out-dated national forest policy (Carbone and Savelli 2009); (ii) the unclear roles in legal framework and 
institutional setting, with the continuous redefinition of competences of Ministries and other central agencies 
in charge of forestry (Pettenella and Secco 2004); (iii) the lack of effective institutions for horizontal and 
vertical coordination, e.g. with regards to European institutions or international forest agreements (FAO 
2005); (iv) the lack of “direct and coherent involvement of the forestry research community” (Carbone and 
Savelli 2009)in defining national forestry policy, led by competences/responsibilities overlapping and 
underling role of research to politics; and finally (v) the underestimation of the forest sector economic value 
by the government (Pettenella and Romano 2010). Coming up with this negative forestry framework it may 
transpire why WM and in general NWFP, have been an alternative income source for rural population. 
 
 
The WM in Italy: from production to recreational WM picking. 
 
Italy is a mycophilic country, accounting a long traditions handed down since the past. Before the 1900, Italy 
was consuming and exporting WM along the trade flows of Venice and Genova. The fist data officially 
recorded by the national statistical institute (ISTAT) were noted in the 1934 (ISTAT 2012). As we reported 
for the forest sector, commercial WM picking was linked with the rural economy; therefore the trends of 
timber and firewood production go over again in the WM production (see Figure 6). Despite the typical 
fluctuation of the WM production, after the seventies there has been a first collapse of the internal 
production, creating an internal deficit filled up only in the late ‘80s with a massive import of WM. Among 
the imported WM, fresh, frozen and dry ceps (Boletus edulis) have represented from 39 to 89% of the total 
weight. 
 
Figure 6: Italian WM production and import (NUTS0) 
 
Note: the import curve considers fresh and chilled chanterelles (HS8 code 07095130, 07095910), fresh or 
chilled flap mushrooms (HS8 code 07095150, 07095930), other WM (HS8 code 07095190, 07095990), dry 
WM (HS8 code 07123000, 07123900), the genus Auricularia (07123200) and the genus Tremella (HS8 code 
0712330). Source: (ISTAT 2012) for WM Italian production; (Eurostat 2012) for trade between 1988 and 
2010. 
 
At the same time, people improved their life standard and they stated to collect WM as a recreational activity 
competing with professional WM pickers. Evidence of this widespread phenomenon have been described in 
the preliminary report6 of the law 352/93 (the mushroom law) aiming to solve the rights conflicts between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Law draft n. 226, 20th May 1992: law report.  
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professional and recreational WM pickers as well with real right holders7. Going back to Italy, also 
customary right holders were addressed by the law that point out the important role of saving traditions on 
the use of WM. Basically the national law 352/93 stated the full property right of the landowner, that has 
anyhow to manifest its willing, labelling the edges of the forest. WM, considered at that moment a forest 
externality (Res Nullius), becames effectively semi-private goods. Moreover, it set up particular standards for 
boletes or cep importers, till today a sort of pillar to determine product class quality at international level. 
The law was a merging point of several concepts contained in other decrees of forest and food sector. In this 
context, a lot of attention have been given to RWMP in which the legislator want to ensure the sustainability 
of the WM use, setting up harvesting limitations in order to reduce their harvesting impacts. Afterwards, due 
to a devolution process, the Italian Government delivered to the Regions the responsibility to control and 
regulate the WM and maintain the local customary rights especially in mountain areas. Each regions, within 
the limits of the national WM law, set up its own WM management system. Figure 7 represents the structure 
of the national WM national law, coordinated with the Veneto’s regional WM law, where concepts contained 
in three main legislative topics have merged. The results was a complex law in which forest and alimentary 
prescriptions have been set up for different groups of WM pickers. 
 
Figure 7: WM law structure within the Italian legal framework. 
 
Note: Abbreviation: O.G.=Official Gazette; C.C.=Civil Code; L.=Law; D.L.= Decree Law; 
M.D.=Ministerial Decree; M.O.=Ministerial Ordinance; P.D.=Presidential Decree; R.D.=Royal 
Decree; R.L.=Regional Law 
 
The overall effect of the national WM law implemented in Veneto Region (similarly to other regions) was 
the differentiation of WM pickers, with a clear distinction between professional and RWMP. Due to the 
several restrictions and harvesting rights we summarized schematically the main categories of pickers and 
their rights (see Figure 8). On one side, real right holders can pick up WM just bearing a certification of the 
property or the contract, and they may exclude other pickers with the application of labels along the property 
edge. On the other, RWMP are differentiated in three: i) living in plain areas, ii) living in mountain and 
holding customary rights iii) and lastly pickers living in mountain area without customary rights. So, holding 
the ID, pickers can go to pick up mushroom freely in plain or purchase a picking permit for mountain areas. 
Before 2012, the these permit were all recorded within a picking badge, but after the implementation of 
Regional Law 07/12, the regional WM authority remove the WM picking badge, a sort of ID for RWMP, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This social occurrence was not only an Italian problem, since it have been recorded also in the states where Italian 
emigrants entered. An example is US, where Californian government faced into the same problem manifest in Italy 
(Arora 2008) due to the invasion of Italian RWMP. 
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simplifying the payment mechanism with a direct compensation to the forest managers (private and public). 
Moreover, the harvest limit is set up to a maximum of 3 kg of WM and only 1 Kg of the most valuable WM 
species8. 
 
Figure 8:WM law outputs in terms of harvesting rights in Italy: private and public land. 
 
Note: “Regole” are a type of community-based land quite well-represented in North-East Italy. In practice, it is a 
common private land owned by local families, where the rights/duties connected with the use and management of forest 
and grassland are shared by all residents. Some of them are ancient institutions, typically in mountain areas. 
Abbreviations. ID: Identity Card;WEF: Wild Edible Fungi.  
 
The law did not addressed to the income let forest managers decide. So either private or public owner may 
use WM revenue as normal income. Thanks to this legislative gap, we searched the actual economic results 
in six MCA that adopted different WM governance methods based mainly on the control of RWMP forest 
access right as well on the revenue reinvestment: two major factors affecting WM revenues out of 
environmental parameters like summer rainfall and temeperature. 
 
RWMP and Timber Production: comparison among six case studies. 
 
A comparison between the levels of profitability for the two different forest functions, RWMP, and timber 
production, has been carried out in six case studies (the six MCA). Altogether the RWMP were 60111, 
accounting for the 6.9% of the Province population; 30747 in plain area and 29364 living in mountain 
distributed among the six MCA. Since RWMP is the most common forest paid recreational activity, it has 
played an important roles where encompassed within the forest management plan and put into effect, in 
organizational, silvicultural and marketing terms. In Table 2, we briefly introduce the general aspects that 
characterized the six MCA considered, representing the administrative embodies managing the mountain 
areas in the province of Vicenza. As already mentioned above, the forest managers have to respect only the 
minimal standards set up by the Regional WM law, such as sell the permits and keep the RWMP record, but 
nothing is specified about WM revenues use.  
In order to compare the economic outputs between traditional forestry production and RWMP, we built a set 
of historical series on gross income, gross revenue per hectare. The data come the accountabilities of the 
municipalities, nevertheless the average wood price within the year and the time we consider (2000-2010) 
has had a minimal variation; this fact might be explained by the small dimension of the local forest sector, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Agrocybe aegerita, Amanita caesarea, Boletus edulis, Calocybe gambosa, Cantharellus cibarius, C. lutescens, 
Clitopilus prunulus, Clitocype geotropa Craterellus cornucopioides, Macrolepiota procera, Russula virescens and all 
the edible species of genus Morchella, Tricholoma and Polyporus. 
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linked mainly with building construction and packaging (timber) or firewood production locally consumed. 
On the contrary, WM income has varied cause of the quantity of summer and autumn rainfall: one of the key 
factor that affects WM sprouting season.  
Comparing the gross income of wood and RWMP, CM_7C is a core area in absolute terms for wood and 
WM, due to forest extension and the type of forest (see Figure 9, Figure 11). The high stand forests have 
generally a high added value compare coppice forest, so is generally much valuable than coppice forest; this 
may be seen also in terms of gross productivity per hectare (see Figure 10), but opposite figure comes up if 
we look the WM gross income per hectare (see Figure 12). While high stand forest needs a longer period to 
increase WM (Perini and Laganà 2004, Salerni and Perini 2004) and lengthen of the forest turnover, coppice 
forest is generally more reactive (Giovannetti et al. 1998) if silviculture practices aim to replace old stumps 
and keep young the forest. Moreover, broadleaf forests have longer sprouting season, with a large variety of 
edible WM, while coniferous forests have a smaller WM season that in relative terms, gross income per 
hectare results lower. For instance, CM_LT promote active forest management with general investments on 
forest silviculture techniques that aim to enhance the chestnuts productivity (Marcolin et al. 2012) and 
beeches stability (high stand forest), indirectly it allow to have better performance also in relative terms for 
WM gross income (see Figure 11, Figure 12); comparable or even higher than very attractive WM area such 
as CM_7C. Also in the case of CM_AP, despite the low wood productivity per hectare, the active 
management of coppice forest enhanced the WM production.  
Low forestry level like in the case of CM_AC may result in a relatively good WM income performance, but 
this is due to the local WM collection habits, linked to the collection of Armillaria species, generally 
sprouting in abandon, degraded forest or after the forest cuts. According to the information gathered by the 
local forest manager (MCA) land abandon has been the cause-effect of this WM income performance, 
decreasing in the time due to the progressive forest depletion. 
 
Table 2: Main features related to WM collection in the six MCA 
Case-study code CM_7C CM_AB CM_AC CM_AP CM_B CM_LT 
Name of the WM 
manager CM dei 7 Comuni 
CM dall’Astico al 
Brenta 
CM dall’Agno al 
Chiampo 
CM dell’Alto 
Astico e Posina CM del Brenta 
CM del Leogra e 
Timonchio 
Type of embody Public coordinator Public coordinator Public coordinator Public coordinator Public coordinator Public coordinator 
Forest surface 30333 ha 4557 ha 13163 ha 23460 ha 11432 ha 10008 ha 
Public land 81% 41% 11% 12% 31% 5% 
Main forest 
management 
High stand and 
coppice 
High stand and 
coppice Coppice Coppice Coppice 
Coppice and high 
stand 
Number of recorded 
pickers (total n.) 6612 1515 6404 3042 2960 8831 
Daily picking 
permit (average) 16700 n.a. 423 2772 n.a. 304 
Month picking 
permit (average) 296 n.a. 167 184 n.a. 233 
Annual picking 
permit (average) 1099 n.a. 1131 1114 n.a. 2288 
Cost of picking 
permits for non 
residents9 
daily 8€;  
monthly 42€; 
 annually 77€ 
daily 6€;  
monthly 17€;  
annually 32€ 
daily 5€; 
 monthly 20€;  
annually 40€ 
daily 6€; 
 monthly 30€;  
annually 77€ 
daily 6€; 
 monthly 30€;  
annually 60€ 
daily 5€; 
 monthly 35€;  
annually 50€ 
Main WM 
collected10 
Boletus spp; 
Armillaria spp. 
Boletus spp; 
Armillaria spp. Armillaria spp. 
Boletus spp; 
Armillaria spp. Armillaria spp. 
Armillaria spp. 
Boletus spp. 
Level of field 
control on picking 
Constant during 
the WM season Very low  
Frequent during 
the WM season 
Constant during 
the WM season Very low 
Frequent during 
the WM season 
Investments in 
forest for WM 
Some investments 
on WM resources 
management. 
No or scarce 
(one in 2011) No or scarce 
Indirectly. 
Investments to 
keep active 
forestry 
No or scarce 
Indirectly. 
Investments to 
keep active 
forestry 
Source: own elaboration. CM= “Comunità Montana” authority, in English Mountain Community Authority (MCA). 
 
Silviculture is an import aspect for WM production in forest, but alone standing, it may have undesired 
effects. In fact, low RWMP control (see CM_AB case) may results in a low WM income, due illegal picking, 
which is a self-feeding behaviour. Nevertheless, there are also areas like CM_B not very productive in terms 
of WM production because of the rugged topography. We also mapped and compare with RWMP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Generally, local residents without customary rights may purchase the WM picking permit for half price. 
10 Several other mushrooms are collected. 
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distribution as rate of municipal population and the average WM gross income (see Errore. L'origine 
riferimento non è stata trovata.Figure 13). The results show a clear linkage between RWMP density and 
the most productive WM areas (CM_LT, CM_7C, CM_AP), while lower presence are recorded where there 
is low attention on RWMP. It is worth to mention that local customary rights affect only to a minimum the 
RWMP income, because the majority of the pickers usually purchase the picking permit for the surrounding 
municipalities, where they cannot claim their customary rights. 
The results highlight the concept of forest active management with a cause-effect link results between active 
silviculture in coppice forest and RWMP. Nevertheless, local RWMP governance is fundamental to achieve 
good economic results in all the forest output. The RWMP control may enhance the WM gross revenue for 
the forest manager, but without an investment on forest sector, it may generate a contrary effect. In fact, the 
case of CM_AC highlights this phenomenon, with a constant decrement of WM gross income along the time. 
Among the reasons that take RWMP in the forest, the change to have good picking experiences is 
fundamental and it represents a core issue on RWMP governance. According to (Tempesta 1996), the chance 
to have good picking determines also higher willingness to pay and consequently a wider margin for the 
forest manager that justify the picking permit price increment, as occurred in the case of CM_7C and 
CM_AP. These trends confirm empirically the comparison between Italian wood and WM market. In fact the 
land abandon, common issue in Italy, together with the political changes in EU, are among the causes of 
market dumps and low productivity, typical scenario of the late seventies for WM and timber market. 
RWMP may be a driving force for the local development as it happened in the case of “Borgotaro 
Consortium” (Regni 2005, Pettenella and Kloehn 2007); place where local economy exploited, not only the 
RWMP, but mostly the ability local stakeholders to provide a wider range of forest and non-forest activities, 
interlinked with WM resource. In fact, local forest managers consolidated RWMP through the creation of a 
complex network11. The forest silviculture have been coordinated within the local context, through the 
integration of a wider number of stakeholders like touristic agencies, restaurants, other agricultural producers 
and international WM traders to fulfil the huge demand of WM, generally activities horizontally integrated. 
WM in Borgotaro were much more than a commodity or recreational service and they represented the key-
component of a larger network based on the concept of “territory”, with the WM as a brand (imago product) 
(Secco et al. 2009). The result was the increment of WM gross revenue. In fact, the Consortium was able to 
provide a consistent portfolio of products and services, while the contribution to the local economy was 
impressive: from permits selling the Consortium is able to gain about 420,000 Euro/year (approximately 18 
€/ha) and an additional 2.8 M€ was estimated as total income deriving from WM tourism in the area 
(Pettenella and Kloehn 2007), approximately 120€/ha (excluded wood production). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In	  this	  context,	  the	  definition	  of	  network	  by	  (Human	  and	  Provan	  1997)	  –	  modified	  is	  referring	  to:	  “An	  intentionally	  formed	  group	  
of	  small-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐sized	   firms	   in	  which	   the	   firms:	  1)	  are	  geographically	  proximate;	  2)	   share	  some	   inputs	  and	  outputs,	  and	  3)	  
undertake	  direct	  interactions	  with	  each	  other	  for	  specific	  business	  outcomes.	  The	  interactions	  may	  include	  joint	  production,	  new	  
product	  development,	  collective	  marketing	  and	  employee	  training” 
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Figure 9: Wood gross income in thousand euros (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 10: Wood gross income per hectare (2000-2009) 
 
 
Figure 11: WM gross income in thousand euros (2000-2010) 
 
Figure 12: WM gross income per hectare (2000-2010) 
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Figure 13: RWMP and average WM gross income: visual distribution  The	  case	  of	  recreational	  mushroom	  picking	  in	  Vicenza	  Province	  	  
RWMP	  distribution	  as	  rate	  of	  municipal	  
population	   Forest	  types	   Average	  RWMP	  income	  per	  hectare	  
	   	   	  Note:	  Pickers’	  distribution	   Note:	   the	   majority	   of	   symbiotic	   mushroom	  (Boletus	   spp)	   are	   produced	   in	   from	   green	   to	  dark	   yellow	   forest	   areas	   (coniferous,	   beech	   and	  chestnuts	   forests),	   while	   orange	   and	   other	  colour	  area	  are	  less	  productive.	  
Note:	  average	  mushroom	  income	  per	  hectare	  by	  forest	   managers	   (MCA).	   High	   values	   occur	  where	  silviculture	  is	  active.	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Conclusions 
 
While a general failure of the forest sector on the production of high added value timber products can be 
recorded, wild mushroom resources represent now an interesting forest output for the forest managers. 
Unlike wood production, mushroom production is characterized by great variability in the annual yield, 
which is linked with a high perishability requiring timely collection and marketing strategies. These 
characteristics, combined with the lack of knowledge on new silviculture techniques among the practitioners, 
make difficult to integrate forest managers with WM production.  
The positive commercial trends of RWMP in the last decades, together with the high WM profitability at 
forest level should thought as a new milepost in the future forest management plan. Focusing on the 
potentials and challenges for enhancing new types of forest-based business, like WM resources to forest 
owners, it seems the organizational model is one of the most important key-issues: from our preliminary 
findings, levels of profitability depend on the how a give resource like WM is consider, managed and 
coordinate with the other forest outputs; hence the most advanced level of profitability from WM are reached 
through networks models. Despite the annual revenues of about 0.45 M€ of the whole WM gross revenue in 
Vicenza province (~88000ha), the same amount of revenue have been achieve in a smaller area 33.000 ha 
through a well-structured organisation of the value-chain based on territorial marketing initiatives.  
The case studies in the province of Vicenza, where no or few forest investments have been done or neither 
controls on RWMP, the income from this type of products is even more limited and decreasing. On the 
contrary, the “net-system approach” enhances the local values, increasing as well the local economic 
resilience basically starting from creating or consolidating ties among the different players of the supply 
chain. By improving the local governance mechanisms, by introducing innovative private-public initiatives 
based on stronger relationships among wild mushroom-tourism-forest, by enforcing and locally adapting 
forest and wild mushroom laws/regulations, by re-organising in networks the value chain, and by creating 
mutual trust among the involved actors (where not only commodities are provided as output but also 
relational goods), rural communities would have the possibility to improve their market position and invert 
the decreasing trend of their forest profitability.  
It is worthwhile to mention that property rights regulations are important, indeed, for pickers and forest 
owners, but more important is the chance of entrepreneurial innovation. Nevertheless, even if the 
development of a WM business represents a potential opportunity in the rural scenario, it cannot always be 
considered “the” solution for rural communities problems, such as employment opportunities. The strong 
dependence on climate seasonality and instability makes mushroom production inconstant and time-limited 
(two-three months) along the year. Only a very well structured system, based on diversification strategies 
and a large portfolio of products and services, may allow to maintain permanent jobs and guarantee 
acceptable stability. However, indubitably RWMP contributes to the diversification of rural economy, and 
indirectly supports an active management of landscape. The straight involvement of the different actors 
guarantees the sustainable use of the resource, and in order to do this, part of the revenues are reinvested in 
forest and forest management. Moreover, larger stakeholders participation into WM business not only would 
favour the local entrepreneurship growth, but also the mutual control of all the partners involved in resource 
management.  
In Italy and Europe, specific and detailed RWMP case-studies are lacking. Additional research would be 
needed in estimating trade-offs between RWMP and other recreational forest uses. The complexity of inter-
relationships occurring among the different aspects connected with WM uses in rural areas (i.e. economic 
activities, natural resources management, mushroom biology, social demands, etc.) requires interdisciplinary 
communication and cooperation.  
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Harvesting wild edible fungi for recreation, home consumption or to supply small local markets has
traditionally been a popular activity in rural Finland. Yet some species, such as ceps (Boletus edulis) and pine
boletes (Boletus pinophilus), which are well appreciated in Southern Europe, were not exploited commercially.
In the past decade, international trade in previously unused mushroom resources has increasingly provided
rural communities with additional earning opportunities. In this article we document the emergence in
Eastern Finland of a wild edible fungi industry, describe its value chain, and assess its significance as a source
of income for disadvantaged rural dwellers. The data for the analysis were collected through interviews with
the management of Finland's largest wild mushroom business, and an extensive survey of the pickers who
supply the company.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, interest in commercial harvesting of wild
edible fungi (WEF) has increased considerably in many regions
(Monserud et al., 2003;Merlo and Croitoru, 2005; Pettenella and Kloehn,
2007). In most cases, this happened as expanding markets for specialty
products, decreasing wood prices and restrictions on logging made the
economics of wild mushrooms more attractive (Alexander et al., 2002;
Palahí et al., 2009). In some forests themarket value of wild mushrooms
may well be as high as that of timber (Pettenella and Secco, 2006).
Indeed, several countries have attempted to promote the emergence of a
WEF industry as a means of providing incentives for forest conservation
and improving the earning opportunities of people living in marginal
rural areas (Härkönen, 1998; Ortega-Martínez andMartínez-Peña, 2008;
Kilchling et al., 2009).
Despite the growing interest in picking wild mushrooms in
developed countries, in most cases the social, economic and
environmental implications are largely unknown because of a
substantial lack of data. Statistical information on volumes collected
and values is patchy and often unreliable (Vantomme, 2003; Boa,
2004) and there are only a few published accounts of how the WEF
industry operates. The region where commercial picking of wild
mushrooms has probably been most thoroughly described is the
Pacific North-Western United States (e.g. Schlosser and Blatner, 1995;
Pilz and Molina, 2002). In Europe, few studies of commercial wild
mushroom gathering could be located: Dyke and Newton (1999)
surveyed pickers, buyers and landowners to assess the sustainability
of theWEF industry in Scotland; in Northern Spain, De Román and Boa
(2006) analyzed the extent to which a small rural community has
been affected by the gathering and marketing of Lactarius deliciosus.
In this article we document the emergence of commercial wild
mushroom harvesting in Eastern Finland, describe the industry's
value chain and assess its contribution to rural development in an area
where the population is slightly more than half a million, sparse and
dwindling, and the rate of unemployment has historically been high
compared to its national counterpart. In 2009, indeed, the unemploy-
ment rate in Eastern Finland, which until recently was designated as a
less developed region under the European Union's regional policy,
exceeded 11%, second only to that of Lapland, the northernmost part
of the country (Statistics Finland, 2010).
In addition, a combination of external shocks (e.g. the Russian
adoption of a wood export tariff in 2008) and long-term downsizing
trends in the wood and paper sector have resulted in significant job
losses in forestry and related industries, which traditionally repre-
sented a key component of the regional economy.
Our analysis devotes particular attention to the harvesters who
gather the WEF from the forest, as they represent the vast majority of
those involved in the industry. Even in developed countries, very little
is usually known about the socio-economic characteristics of the
pickers, their practices, and returns from the activity. With the aim of
identifying howmany andwhat types of people engage in commercial
gathering of WEF, quantifying the time devoted to the activity and the
amounts collected, and assessing the economic significance of this
source of income, we ran an extensive survey of Eastern Finland's
pickers. Our analysis has been facilitated by the presence in the area of
Finland's largest WEF company, Dalla Valle OY.
Forest managers and researchers in several countries have
reported that pickers are unwilling to share information about their
activities because of a combination of jealously guarding good sites,
awareness that they access the resource without a required
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authorization, andworries about possible changes inWEF regulations.
In the specific case of Finland, friendly legislation leaves pickers with
few reasons to be suspicious of inquiry. Under the so-called every-
man's right, anyone is entitled to collect wild foods from a forest,
irrespective of land ownership. Also, any revenues from the sale of
their harvest are exempted from income tax.
Indeed, Finland's pickers of wild edibles have been the subject of a
handful of studies. Once necessary for subsistence, collecting wild
foods from the forests now largely represents a form of recreation.
While its popularity is sometimes described as declining, the activity
is still very common:more than one Finn in two appears to participate
to some extent in the collection of wild edibles (Kangas and
Niemeläinen, 1996; Saastamoinen, 1999). Most studies of pickers,
however, have concentrated on berries, which are more widely
collected thanWEF (Saastamoinen and Lohiniva, 1989; Saastamoinen
et al., 2000; Kangas and Markkanen, 2001; Pouta et al., 2006). A study
specifically on the collection of WEF was carried out by Sievänen et al.
(2004) using data from a large survey of outdoor activities conducted
in the late 1990s. They observed that as many as 73% of Finnish adults
possess the necessary skills to pick WEF (e.g. distinguishing edible
from poisonous mushrooms, wandering in a forest without getting
lost, a basic understanding of the forest ecosystem). While picking
abilities are widespread, actual involvement and target species vary
widely across locations, with Eastern Finland being the region with
the largest share ofWEF pickers (50% of the population). Picking effort
is also found to respond to the abundance of the crop. Being closely
linked to the weather, the availability of WEF can vary dramatically
from one year to another. When the crop is poor, both the rate of
participation and the number of harvesting trips to the forest appear
to decrease substantially. Unfortunately, the study by Sievänen et al.
(2004), consistently with its focus on recreation, produced little
evidence on the commercial aspects ofWEF collection. No information
is available about the quantities picked, the share that is collected for
sale as opposed to home consumption, and the earnings of the pickers.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 1
gives a brief description of the survey and outlines themethodological
aspects of the subsequent analysis; Section 2 documents the
emergence of a local WEF business; Section 3 presents the results
and the discussion of our survey; Section 4 concludes.
2. Materials and methods
The operations and socio-economic impacts of Eastern Finland's
WEF industry are described using information from twomain sources:
interviews with the management board of Dalla Valle OY, a WEF
business with large operations in the area, and a survey of the pickers
who supply the company. The wholesaler that places most of Dalla
Valle OY's fresh ceps on the Italian market was also interviewed. Due
to the tight schedules of company staff during the WEF high season,
the interviews took place over a relatively long period of time
stretching from late 2007 to late 2008. Whenever possible the
answers were validated against official forestry statistics (METLA,
2008).
The survey of the pickers was conducted in August and September
2008, throughout the mushroom gathering season. At selected Dalla
Valle OY purchase points located throughout North Karelia, in Eastern
Finland, pickers who approached the company to sell their harvest
were administered a questionnaire which asked for information about
their mushroom gathering activities, socio-economic characteristics,
and concerns pertaining to the picking of wild mushrooms.
Of the 1652 questionnaires handed out, about 59% were returned,
but only 750 had complete answers to all the questions of interest,
which amounts to a 45% response rate. In fact, the only problem with
the great majority of the incomplete questionnaires is that they lack
answers to the questions about collected quantities (i.e. about
revenues). However, no evidence was found of selection bias, and it
can be safely assumed that answers are missing at random.
Using cluster analysis, pickers were divided into internally
homogeneous groups on the basis of measures of their picking effort
(amount collected and picking days per season, percentage sold, and
length of a typical gathering trip). At a preliminary stage, hierarchical
clustering algorithmswere used to identify the appropriate number of
groups. Subsequently, the sample was partitioned using the k-means
algorithmwith Euclidean dissimilarities. Variables were rescaled to be
in the [0,1] interval. Differences among groups are described bymeans
of linear discriminant analysis.
The probability that a picker belongs to a given group was then
modelled as a function of socio-economic characteristics (age, sex,
education and occupational status) using logistic regression. We also
present the results of separate ordinary least-square regressions of
time spent on mushroom gathering trips and total commercial
harvest on socio-economic characteristics. The statistical analysis
was carried out in Stata (2007).
3. The development of a local WEF industry Dalla Valle
Over the years, Finland's governments have tried to promote the
use of wild mushrooms through a variety of rural policy measures.
Early attempts to encourage collection for food after World War II
were not very effective (Härkönen, 1998). In the 1970s, efforts
intensified to develop the commercial uses of wild mushrooms and
other non-timber forest products. Several local and national projects
were established to train mushroom advisers. Revenues from
collecting wild edibles were exempted from income tax, and tax
relief was introduced for companies purchasing wild mushrooms or
berries (Saastamoinen, 1999). A statute on WEF was passed and a list
of commercial species published.
For a short period in the mid-1990s, direct subsidies were
implemented to encourage mushroom and berry businesses to
expand their operations. A trader would receive 3 Finnish Marks
(about .50 Euro) for every kilogram of mushrooms bought from the
pickers. It was at about this time that two wholesalers and a berry
entrepreneur teamed up to found Dalla Valle OY.
Until mushroom export companies began to appear in the early
1980s, very few businesses were active in mushroom collection in
Eastern Finland and focused only on marketing a few locally well-
known species (Lactarius trivialis, Lactarius rufus, Cantharellus cibarius
and Russula spp.) in the urban areas of the country. Some species that
command fairly high prices on foreign markets, such as ceps (Boletus
edulis), received little interest.
Since the 1997 season, Dalla Valle OY has purchased wild
mushrooms — mainly but not exclusively ceps — from pickers, and
marketed most of its output in Southern Europe. Because ceps were
not popular among North Karelia's pickers, the company had to
devote substantial effort to training. Leaflets were distributed to
explain why, when and how to collect boletes. Communication with
potential pickers is also crucial in order to secure a stable supply of
mushrooms. Ensuring that enoughmushrooms are available for sale is
one of the most critical issues in the WEF industry. To this end, Dalla
Valle OY advertises massively in the local and national press, and
dispatches information to pickers through its newsletter. In the
summer of 2008, Dalla Valle OY's website had about 14,000 registered
users who regularly received mushroom news on their cellphones. At
the peak of the 2003 season the number of pickers supplying the
company was reportedly between 15,000 and 20,000.
In each major town, the company operates permanent ‘collection
points’ where pickers can sell their harvest throughout the season. In
addition, daily trucks (‘lines’) drive to more remote areas that are
deemed strategically important. Depending on the local crop and the
conditions that prevail on the international market, picker-level
prices range from 3 to 10 Euro/kg for high-grade ceps, and from 1 to
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3 Euro/kg for medium-grade. Low-grade ceps are purchased for less
than 1 Euro/kg. Chanterelles (C. cibarius) and black trumpets
(Craterellus cornucopioides) are bought for 4 to 7 Euro/kg.
At day's end, the whole harvest is delivered to the central
processing facility in Sotkuma, from where it can take three different
routes. Ceps may be sold either fresh or frozen, depending on quality
and market demand, and shipped to Italy or, more rarely, to other
Southern European countries. Mushrooms other than ceps, which
account for only a minor share of Dalla Valle OY's revenues, are sold
locally to food processors or as fresh products at municipal markets.
Fresh boletes are sorted, cleaned, packed in suitable boxes and
shipped either on the same day they were collected, or within the
next 24 h if the amount fails to reach a certain threshold size. Because
of the difficulties in supplying a multitude of buyers with modest
quantities of a highly perishable product, the company relies on a
wholesaler to place its fresh ceps on the Italian market. Typically,
wholesalers buy fresh high-grade ceps at prices between 9.50 and
12 Euro/kg. Rarely does the price of medium- and low-grade mush-
rooms exceed 3–5 Euro/kg.
While many mushroom wholesalers operate in Italy, only a few of
them trade in fresh products. As a result of high handling costs and
wholesaler market power, retailers pay prices in the range 16–24 Euro/
kg for fresh high-grade ceps. Consumer prices vary between 18 and
40 Euro/kg.
Production exceeding demand for the fresh product and lower-
grade mushrooms that are not suitable for sale as fresh are frozen. Far
less perishable, the frozen product is marketed, at least partially,
without intermediation by a wholesaler. Dalla Valle OY directly
supplies many small and medium Italian firms at prices of about
12 Euro/kg plus shipping costs (.20–.40 Euro/kg) for high-grade ceps
and 5 Euro/kg for medium-grade.
In 2007, Dalla Valle OY accounted for about 45% of the total volume
of WEF collected in Finland (90% of ceps). Inevitably, its revenues are
closely linked to local availability of WEF. A poor crop affects output
not only because there are fewer mushrooms to be picked, but also
because fewer pickers collect them. Sale prices, on the other hand, are
relatively unresponsive. As a result, the company's turnover can
change by one order of magnitude from one year to another. Over the
past few years, Dalla Valle OY's total revenues ranged between
444,000 Euro in 2007 and 5.5 million Euro in 2003.
Following a boom harvest in 2003 (1100 tons), the company
received enthusiastic coverage from the local media and official praise
from the government for generating considerable economic oppor-
tunities for disadvantaged rural dwellers (Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Finland, 2007). Regional forest planning documents cited Dalla
Valle OY as a model that should be replicated with other natural
products and in other regions (Forestry Centre North Karelia, 2005).
4. Results and discussion on the socio-economic characteristics of
the pickers
Because the availability of WEF is intrinsically variable, a survey of
the pickers may produce rates of participation and estimates of
quantities collected that are remarkably different depending on
whether the research hits a favourable or an unfavourable year. In
this respect, the 2008 season was average and, to some extent, can be
taken as representative of a typical year. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for key socio-economic characteristics and measures of
mushroom picking activity.
Enumerating all the pickers who supplied Dalla Valle OY was not
possible because of time and budget constraints. Yet, company
records, survey results and anecdotal evidence combine to suggest a
total number of between 2500 and 3000.
Levels of activity can differ markedly from one picker to another.
On average, over the course of the season, a picker spent about
90.76 h (s.d. 105.00) collecting mushrooms in the forest and sold
113.91 kg (s.d. 181.42) to Dalla Valle OY. At 2008 prices, this implies
revenues of around 420.32 Euro. Mean harvest is 1.69 kg/h (s.d. 1.51),
which would earn a picker about 6.22 Euro/h, little more than half the
wage rate for a regular forestry worker (10.51–12.84 Euro/h) (METLA,
2008).
While the data from our survey are not amenable to a detailed
analysis of the determinants of participation in commercial picking,
hints may come from comparing the socio-economic composition of
our sample with that of the general population of Eastern Finland.
Dalla Valle OY's pool of pickers appears to differ from the general
population in several ways. Consistently with the findings of other
studies on participation in wild food collection, people who are
comparatively older, less-educated and retired are over-represented
in the sample. However, even though those with low opportunity cost
of time appear more likely to engage in commercial picking, there is
no evidence of the unemployed becoming heavily involved in the
activity.
Clustering algorithms were used to identify groups that are
homogeneous with regard to their mushroom gathering activities
(i.e. with respect to the variables in Table 1, part A). From a
preliminary hierarchical analysis with Ward's linkage, Euclidean
dissimilarity and variables rescaled to be in the [0,1] interval, three
emerged as the appropriate number of groups. This result proved
fairly robust to the choice of other data transformations and clustering
methods. The k-means algorithm was then used to form three
partitions of the sample. Table 2 reports cluster sizes and center
Table 1
Summary statistics of the study area.
A. Mushroom collection activity
Mean St. Dev.
Days picked per season 24.50 21.30
Duration of typical picking trip (h) 3.39 1.64
Mushrooms collected per season (kg) 136.77 196.13
Percent sold 72.13 27.50
B. Socio-economic characteristics
Proportion p-value for
equality of
proportions
Sample Eastern Finland
Male .559 .494a b.001
Retired .321 .189d b.001
Unemployed .108 .110a .861
Basic education .355 .352c .863
Secondary education .471 .385c b.001
High education .175 .263c b.001
Age≤26 .088 .302b b.001
Age 27–35 .072 .085b .189
Age 36–42 .095 .086b .383
Age 43–55 .313 .206b b.001
Age 56–65 .276 .139b b.001
AgeN65 .156 .181b .078
Based at summer cottage .056 n.a. –
N 750
a Year 2007 (EUROSTAT, 2009b).
b Year 2006 (EUROSTAT, 2009b).
c Whole Finland, year 2006 (Statistics Finland, 2008a).
d Whole Finland, year 2007 (Statistics Finland, 2008b).
Table 2
Cluster centers.
Group of pickers n Harvest (kg) Days picked Duration (h) % sold
Professional 164 369.58 45.21 5.52 88.29
Ordinary 403 82.66 19.50 2.85 84.45
Recreational 183 47.30 16.93 2.65 30.51
N 750 Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F 427.3
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points. A different choice of starting point or limiting the analysis to a
subsample has little influence on these results.
Linear discriminant analysis was performed to describe the
relative importance of the four variables in separating the three
groups. In the first function, which accounts for about 74% of
discriminating power, the largest standardized coefficient (in abso-
lute value) is the one on percentage of harvest sold. Duration of a
typical picking trip has the second-largest absolute value coefficient in
the first function and the largest in the second function. All variables,
being closely linked to one another, have similar correlations with
both the first and the second discriminant functions.
In broad terms, what seems to differentiate pickers into different
groups is their degree of professionalism. About one in four pickers
appear to be gathering mushrooms mostly for recreational purposes.
While relatively frequent, their trips into the forest to gather
mushrooms tend to be short. They harvest relatively modest
quantities and sell only a fraction to Dalla Valle OY. While sizable,
this group only accounts for 3.5% of the company's purchases of
mushrooms. For convenience, we label these people “recreational
pickers”.
At the other end of the spectrum there appear to be “professional
pickers” for whom mushroom collection represents the main
occupation, at least at the peak of the season. Despite representing
slightly more than one picker in five, this group supplies almost two-
thirds of all the mushrooms the company buys. On average, a
commercial picker earns about 1224 Euro over the course of the
season.
About half of all pickers (“ordinary pickers”) fall somewhere
between those two groups. Compared to commercial pickers, their
mushroom gathering trips to the forest are both fewer and shorter, yet
their harvest is almost entirely sold for cash and represents about 33%
of Dalla Valle OY's purchases. Overall, earning extra income appears to
be their main motivation for picking mushrooms. For people in this
group, mean seasonal revenues from mushrooms amount to about
257 Euro.
Using a multinomial logit specification, we modelled the proba-
bility of a picker belonging to a given group as a function of socio-
economic characteristics (i.e. the variables in Table 1 part B). The base
category is ordinary picker. The estimated parameters are reported in
Table 3.
Because the magnitudes of logit coefficients can be difficult to
interpret, average partial effects were computed by averaging the
predicted individual partial effects across the sample (Wooldridge,
2006) and are displayed for selected variables in Table 4.
The chances that a person engages inmushroompicking for leisure
rather than for income increase with the level of education. Having a
higher education increases the probability of being a recreational
picker by .109. The probability of being in the recreational group is
about 30 higher for those people who pick mushrooms while taking
time off at their summer cottage. Male pickers are significantly less
likely than female to be in a group with lower mushroom gathering
activity. Those aged below 26 are more likely to be in the intermediate
group by about .15. Yet, there is no other evidence that the intensity of
a picker's effort is related to his or her age or retirement status. Also,
the coefficient on unemployed is only significant at the 10% level in
the equation for commercial versus ordinary.
Regressing the natural logarithm of total time spent collecting
mushrooms and the log of total kilograms sold on the socio-
demographic characteristics produces qualitatively similar results.
The estimates are reported in Table 5. While a lot of the variability in
picking effort appears to relate to factors other than the socio-
demographics, some patterns are clear. Higher levels of education are
associated with lowmushroom gathering effort: compared to a picker
with basic education, a highly-educated one seems to devote 29% less
time to mushroom gathering and harvest 36% fewer kilograms for
sale. Being based at a summer cottage is associated with 58% less time
spent picking and 66% smaller commercial harvest. Males spend more
time picking in the forest and sell much larger quantities of
mushrooms than females. Age turns out to be not significant, with
the exception of the dummy for being 26 or younger, which appears to
reduce time and amounts collected by 28% and 42% respectively.
There is little evidence of retired or unemployed people putting more
effort than others into mushroom gathering.
5. Final remarks
In recent decades, non-timber forest products have been the object
of considerable public interest as a potential source of revenues for the
forest sector that are complementary or alternative to timber. While
enthusiastic assumptions have sometimes overplayed the potential
role of non-timber forest products for rural development (Sheil and
Wunder, 2002), success stories do exist. In this article, we have
described how a small but economically viableWEF industry emerged
and operates in a marginal area of Finland.
Our account revolved around Dalla Valle OY, a company that
purchases wild ceps from pickers in North Karelia, where virtually no
demand exists for this type of mushroom, and exports its output,
either fresh or frozen, to the markets of Southern Europe like Italy,
Spain and France, where this product commands quite high prices.
Our survey produced evidence that, for a fairly sizable group of
people, the presence of this business generates the possibility to earn
significant additional income.
Table 3
Multinomial logit analysis of picking efforts.
Professional picker Recreational picker
Male .378*
(.200)
−.538***
(.188)
Retired .370
(.282)
.320
(.286)
Unemployed .541*
(.303)
−.010
(.331)
Secondary education −.284
(.219)
.178
(.226)
High education .073
(.296)
.604**
(.282)
Age≤26 −.430
(.504)
−.899*
(.461)
Age 27–35 −.796
(.588)
−.693
(.452)
Age 43–55 .522
(.384)
.049
(.324)
Age 56–65 .326
(.414)
−.278
(.367)
Age N65 .236
(.496)
.021
(.455)
Based at summer cottage −.880
(.645)
1.221***
(.352)
Constant −1.404***
(.407)
−.736**
(.350)
N 750
Log-likelihood −717.470
*: 10% significant; **: 5% significant; ***: 1% significant.
Standard errors in brackets; ordinary picker is the base outcome.
Table 4
Logit average partial effects (selected variables).
Professional Ordinary Recreational
Male .087 .026 −.113
Retired .045 −.082 .037
Unemployed .098 −.067 −.031
Secondary education −.054 .010 .044
High education −.021 −.088 .109
Age≤26 −.035 .151 −.116
Based at summer cottage −.157 −.146 .303
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In a typical year, between 2500 and 3000 pickers supply the
company over the course of the season, which lasts for most of August
and September. However, because mushroom crops are both highly
variable and very difficult to predict, the number of people who take
part in harvesting in North Karelia may vary widely from one year to
another. As a share of the region's total population, the number of
pickers may vary from less than 1% in a bad year to about 8% in an
exceptionally good one (e.g. 2003), and is the same order of
magnitude as the number of forestry workers (METLA, 2008).
Although about 25% of all pickers, especially those based at a
summer cottage, gather only trivial amounts and appear to have
mostly recreational motives, more than one in five harvest WEF
almost as a full time occupation during the season, devoting on
average 5.5 h per day to the activity over 45 days. In the 2008 season,
such professional pickers earned on average 1224 Euro, which
exceeds 5% of the average net annual household income in Finland
(EUROSTAT, 2009a). The remaining majority of the pickers, which
includes most young pickers, spend much less time in mushroom
gathering but still appear to be driven by the possibility of earning
some extra income. On average their revenues amount to 257 Euro
per season and their collective harvest accounts for one-third of Dalla
Valle OY's total purchases.
As expected, rates of participation and picking effort tend to be
higher among people with lower education, that is, among those with
presumably fewer earning opportunities. There is onlyweak evidence,
however, that particularly vulnerable groups, such as the retired or
unemployed, are turning to intensive mushroom harvesting as a
source of income.
It is worth mentioning that professional pickers display a general
preference for spruce forests, where the availability of fruiting bodies
during the sprouting season is typically higher. Pine forests, on the
other hand, are more popular destinations for recreation.
The ecological impact of collection activities on Eastern Finland's
WEF resources appears very limited. Nevertheless, pickers often
remark about the scarcity of boletes in the forest. Most likely, what
causes this perception is, rather than actual ecological degradation,
the fact that most pickers tend to concentrate in areas that are close to
urban centres and easily accessible through the road system.
A recurring question in the literature on the commercialization of
NTFPs is what determines success. While it is hard to generalize from
a single example, it is clear that the everyman's rights and the
widespread custom of collecting mushrooms and berries made
Finland a very favourable environment to begin with. Most likely,
the short-lived government subsidies of the mid-1990s and the
exemption of mushroom revenues from taxation played a significant
role in kicking off the industry. However, even though any policy
change making mushroom harvesting less economically attractive
(e.g. permit fees or income tax) would presumably put off a
substantial portion of the pickers and reduce Dalla Valle OY's output,
a crucial aspect for the establishment of a successful value chain was
in this case represented by entrepreneurship. As te Velde et al. (2006)
have argued, NTFP entrepreneurs fulfil the function of creating the
links with attractive and often distant markets where the products of
local rural communities can be placed. The role of entrepreneurs will
also be critical in any attempts to replicate the North Karelian WEF
business model in broadly similar contexts (e.g. in Eastern Europe), as
doing so will require devising effective logistic solutions and a fair
system of payments to the mushroom collectors. According to
anecdotal reports, indeed, firms that have tried to operate similar
models in Poland and Romania have often received little interest from
local communities, in most cases because their grading and payment
systems were not attractive or transparent enough.
Data about the working of the WEF industry are scarce and it is
sometimes claimed that the major barrier to entry in this market is
lack of information (Sievänen et al., 2004). Uncertainty about
potential output, costs, revenues, and marketing channels may be
holding back the development of a WEF business in locations where it
could be economically viable. Without trying to abstract too general
lessons from the case examined here, this study has contributed new
data on some of these issues. From an applicative perspective,
identifying types of pickers can be useful for the purpose of designing
more effective procurement marketing strategies. In the WEF
business, where ensuring a stable supply of the key input is often a
major problem, aiming one's promotional efforts at those pickers who
are more likely to become productively involved can be crucial.
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Introduction
Forests  are  worldwide  considered  genera-
tors of a multitude of environmental  goods 
and services. Due to increasing problems of 
scarcity and quality, the water-related servi-
ces are assuming a priority role  among fo-
rest-based ES (FAO 2008, Birot et al. 2011).
The essential role of water for human life is 
being recognized by many water legislative 
frameworks  in  Western  society  (Scott  & 
Coustalin  1995,  Cullet  2011,  Grafton  & 
Hussey 2011),  which  are  setting out  rights 
and duties  on its use,  as a result  of demo-
graphic  expansion,  use  conflicts  and  per-
ceived problems of scarcity (Dosi & Muraro 
2003,  Kuks  2004).  Despite  this,  in  the 
European Union (EU) and in many countries 
no specific normative tools directly address 
the  link  between  forest  and  water  produc-
tion.  For  example,  even  if  the  EU  Water 
Framework  Directive  (WFD  -  Directive 
2000/60/EC)  has  pointed  out  the  key role 
played by environmental resources manage-
ment policies in  the water cycle,  especially 
for water quality, it does not refer explicitly 
to forests. Nonetheless, scientific evidence is 
growing  of  the  cause-effect  links  between 
forest management and water quality: recent 
papers have highlighted the role of wooded 
areas on water quality maintenance (Neary et 
al. 2009,  Eriksson et al. 2011,  Robinson & 
Cosandey  2011),  underlining  the  possible 
management options to enhance quality pa-
rameters  in  rivers  as  well  as  in  shallow 
aquifers.
In some countries, both the most advanced 
and developing economies,  the cause-effect 
scientific proofs combined with gaps in the 
legislative  framework  allowed  private  or 
public entities to create payment schemes on 
a voluntary basis in order  to  ensure higher 
water  quality  standards,  using  economic 
tools to stimulate the catchment areas’ land-
owners  to  change  their  management  prac-
tices. An historical example is the payment 
mechanism promoted by the New York City 
Council to enhance water quality, compens-
ating landowners in the catchment area when 
they  improve  their  management  practices 
(NYC-DEP 2010). Several public authorities 
in France have also encouraged the produc-
tion  of  forest  drinking  water  by drafting  a 
similar compensation scheme (Ferry 2006). 
Again in France, a private company (Vittel) 
producing bottled mineral water has imple-
mented  a  payment  scheme  to  compensate 
land  managers  for  their  farming  practices 
aimed  at  water  quality  protection  (Per-
rot-Maître 2006).
These  mechanisms  are  better  known  as 
Payment for Environmental Services (PES), 
defined as a “voluntary” transaction where a 
“well-defined”  environmental  service  (ES) 
(or a land-use likely to secure that service) is 
being  “bought”  by  a  (minimum  one)  ES 
“buyer”  from  a  (minimum  one)  ES  “pro-
vider”, if and only if the ES provider secures 
ES  provision  (conditionality  -  Wunder 
2005).  Nevertheless,  in  many cases  one  or 
two out of five parameters are not fulfilled, 
so  Wunder (2007) suggested the use of the 
term PES-like schemes. Generally,  PES are 
contract-based schemes acting as a financial 
tool. They target ES as goods traded among 
the parties, particularly where no public re-
gulations  have been  implemented.  In  Wes-
tern  society,  local  or  national  governments 
have only recently promoted PES schemes, 
while  they continue  to  develop  and  imple-
ment PES-like approaches based on legisla-
tive  tools.  However,  in  several  cases  the 
complex and rigid legal systems lack a clear 
property  rights  definition,  this  being  the 
main obstacle for the promotion of economic 
tools such as PES.
PES schemes in Italy have not yet been im-
plemented  or  investigated  in  detail,  except 
for some scattered cases linked to non-tim-
ber  forest  products  (Pettenella  &  Kloehn 
2007) and some exploratory case-studies on 
water  (Gatto  et  al.  2009).  This  paper  ana-
lyzes  three  Italian  water-related  payment 
schemes  based  on:  (i)  hydropower  genera-
tion; (ii) tap-water supply; and (iii) mineral 
water production. Each scheme is embedded 
in a national legislative framework that sets 
limitations and constraints on water use, as 
well  as how its benefits should be redistri-
buted to the catchment areas (thus reflecting 
the basic principles of PES-like schemes).
Starting with a brief description of the Ita-
lian regulatory framework on water, we com-
pared the three water-related services to de-
scribe the strengths and weaknesses in envi-
ronmental  services  provision,  concluding 
with some political findings.
Methods
The regulatory framework related to water 
resources  and  environmental  services  has 
been defined making reference to the relati-
vely  ample  literature  and  the  official  Acts 
approved by the State and regional authori-
ties.
For  the comparative  analysis  of  the  three 
services we used the six parameters defined 
by Wunder  (2005,  2007) as key-criteria  to 
make a  distinction  between PES  and PES-
like schemes, as well as the five key-criteria 
defined by the  OECD (2010) to address the 
cost-effectiveness of PES schemes.
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In  detail,  starting with  a definition of the 
PES scope, we compared the different cases 
analysing the presence of monitoring and re-
porting  frameworks,  cost-benefit  targeting, 
contracts-based  payment  mechanisms  and 
systems of payment revision.
Water and environment: the Italian re-
gulatory framework
PES schemes vary case by case, according 
to the type and scale of traded ES, payment 
source, measures and practices implemented 
to enhance the ES, output performance, and 
payment transfer between the parties (Engel 
et al. 2008). A crucial role in PES develop-
ment  is played  by the implementation  of a 
proper property rights regulatory system. As 
already known, common or public goods and 
services  (like  ES)  are  much  less  tangible 
than private goods and services normally ex-
changed  on  the  market,  even  if  resource 
scarcities connected with certain public ser-
vices are quite clearly perceived. Moreover, 
the uncertain property rights and high frag-
mentation of demand and supply of ES con-
tribute  to  limiting the market  development. 
Due to these factors the transaction costs are 
expected to be very high,  thus representing 
the major constraint to the implementation of 
PES-like schemes. In such conditions, local, 
regional or national governments play essen-
tial roles in promoting a more effective sys-
tem based on defined, defendable and dive-
stible  economic  property  rights  (Yandle 
1999,  Bougherara  et  al.  2009),  as  well  as 
embodying supply-demand coordination.
In Italy PES-like schemes related to water 
have been developed in the national legisla-
tive framework on the basis of the principle 
of keeping the ownership of the resources in 
public  hands.  According  to  Act  36/1994, 
surface  and  underground  water  belongs  to 
the  State.  Private  water  ownership  may be 
established  only if  the rain  is  collected on 
private property.
Public ownership of water is connected to 
the  strict  link  between  water  services  and 
mountain  forests:  almost  two  thirds  of  the 
land surface consists of mountain areas, his-
torically facing  major  social  and  economic 
problems such as unemployment, depopula-
tion,  loss  of  identity  and  cultural  heritage. 
Some 66.3% of the national forest cover (8.7 
million ha on the basis of the 2004-05 Na-
tional  Forest  Inventory -  http://www.infc.it) 
is located in areas at altitudes above 500 m 
and  44.6%  has  a  slope  over  40%.  Con-
sequently,  the national  government  develo-
ped a set of regulations in order to ensure a 
financial  support  for  maintaining  a  viable 
mountain environment  and to control  defo-
restation  and  forest  degradation  processes. 
The  first  important  Act  was  approved  in 
1923  (the  “Forest  Act”  -  Decree 3267),  in 
which  strict  restrictions  were  set  out  on 
forest land use and conversion; 95% of the 
national forest cover still comes under these 
restrictions to prevent soil erosion and regu-
late the water cycle. In theory, the Act esta-
blished the creation of a compensation fund, 
but  in practice, the lack of public financial 
resources has limited its use. A decade later, 
a water and hydropower Act (Decree 1775/ 
1933) established a compulsory fee for each 
water  use.  Under  this  Act,  the  hydropower 
companies had to pay a certain sum of mo-
ney per kilowatt installed in the power plant 
(this  sum is  now  about  7.0  €/kWh).  This 
payment is transferred both to the municipa-
lities  included  in  the  catchment  basin  and 
those downstream where the water is reintro-
duced  in  the riverbed.  The payments  com-
pensate the municipality’s opportunity costs 
of  the  potential  water  uses  and  the  money 
have to be invested in local public services. 
In  many mountain  regions  these  funds  re-
present a relevant income for local admini-
strations,  and  have  also  been  used  to  im-
prove forestry operations and management.
The water legislative framework continued 
to evolve for half a century with minor regu-
lations  until  the  Water  Quality  Act  (Law 
183/1989) was approved. A few years later, 
Galli’s Act (from the name of the main pro-
poser  -  Law 36/1994),  formally introduced 
the concept of catchment area compensation 
(art. 18), even though it was just addressed 
to  public  or  collective lands (art.  24),  thus 
implementing  a  principle  already stated  by 
Law 183/1989 concerning environment pro-
tection.  However,  its  implementation  has 
been limited and has occurred only at local 
level. Indeed, only a two regional public au-
thorities  (Piedmont  and  Veneto  Regions) 
have fully implemented Galli’s Act in their 
local  legislative  framework.  This  law basi-
cally resets the fragmented municipal-based 
water supply into a wider integrated system 
(based on the principle of whole river basin 
supply).  Six years later, the EU Water Fra-
mework  Directive  (WFD  -  Directive  60/ 
2000)  enforced  a  regulatory system of  the 
entire water cycle, especially in terms of wa-
ter quality maintenance. This issue has been 
considered in  Legislative Decree 152/2006; 
the  Decree  affirms  the  three  driving  prin-
ciples  of  the  WFD:  (i)  the  “full-cost-reco-
very principle”; (ii) “polluter-pay-principle”; 
and  (iii)  “access-right-guarantee  principle” 
(Kissling-Naf & Kuks  2004).  The “full-re-
covery-cost” key-concept has been an impor-
tant step to recognize the role and costs of 
ES on  water  supply quality,  recently with-
drawn in a national referendum.
Given the complexity of the Italian regula-
tions, some public as well as private organi-
zations  have  used  gaps  in  the  legislative 
framework  to  promote  and  build  PES-like 
schemes, moving towards an innovative eco-
nomic approach based on ES supply and de-
mand for water quality.
The  state  of  water-related  PES  imple-
mentation
Hydropower generation
Italy has  traditionally  taken  advantage  of 
the many streams and rivers in its mountain 
areas and,  since the last  century,  dams and 
plants have been built to produce hydroelec-
tric  power.  Today,  hydropower  represents 
16.6 % of the total Italian electricity produc-
tion,  and is the top national  renewable en-
ergy source  (ISTAT 2010).  The infrastruc-
tural impacts had already been well recogni-
zed in the 1930s, when the first compensa-
tion  scheme  was  implemented  by  Decree 
1775/1933  through  the  creation  of  a  quite 
complex system of public agencies and go-
vernance rules.
Basically, the rationale is that the canaliza-
tion of mountain streams greatly reduces the 
water  availability  for  the  local  residents, 
hence reducing the land opportunity costs on 
the areas between the catchment  point  and 
the place in which water is re-introduced in 
the riverbed. In the compensation scheme in-
troduced by Decree 1775/1933, the payment 
was based on the installed power capacity of 
the  power  plants,  strictly  linked  with  the 
quantity  of  exploited  water.  To  define  the 
amount of the annual payment the installed 
power  of  the  power  plant  is  multiplied  by 
three economic parameters: the state fee con-
cession  (min  9.65  -  max 35.03  €/kW),  the 
extra-fee  for  the  Mountain  Basin  Agency1 
(28.00  €/kWh)  and  a  further  extra-free  to 
compensate  those  municipalities  located 
between the catchment and the place where 
the water is returned to the riverbed, named 
Coastal  Municipalities  (7.00  €/kWh).  Law 
925/1980 let the extra-fee be reviewed every 
two years. Finally Law 122/2110 increased 
the extra-fee up to 28.00 €/kWh (instead of 
21.08 €/kWh) and established another extra-
fee to be delivered to Coastal Municipalities 
(7.00 €/kWh). The repartition of the second 
last extra-fee among actors is based on Mini-
sterial  criteria2,  while  20%  of  the  Coastal 
Municipalities  extra-fee  is  delivered  to  the 
Provinces. The three mentioned agencies are 
formally the beneficiaries  of  the ES,  while 
private  or  public  hydroelectric  companies 
represent the suppliers. The fund allocation 
is driven by political decisions and priorities, 
but  is  generally  reinvested  in  public  infra-
structure  and  innovation  including  in  the 
forest sector, especially in slope stability and 
rural area investments. A feeble point of the 
PES-like  scheme  is  surely  the  competence 
overlapping  among  the  involved  agencies 
that can create conflicts in some cases; more-
over,  the  linkage  between  land  stability 
provided  by  forests  and  its  compensation 
seems to be rather weak. In fact, the preven-
tion of soil erosion is one major externality 
of forestland  that  guarantees slope  stability 
and reduces damages to the artificial  chan-
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nels and water infrastructure for hydropower 
production.  The  scheme today involves  al-
most  one-fourth  of  Italian  municipalities 
(1684 municipalities all located in mountain 
or  hilly areas with  518 hydropower  plants) 
and is managed by Mountain Basin Autho-
rities (consortia of municipalities).
Tap-water provision
Water for human consumption has formally 
been declared a priority by the State with re-
gard  to  the  alternative  uses  (art.  2,  Law 
36/1994 - Galli’s Act). Hence, this assump-
tion sets a sort  of hierarchy on water uses, 
where  environment  maintenance  has  been 
addressed  (Kuks  2004).  The  compensation 
(art. 18) is directed at public owners (art. 24 
- municipalities and other public authorities), 
probably because of the high fragmentation 
of private  land,  which has been considered 
an obstacle in managing the scheme due to 
high transaction costs and huge numbers of 
landowners.  However,  ES  payments  based 
on  an  extra-charge  on  the  tap-water  bill 
(“user-pay-principle”) have only been intro-
duced  in  some  local  contexts,  namely two 
Italian Regions: Piedmont and Veneto. Pied-
mont Region (Regional Act 13/1997, art. 14) 
built up a structural fund with 3-8% of extra-
charge on water bills to compensate moun-
tain areas in terms of projects or infrastruc-
ture  aimed  to  improve  local  land  manage-
ment practices. In the same way, the Veneto 
Regional Decree no. 3483 of 10 th December 
2010  set  up  a  financial  tool  for  mountain 
areas (3% of the water bill)  partially cove-
ring the costs of new hydraulic infrastructure 
or  forest  operations close to areas of slope 
instability,  in  order  to  protect  the  down-
stream population.  There are few examples 
in  addition  to  these  two  regional  payment 
schemes. It is worth mentioning the case of 
Romagna  Acque  S.p.A.,  a  public  company 
owning and managing all the drinkable water 
resources  of  Romagna  sub-regional  area. 
Started as a consortium of municipalities to 
reduce the cost of drinking water supply in 
1966, it was able to cover the distribution of 
water  to  the whole  Romagna area in  1989 
and just a few years later, in 1994, Romagna  
Acque S.p.A. was founded, becoming owner 
of water resources in 2004. The most import-
ant water source of the company is a dam-
basin  in  the  central  Apennines  (Ridracoli, 
municipality of Bagno di Romagna), which 
covers 50% of the entire Romagna tap-water 
demand (108 M m3/year). Since its construc-
tion,  the  biggest  problems  have  been  dam 
sedimentation and the maintenance of high 
water quality. In 1993, the company invested 
in  research  to  understand  the link  between 
forest management and soil  erosion as well 
as  water  quality stabilization.  The  research 
(Bagnaresi et al. 1999) shows the clear im-
pact of forest operations such as clear-cut or 
forest  conversion  from  coppice  to  high 
stands on soil erosion,  while minimal silvi-
culture  treatments  or  natural  evolution  of 
stands  markedly reduce  the  erosion.  These 
last two practices were also demonstrated to 
have a positive influence on nitrogen reduc-
tion and pH stability.  Acknowledging these 
problems, part of the revenues deriving from 
the  water  tariff  payments  (1-3%) has  been 
used to compensate landowners in the catch-
ment areas, helping them to cover the costs 
related with management practices changes. 
The positive impact of the PES scheme was 
accounted  in  a  general  decrease  in  soil 
erosion  of  25%  (from  an  initial  40 000 
m3/year to the ongoing 30 000 m3/year), and 
a consistent nitrogen reduction as well as pH 
stabilization.  In  terms of  performance both 
Romagna Acque S.p.A. and the landowners 
have increased their utility: the company has 
reduced its costs for water purification and 
assured  longer  dam  life,  while  the  land-
owners  have  increased  or  maintained  their 
annual  forest  revenue.  Anyway,  due  to  the 
complex bureaucratic process, a public com-
pany  cannot  deliver  public  funds  or  sub-
sidies to a singe landowner if there are un-
clear  traded  goods  or  services,  hence  Ro-
magna Acque S.p.A. decided to directly ac-
quire the land whenever this was possible, or 
to  promote forest  road maintenance for the 
other landowners in the catchment area. Part 
of  the  compensation  has  been  invested  in 
programmes to inform the public on the use 
of tap water and the effects of the manage-
ment  practices  adopted  in  the  catchment 
area.  The  positive  example  of  Romagna  
Acque S.p.A. represents  a PES-like scheme 
built on legislative gaps (art. 18 and 24 Act 
36/1994);  it  cannot  be  categorized  as  pure 
PES due to the overlapping between the ES 
supplier  and  consumer:  in  some way,  they 
are  both  represented  by  Romagna  Acque  
S.p.A.
Mineral water supply
Italy has been one of the first  five world 
bottled mineral water consumers since 2002 
and (with 191.7 liters  per capita consump-
tion in 2009) the second  per capita mineral 
water consumer in  the world,  after Mexico 
(see  statistics  at  the  IBWA  website  - 
http://www.bottledwater.org). Considered as 
the  safest  water  for  human  consumption, 
since the 1980s bottled water has been pro-
moted by several industries due also to the 
introduction  of  new  plastic  polymers  like 
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) instead of 
the traditional glass (Niccolucci et al. 2011). 
Nowadays, there are approximately 230 mi-
neral springs in Italy, with a total production 
of  12.2  billion  liters  and  an  annual  sector 
turnover  of  2.3  billion  euros  (Beverfood 
2011). Nevertheless, there are no substantial 
differences  in  terms  of  qualities  between 
bottled water and most of the tap water cur-
rently offered by the aqueduct companies.
Bottled water production is a concession- 
based business where a given company ap-
plies for the extraction license of a particular 
spring. The fee3 considers the compensation 
to the local municipality for the land that is 
covered  by  the  mineral  water  plant  and  a 
general  production  fee  based  on  the  water 
extracted  in  the  power  plant,  but  no  com-
pensation  is  addressed  by  law  to  the  sur-
rounding catchment areas. However, the en-
vironmental code addresses the preservation 
of  any  water  resources  (Decree  152/2006) 
and some positive examples do exist.
According  to  Mineracqua (personal  com-
munication) there are several contract-based 
© SISEF http://www.sisef.it/iforest/ 212  iForest (2012) 5: 210-215
Tab. 1 - PES parameters to classify Italian PES-like schemes (source: Wunder 2005 - modified).
PES parameters Hydropower generation Tap-water provision Mineral water supply
Start-up
(voluntariness)
Compulsory compensation. Governmental and 
legislative driving force
(Decree 1775/1933 and Law 959/1953)
Voluntary compensation, follo-
wing the Galli’s Act indications 
(art.18 and 24, Law 36/1994)
Voluntary compensation, following 
Decree 152/2006
ES definition Forest hydrological protection
(indirectly mentioned in Decree 1775/1933 
and Law 959/1953)
Water cleaning service and 
erosion mitigation service
Set aside forest land to improve its 
natural evolution
Buyer/s Hydropower companies Romagna Acqua S.p.A. Mineral water industry
Seller/s River basin municipalities and forest owner 
associations
Municipalities in the 
catchment area
Municipalities in the spring 
catchment area
Conditionality Forest operations to reduce erosion, landslides 
and forest instability
Forest management change towards 
close-to-nature silviculture
Land management change to re-
duce pollutants in the watershed
Basic principle Polluter-pay-principle Buyer-pay-principle Buyer-pay-principle
Pettenella D et al. - iForest 5: 210-215 
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Tab. 2 - Cost-effectiveness of PES schemes: a comparative analysis of the three types of water uses (source: OECD 2010 - modified).
PES parameters Hydropower generation Tap-water provision Mineral water supply
Purpose 
and scope
Environmental 
objective
Reduce soil erosion and en-
hance forest stability in the 
river basin
Enhance water quality through close-
to-nature forest practices
Enhance water quality through gra-
zing intensity reduction
Social objective Compensate the water oppor-
tunity cost for local populations
Compensate the water opportunity 
cost for local populations
Compensate the water opportunity 
cost for local populations
Principal eco-
system services
Soil erosion, water quantity Water quality, soil erosion (only in 
the case of dam), biodiversity
Water quality, biodiversity (only in 
the case of Acqua Panna - Nestlé 
group)
Scale River basin Spring catchment basin or dam basin Spring catchment basin
Reference law Decree 1775/1933 and Law 
959/1953
Law 36/1994 (Galli’s Act) and 
Decree 152/06 (environmental code)
Decree 105/1992 and 339/19
Monitoring
& reporting
ES Monitoring Linked to the given municipa-
lity consortium statute; gene-
rally it is performed by the 
Mountain Basin Authority
Romagna Acque S.p.a. monitors the 
water quality parameters, hence indi-
rectly the performance of forest eco-
system. Soil erosion is estimated ac-
cording to the annual water quantity 
processed at level of tap-water facili-
ties, annual precipitation and water 
losses
The monitoring depends on the con-
tracts or agreements between the min-
eral water company and generally the 
municipality that manages the catch-
ment area
ES Reporting Generally no ES reports are 
preformed
Romagna Acque S.p.a., under its cor-
porate social responsibility policy, is 
publishing an annual environmental 
report
Generally no ES reports are pro-
duced; scattered information is some-
times provided in company adver-
tising campaign
Benefit- 
Cost 
targets
Ecosystem 
benefits
Forest stability and reduction 
of landslides
Natural evolution of forest areas with 
an enhancement of biodiversity rich-
ness and stability. Minimal anthropo-
genic pressure.
Nitrogen reduction in the water envi-
ronment. Only in the case of Acqua 
Panna biodiversity enhancement is 
measured in terms of species.
Additionality Number of forests or forest 
operations in the river basin
(prescribed by law)
Forest management changes are con-
sidered additional (indicated but not 
prescribed by law)
Land and pasture management 
changes are consider additional (mit-
igation on the catchment is prescribed 
by law). In the case of Acqua Panna 
species presence such as wolves is 
considered additional
Risks Conflicts within the municipal 
consortium may lead to 
political instead of technical 
decisions
Risk of losing additionality in the 
long run. Once the forest reaches the 
climax status no environmental im-
provements may be carried out by the 
company
Where deep springs are exploited, the 
rock filters and cleans the water, so 
there is no need to invest in PES
Opportunity 
cost
It is estimated by the govern-
ment that consequently fixes 
concession extra-fee
Romagna Acque S.p.A. estimates it 
according to the constraints induced 
by the water withdrawal along the 
catchment basin valley
No available information
Payment 
mechanism 
and contract
Payment source Hydropower concession fee Percentage of water bill (1-3%) Mineral water industry’s direct 
payment
PES contract 
and length
The coastal and catchment mu-
nicipality consortium statute 
and the River Basin Authority 
decide the length and the prio-
rities of the action. Theo-
retically the PES scheme will 
last until the law is repealed
The PES scheme will be enforced as 
long as Romagna Acque S.p.a. and the 
local municipalities ( i.e. , the com-
pany shareholders) consider it useful. 
Anyway, any law change in terms of 
fund transfer may limit or delete the 
monetary transfer 
No available information
Payment mode 
and amount
Monetary transfer to the muni-
cipalities within the consor-
tium. The actual extra-fee is 
fixed at 28 + 7 €/kWh installed 
in a given power plant, but no 
data are available in terms of 
direct reinvestment in forest of 
hydraulic operations
Monetary transfer to the municipa-
lities in the catchment area. The actual 
water bill percentage is between 2 and 
2.5% for an overall monetary transfer 
of half a million euro/year
No available information
Revision Payment 
revision
The revision takes place every 
two years, but the forest opera-
tions rely directly on the con-
sortium’s decision and the 
River Basin Authority
The revision takes place every year 
according to the forest operations 
needed and the opportunity cost of the 
forest owners (mainly municipalities 
and Romagna Acque S.p.A.)
No available information
Paying for water-related forest services in Italy 
mechanisms  between  the  mineral  water 
plants and the local municipalities to reduce 
the grazing intensity in the catchment areas, 
as well as to convert meadows into set-aside 
lands, to leave lands to their natural evolu-
tion or to change intensively cultivated farm-
land to organic farming systems. Two singu-
lar  cases  in  Italy  involve  two  Nestlé-con-
trolled water companies: Levissima, which is 
using  large  plastic  sheets  during  summer 
time  to  reduce  the  glacier  melting  in  its 
Alpine  catchment  area;  and  Acqua  Panna, 
which  is  promoting  natural  evolution  of 
forestland to enhance biodiversity around the 
spring.  Unfortunately,  specific  data  and re-
ports are lacking, and information is still in-
complete.
Notwithstanding  the  massive  investments 
in advertising and communication by all the 
mineral water producers, only scattered and 
limited information is provided on the catch-
ment  areas  management  policies.  We  pre-
sume  that,  generally,  mineral  water  indus-
tries do not directly invest in ES within the 
catchment  areas  because  they  use  deep 
spring water, hence the role of forest is pro-
bably considered minimal in comparison to 
the filtering effect of rocks.
Tab.  1   summarizes the main findings of 
the analysis comparing the three services on 
the  basis  of  the  six  parameters  defined  by 
Wunder (2005, 2007), while Tab. 2  presents 
a summary view of the issues connected to 
cost-effectiveness of PES schemes using the 
five  key-criteria  defined  by  the  OECD 
(2010).
Discussion and conclusions
From  the  analysis  of  the  three  payment 
mechanisms described above, we can deduce 
that  pure PES schemes do  not  exist  in  the 
water sector in Italy, while PES-like schemes 
driven by national  government  are well  re-
presented among the different water uses.
As a matter of fact Italy represents a em-
blematic  case where the implementation  of 
economic tools such as pure PES schemes is 
inhibited by the presence of a complex regu-
latory  and  institutional  framework.  Accor-
ding  to  some  authors  (Aubin  &  Varone 
2004, Carbone & Savelli 2009), the accumu-
lation of norms, customary rights and formal 
institutions  have  limited  the  effectiveness 
and coordination of policy and rules imple-
mentation  in  Italy.  Besides,  Italy is  facing 
two significant constraints to any PES imple-
mentation  in  the  forestry  sector:  (i)  the 
highly fragmented  landownership  structure; 
and (ii) the limited number of forest owners’ 
associations,  which  both  determine  higher 
transaction costs and limit the capabilities of 
ES  potential  investors  or  suppliers  to  take 
action. In such conditions the role of natio-
nal or local governments is fundamental, due 
to the fact that the economic agents involved 
in  any  PES  scheme  trade  mainly  access 
rights  to  the  resources  (Hill  1997,  Yandle 
1999). The perceived environmental scarcity 
has  stimulated regulatory interventions,  but 
only in terms of new command and control 
instruments  (thresholds  and  constraints). 
Despite common law, civil law systems like 
the  Italian  one  lack  efficiency  due  to  the 
delay in updating the regulatory framework 
with the inclusion of the new stakeholders’ 
needs and expectations connected to rapidly 
developing issues like  water  resources ma-
nagement.  Due to  the Italian  water legisla-
tive  framework  the  PES  schemes  should 
operate within the legislative gaps, so quite a 
few ES trades may be put in practice and in 
most cases linked with the public authorities. 
From the  political  point  of  view,  although 
policy-makers  are  pushing the privatization 
of common goods  (such water,  health  care 
and education), civil society seems more re-
luctant about the privatization process in the 
water sector. In June 2011, in a national re-
ferendum  on  this  topic,  an  overwhelming 
majority of Italians (95.8%) expressed a ne-
gative  evaluation  of  any  privatization  pro-
cess in the tap-water management sector.
A further  problem that  would  need to  be 
solved by the legislator  is the definition of 
clear  property rights  over  the  land  and  re-
lated forest externalities. The civil or penal 
code  considers  the  negative  externalities 
rather than the positive ones (Mattei 1995). 
In  the  case,  for  example,  of  medium-large 
scale  positive  externalities  such  as  water 
quality improvement or soil erosion control, 
the ES may be achieved at large catchment 
area, so only the conjoint actions of all the 
interested landowners may change the water 
quality parameter or soil stability, while the 
action of each single actor has a minimal im-
pact.  The  policy-makers  should  review the 
property rights in order to let any ES stake-
holders  attain their  direct or  indirect  bene-
fits.
The water sector operators need to operate 
in synergy with land and forest managers at 
different  scales  according to  the  ES exten-
sion. Anyhow, technicians have often faced 
legal  constraints,  while  an  economic  ap-
proach may increase the environmental pre-
servation, stimulating the parties to deal in a 
more efficient way. The traditional command 
and  control  approach  has  already revealed 
several weak points, linked to the high cost 
of monitoring and the failure to follow the 
dynamic  needs  and  wants  of  society.  The 
need to build a critical mass of land (suppli-
ers)  or  ES  consumers  (buyers)  is  the  first 
step towards the success of a PES scheme, 
hence  ensuring  the  provision  of  ES.  The 
landowner  associations  may  tangibly  de-
crease  the  transaction  costs  on  the  supply 
side, but the most relevant effort should be 
spent on increasing ES awareness de facto, 
the real engine of the green economy. It  is 
likely that PES or PES-like schemes may be 
partly  replaced  by  subsidy-based  mecha-
nisms, in order to operate more dynamically 
than  the  legislative  process,  especially  in 
mountain rural areas.
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Notes
1. The Mountain Basin Agency (Bacini Imbriferi 
Montani - BIM) is a consortium of municipali-
ties that charge for the water use in order to re-
invest for socio-economic purposes within the 
managed area, the extra-fee introduced by the 
Act 959/1953, art. 1 and art. 53 (only for those 
power plants larger than 220 kWh installed).
2. The extra-fee being 100% (7 €/kWh): 10% is 
distributed equally among all the municipalities 
within the Mountain Basin Agency; 20% is 
linked to the given municipality’s population 
within the Agency; 30% is linked to the surface 
of a given municipality within the Agency; 40% 
is linked to the presence of water infrastructure 
and its impacts.
3. Regional governments implement the fee, so 
conditions are very different in the 21 Italian re-
gions. The fee is based on the surface that the 
mineral water plant uses and the water extrac-
tion. Both fees vary a lot among regions, for in-
stance the surface based fee is 5.11 €/ha in Mo-
lise (Regional Law 33/1977) and 587.27 €/ha in 
Veneto (Regional Law 40/1989), while the wa-
ter production fee varies between 0.3 €/m3 in 
Campania, Basilicata and Abruzzo (respec-
tively, Regional Laws 8/2008, 43/1996, 
15/2002) and 3 €/m3 in Veneto (Regional Law 
40/1989).
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Abstract: Forests produce a large array of market and public goods. The demand for forest 
services is increasing in many European countries, however data on service values at the regional 
scale are still scarce for Alpine areas. Forest owners are not compensated for service provision, 
therefore their forest management regimes are often not targeted at social optimum. A Choice 
Experiment survey has been conducted in order to explore preferences, uses of and Willingness to 
pay (WTP) for mountain forest services by the Veneto Region population. The results show that 
WTP is higher for recreation and C-sequestration and near to zero for landscape and biodiversity 
conservation. These results seriously question the feasibility of developing market-based 
mechanisms in Veneto Region in fields like biodiversity conservation and landscape and open a 
discussion on a revisited role of public institutions in the provision of such types of public goods. 
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1. Introduction 
In Italy the first attempts to evaluate ES, beside the traditional forest goods such as timber, firewood 
and non-wood forest products, goes back to 40 years ago when Patrone (1970) made some estimates 
of the soil protection and landscape conservation functions . Today, driven by other and more glob-
al stances, the list has widened to include new services like climate mitigation, biodiversity conser-
vation, recreation and effects on water quality and quantity in the Italian Alps (Merlo and Croitoru 
2005, Tempesta and Marangon 2005, Goio et al. 2008). Most of these long-established and new 
services are un-priced goods, enjoyed freely by an increasing number of users. Some of them are 
provided through mandatory instruments; back in 1923, the Italian legislator decided that soil pro-
tection from erosion should have been provided by forests as a public good, and imposed a con-
strain on all mountain forests without compensation; with a similar approach, a landscape amenity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper has been prepared thanks to the funds of the NEWFOREX project (New Ways to Value and Market Forest 
Externalities - http://www.newforex.org/) supported by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Pro-
gramme for Research and Technological Development. 
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conservation was enforced in 1985. Others, like recreation, regulation of water flows and climate 
mitigation are provided in an unclear property right framework, impeding the full implementation 
of any market mechanisms. 
Lacking compensation, forest owners do not include provision of ES amongst their management ob-
jectives, unless constrained by the existence of command-and-control tools. Among the few policy 
advises to enhance ES provision, the last national Forest Act (the legislative decree 227/2001 ) ad-
dressed only general indications and suggestions, implemented only in limited number of forest 
management plans. As a result, social optimum has been rarely achieved by the present forest man-
agement regimes. Increasing the revenues for the benefit providers and improving forest manage-
ment in the society’s perspective calls for new and appropriate policy tools (Merlo et al. 2000, Gatto 
et al. 2009). On turn, any policy aiming at internalising externalities or at developing new markets 
through Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), needs a thorough assessment of the ES values at 
stake (MEAB 2005, Wunder 2008). It is essential, in Italy as well in other countries, to understand 
if and to what extent forest users, or in economic sense “consumers”, perceive the value of forest 
ES, whether a Willingness to pay (WTP) exists, who wants to pay, for what and how much. These 
questions have inspired and stimulated the progress in the field of evaluation of forest ES: the result 
is a wide literature – contributing both from the methodological and operational viewpoints – on 
forest values, on the consumers’ characteristics and perceptions and on the determinants of the de-
mand for forest ES (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). 
This paper shows the results for the initial phases of the NEWFOREX project, focused on the as-
sessment of WTP for forest ES, in terms of existence and magnitude, in the mountain forest of the 
Veneto Region (North-eastern Italy). The set of ES under evaluation ranges from aesthetic value to 
landscape, from carbon sequestration to recreation. The research contributes to fill a gap in the liter-
ature on evaluation exercises referred to the Alpine context, being one of the first attempts to esti-
mate the values of different forest ES at the same time and at regional scale. However, the project 
final goal remains operational, so the evaluation effort is aimed at producing values and indications 
to support the design of appropriate policy mechanisms to enhance ES provision and to provide in-
puts to policy makers and forest managers.  
The paper is organized as follow: a literature review introduces the ES valuation in the Alps; the 
section on methodologies presents the process undertaken by the authors to define attributes and 
econometrics models; a result and discussion session follows, with some conclusions providing 
some advise for the policy makers. 
 
2. Evaluation of forest ES in the Alps 
Since the approval in 1989 of the Alpine Convention2 and its Mountain Forests and Environmental 
protection and landscape management Protocols, the attention of scholars towards the Alps and 
mountain forests has increased, while a fair amount of papers have been published on ES of Alpine 
forests, like biodiversity, landscape and soil protection. However, the literature assessing economi-
cally the values of these services is not equally rich, despite the well-established theoretical and 
methodological background. Even more scarce are the surveys attempting to measure ES values at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  http://www.alpconv.org/ 
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regional or wide scale; usually the studies have considered either one ES – i.e. landscape and scenic 
beauty, recreation, biodiversity, water – or have attempted at an integrated assessment of the Total 
Economic Value of Alpine forests, but rarely a bunch of ES at the same time. Among the papers 
aiming at ES valuation, Croitoru (2007a) assessed several ES generated by mountain forest though 
Imputed Preference (Holbrook et al. 1988), while Tangerini and Soguel (2004) used Revealed Pref-
erence to evaluate the landscape of the Swiss Alps using an Adjusted Hedonic Pricing method and 
found that the landscape attribute considerably affects the final price of real estate properties. More 
recently Grêt-Regamey et al. (2008) summarized the ES valuations available on the Alps that used 
State Preferences Methods such as Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiment; the studies assess 
the value of landscape, recreation, biodiversity and avalanche protection separately, pointing out the 
considerable variability among values found, even when the studies deal with similar environmental 
services Lastly Croitoru (2007b) added a further evaluation based on Benefit transfer: a pillar for the 
implementation of ES markets. Also meta-analyses as combination of different evaluation methods 
have been implemented; for instance Goio et al. (2008), in the attempt to estimate the total econom-
ic value of the mountain forests in Trento province, found a much higher economic value for the ES 
compared to traditional forest production functions (timber) A major methodological contribution 
has been delivered by Scarpa and Thiene (2005) and Scarpa et al. (2007) on recreational assess-
ment, merging Travel cost method and Choice experiment, and in such a way increasing the relia-
bility of recreational service assessment generated by the mountain systems: up to now, the most 
studied ES in Veneto’s mountain forests  (Scarpa et al. 2008, Thiene and Scarpa 2008, 2009). 
Moreover, the valuation methods were based on stratification of users, which allowed a better un-
derstanding of the factors influencing personal choices and the direct elicitation of WTP.  
On the contrary of recreation service, the studies on biodiversity economic values in the Alpine re-
gion are still limited. Among the few works available in literature, Soliva and Hunziker (2009) tried 
an integrated approach to evaluate biodiversity protection in Switzerland, while Getzner (2000) 
tested the hypothetical bias of WTP calculation within natural protected areas on specific sites like 
the Hohe Tauern National Park in Austria. An important contribution has been given by Menzel and 
Scarpa (2005), who aimed to improve the WTP assessment methodology for promoting new biodi-
versity protection programs.  
Moving to watershed protection in the Alps, the massive presence of steep slopes and unstable soils 
has been a challenge for the economists assessing the values of this ES. Given the complexity of the 
cause-effects relationships between forests and downstream water control (FAO 2008), the service 
has mostly been assessed using Averting behaviour from a change of actual to better ES provision 
(Bateman et al. 2009), Other authors (Pettenella et al. 2006) applied different operational approach-
es traditionally used for the evaluation of the costs of ES provision (supply cost). Croitoru (2007a) 
used the Avoided loss approach making reference to the productivity in nearby agricultural areas 
and  the Avoided costs approach related to building and managing drainages or other erosion con-
trol and land consolidation works, while Notaro (2001) used a mixed approach for assessing water-
shed protection, assuming that the value of water in rivers is linked to the level of fishable water 
fauna and to fishermen’s surplus.  
The literature review on values of ES in Alpine areas has pointed out the wide variability in the fo-
cus, scale, and values obtained by the studies; some of the works assess the Total Economic Value 
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of Alpine forests, others the value of single services; the ES considered are mostly landscape and 
recreation, while biodiversity, carbon sequestration or watershed protection are dealt more rarely. 
Finally the scale of the studies ranges from local to national, while none of the studies reviewed tar-
geted Alpine region at full scale. In terms of methodology, a clear-cut distinction of approaches is 
not possible: regional or national studies focused on total economic value have mostly used Benefit 
Transfer with values estimated by revealed and stated preferences. Only recently, the focus of re-
searchers has shifted towards a better understanding of consumers’ behaviour as one root-
component of environmental services demand. Methods like Choice experiment have been devel-
oped in order to overcome the limits of Contingent evaluation and applied to the Alpine context, but 
only at a local scale and not to all the most important forest externalities at the same time aim of this 
paper. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Choice Experiment background 
The methodologies to assess non-market values have been traditionally divided in two main 
branches: revealed preference method and state preference methods. The first have been developed 
to assess single non-market environmental goods based on observed behaviours. Hedonic Pricing 
and travel cost has been the most common approaches used to estimate the environmental value of 
the land surrounding a house or village or a touristic value of certain environment. However both of 
them have not been able to capture non-use value: the reason why state preference methods have 
been developed. Among the most common state preference methods, contingent valuation methods 
(CVM) have been adopted to estimate use and non-use values of certain environmental goods and 
services in which the respondents were asked to declare their WTP (open-ended survey) or more 
commonly to affirm their WTP a certain amount of money for a given environmental good or ser-
vice (close-ended survey).  
Despite some authors (Hausman 1993, Diamond and Hausman 1994) deeply argued CVM trustful-
ness, the method have been widely used since Choice experiment (CE) method (McFadden 1974) 
has been transferred from transportation marketing to environment goods and services assessment 
(Adamowicz 1995, Hanley et al. 1998). While CVM targets the study of WTP for a specific policy 
change, CE allows to break up complex goods in different attributes including price, and creates a 
set of policy scenarios changing the attribute levels according an experimental design that simulate 
the composition of different policies alternatives. Interviewed persons may compare and choose one 
of the policy alternatives within one of choice set, usually made up of different scenarios and the 
status quo. Hence, instead to answer to a single question, the respondent has to select a certain 
number of choice sets (Louviere 1991) changing each time their simulated policy alternatives. 
CE models are rooted in the random utility model (RUM) (Lancaster 1966), which stated the utility !!"# of a given an individual i gets form the alternative j in the choice situation t can be divide in a 
deterministic part !!"# and a stochastic terms !!"#. Usually, the deterministic part is explained by lin-
ear parameters and it may be rewritten as product of vector !′!!"# that describe certain topic (1). !!"# =   !!"#  +  !!"# =   !′!!"# +  !!"#   (1) 
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The respondent will maximize its utility choosing the scenario (or alternative) j among the other k 
within the choice set !!"  if the scenario j has higher utility of the others. Hence, the probability to 
choose the alternative j over the other k may be describe in the (2) !!"# ! ! = !"#$ !!"# > !!"# = !"#$ !!"# − !!"# >   !!"# −   !!"# ;     !, ! ∈ !;   ! ≠ !         (2) 
To estimate the equation (2) it must be assumed the error distribution, usually Gumbel-distributed 
and independently and identically distributed (IID), hence the probability to choose j is given by  !!"# =    !!!!!!"#!!!!!!"#!∈!         (3) 
where µ is the scale parameter, commonly used equal to one to keep constant error variance, !!"# is 
the vector of attributes linked to the individual i that chooses the alternative j within the choice situ-
ation t, while   !′ is the vector of the betas. !!"# considers, as in our case, individual’s characteristics 
zi that helps us to find respondent behaviours on particular socio-demographic strata of the sample. 
The equation (3) may be estimated through a mulit-nomial logit (MNL) regression if only inde-
pendence for irrelevant alternatives (IIA) holds, which means the ratio of choice probability of a 
given alternative is not affected by any other alternatives, because the utility is set up systematically 
with the statistical design (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). Nevertheless, IIA is seldom respect, so 
other models have to by considered. Finally the average willingness to pay for a given attribute may 
be calculated with the ratio between the beta parameters of interest !! and the beta parameters of 
cost !! (Train 2003), as follow: !"# = −! !!!!                       (4) 
Only in case of effect coded variable, the (4) have to be multiplied for a constant terms equal two 
(Bech and Gyrd-Hansen 2005). In this paper we consider also latent class model (LCM) (Boxall and 
Adamowicz 2002) to overcome to this problem, in which it is considered the presence of a certain 
number of segment s in the population sample that in total has S segments. Thus, the utility function 
of an individual i that belongs to a particular segment s and chooses the alternative j within the 
choice situation t can be written as: !!"#|! =   !!"|!  +  !!"#|! =   !!!!!"# +  !!"#|!   (5) 
where !! is the vector that explain the homogeneity within the segment s and the heterogeneity 
among the segments S. Assuming the same error distribution as in the (3) the probability that indi-
vidual i belonging to segment s chooses the alternative j is given by: !!"#|! =    !!!!!!!!"#!!!!!!!!"#!∈!         (6) 
Nevertheless the (6) provides only partial information on the individual choices. The likelihood of 
an individual i to belong to a given segment s within a finite number S depends to the socio-
economic characteristics, personal knowledge and attitude in general Z, thus membership likelihood 
function may represent as: !!" =   λ!!! + ξ!"          (7) 
where λ! is a segment of the vector λ and ξ!" is the error terms. Assuming IID of the error term, the 
probability of the individual i to belong to segment s is: 
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!!" =    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!∈!         (8) 
where λ! (h=1,2,..S) are the segment-specific parameters that have to be estimated for each individ-
ual. The sum of the all segment !!" sum up to one, so the s-esim !!" varies from zero to one. 
Whether the (6) and the (8) are put together we obtain the probability of the individual i belonging 
to segment s and choosing alternative j within the choice situation t and it can be written as: !!"#$ = !!"#|! ∙ !!" =    !!!!!!!!"#!!!!!!!!"#!∈!      ∙    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!∈!         (9) 
In the following paragraph we will describe in the details the target population we selected, the at-
tribute description, and the statistical design with the utility function specification. 
 
3.2. Target and sample population 
The target population considered in the CE survey is the resident population of the Veneto Region, 
by far the main user of forest-related mountain externalities excluding recreational activities already 
paid by tourists. The target sample was identified as 700 people to be interviewed during July-
October 2011 through a face-to-face interview. Two interview sessions were carried out: 74 people 
were interviewed with a pilot survey and 630 people with the final version of the questionnaire.  
The pilot test was mainly run to calculate the priors to calculate the D-optimal design for the final 
version of the survey (Street et al. 2005). The main survey began just after the summer and ended in 
the second half of October gathering 637 validated questionnaires; very few people refused to an-
swer (below 2.5%, in the main survey 16 people) and this is partially do to the economic compensa-
tion for the time loss we gave to the respondents (~10 €/person).  
In order to maximise the representativeness, we 
designed the survey sample using two main 
strata, namely the place of residence – whether 
on the plain or in the mountain areas – and the 
size of the municipality of residence: for this, 
we used four strata based on the number of in-
habitants: 0-5,000, 5,000-10,000, 10,000-
100,000 and the provincial capital. 
The geographical distribution (see Figure 1) of 
the sample covered 63 municipalities that in-
cluded cities, towns and villages (10.3% of the 
total number of municipalities in the Region). 
Chi-squared was run to test the hypothesis of 
sample-population similitude. The difference 
between Veneto’s population and that sampled 
did not exceed 5% for gender balance, age clas-
ses and size of household; only two parameters 
– education and income – were not comparable, 
due to the lack of data to design the real sample. 
Figure 1: Sample distribution 
 
Source: our elaboration 
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Indeed, education was the only socio-demographic parameter that was not considered in the statisti-
cal design, therefore one potential bias of the research could be the failure to reach people without 
education, representing around the 8% of the total voters, even though the expected proportion of 
persons without formal education in the sample is lower than in the reference population. As re-
gards income, we had to take into consideration that, for a cultural attitude, Italians do not like to 
disclose information on their earnings and information on this issue is not publicly available, even 
with a formal request to the regional tax office. Thus we only have information on the income com-
position of the sample population, where 60.7% were families in which the main income came from 
employed workers and 34.4% families with self-employed workers (4.8% provided no answer). In 
the survey, we asked for indications on household monthly income (then transformed into annual 
income) from the employed workers and on net annual household income from the self-employed. 
Merging together the two income types we obtained an aggregate distribution in four classes on a 
single scale: 0-30, 30-60, 60-120 and more than 120 thousand Euros per year. After the survey, a 
further test was performed with reference to the rurality indicator (OECD 1994, Jonard et al. 2009). 
A threshold of 150 inhabitants per square kilometre was used to divide rural municipalities from 
non-rural municipalities. The sample distribution generally fits Veneto’s rurality distribution despite 
mountain remote areas being considered inappropriate because more linked to the ES supply instead 
ES demand. 
The questionnaire was prepared to serve as a guide during the face-to-face interviews. It is orga-
nized in four main parts: the first asks attitudes and frequency of the use of mountain goods and 
services, the second part introduces the attributes and attribute levels and ends with six choice tasks 
of the CE, the third part is a debriefing aimed at understanding the respondent’s impressions of the 
questionnaire and the last part is on socio-demographic variables. It is worth mentioning that the at-
tributes and attribute levels were thoroughly explained before the CE, to fill the knowledge gap on 
forest externalities of the ordinary residents of the Veneto Region3.  
 
3.3. Attribute selection 
Forests in Veneto are mostly located in the Northern part of the region, in the mountainous areas of 
the Alpine range. Here, together with pastures and meadows, they are the two main components of 
the landscape. At the same time, they contribute towards biodiversity conservation – as many as 
240,984 hectares of forests are within the Natura 2000 network accounting for the 64% of mountain 
forest surface – they are destinations for recreational activities.  On average they are able to attract 
over 5.3 million daily stays per year (Regione Veneto 2011). Moreover, forests play an essential 
role in protecting soils from erosion in steep slopes and they represent an important carbon sink  ac-
cumulating every year 2.2 MtCO2 . 
Based on the physical, ecological and economic characteristics of forest ES in Veneto, a prelimi-
nary selection of the forest attributes to insert in the CE has been made. The initial list comprised: i) 
landscape beauty; ii) biodiversity conservation; iii) carbon sequestration; iv) recreation; v) effect of 
the forest on soil erosion and landslide prevention. Effects on the forests on water quality, quantity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This also helped to filter respondents who did not understand the CE and gave illogical answers. For instance, we asked them to 
identify the best level for one specific attribute without any reference to its cost and, in this way, we understood whether they 
grasped the meaning of the question. These answers have been used to weight their answers or to identify strategic or protest an-
swers. 
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and regimes, although relevant, have been deliberately excluded from the analysis since the begin-
ning, due to the difficulties of identify clear cause-effect relationships between forest management 
practices and effects on water on which to build the proposed CE scenario. Moreover, the conspicu-
ous number of regulations is limiting forest owners to manage freely their land with the results of 
land abandonment and forest re-naturalization that, as a matter of fact, are unintentional good prac-
tices which improve water quality (Bagnaresi et al. 1999). 
In order to show forest attributes in the most effective way to the respondents three focus group ses-
sions with sectoral experts were organized: the first group included mostly forest ecologists and sil-
viculturalists, the second group included naturalists and landscape experts, the third group mostly 
economists, each one consisting of 8-12 professionals. At first, the experts were interviewed singu-
larly while afterwards they were invited to participate to an open debate in a focus group in order to 
see whether or not they confirm their previous suggestions. As a result of the three focus groups, a 
set of attributes and attributes levels have been drafted as reported in Table 1. 
Forest structure view has been the first and the most debated attribute. Originally it was draft to de-
scribe the soil erosion effects according to different forest management techniques, however due to 
the river floods occurred in the region the year before the survey, respondents had a very high 
grudge on their answers leading strategic answers. Though it was not the same, we convert it in a 
recreational attribute to capture at least the respondents’ connection with forest in terms of aesthetic 
appreciation, so far the main visible output of the forest management people may see along roads or 
paths. An attribute on carbon sequestration was developed using the information gathered in a re-
gional program for marketing carbon credits generated by the regional forests 
(www.carbomark.org). Biodiversity was another difficult attribute to describe due to the scale of bi-
odiversity representativeness, very often site specific. Despite regional dwellers are not so familiar 
with biodiversity, the attribute was considered for the increasing demand for nature-based experi-
ences (flora and fauna watching). Finally we draft the biodiversity attribute with reference to the 
number of Alpine threaten species,. Landscape view, as mosaic of forest and grassland, was the se-
cond last attribute; we add it to check and update findings of previous studies (Tempesta and Thiene 
2004) on this topic, considering also the growing interest to maintain a balanced relationship be-
tween the mountain farmland under a process of abandonment and an expanding forest cover. Rec-
reation facilities in the forest (picnic and barbecue areas, mountain paths, car parks, ...) were the last 
attribute considered in the survey, being such infrastructures extensively requested by forest users. 
An annual regional income tax has been assumed as the most suitable and concrete payment vehicle 
for the majority of the respondents and it logically associated to the proposed policy scenarios im-
plementation. The wide range of cost levels has been defined according to the economists’ sugges-
tions in the focus groups and it allows respondent to have fewer attribute repetition between the al-
ternatives, keeping at the same time the low number of choice sets. 
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Table 1: Attributes of the CE survey  Attribute	   Attribute	  level	   Reference	  
Forest	  structure	  view	  along	  paths	  and	  roads	  
Icons	  
	   	  
(Nielsen	  et	  al.	  2007)	  modif.	  Description	  A=thick	  stand	  forest	  (coppice);	  	  B=even	  aged	  forest	  (Status	  quo	  –	  S.Q.);	  	  C=uneven	  aged	  forest;	  	  D=uneven	  aged	  forest	  with	  dead	  tree	  
Model	  code	  view	  A	  	  view	  C	  view	  D	  
Carbon	  sequestration	  in	  forest	  stocks	  as	  %	  of	  the	  Veneto’s	  dweller	  in	  a	  	  carbon	  neutral	  condi-­‐tion	  
Icons	  
	   (Mogas	  et	  al.	  2006)	  modif.	  Description	  Level	  1=	  5.5%	  (or	  280.000	  people)	  of	  Vene-­‐to’s	  dwellers	  (S.Q.);	  	  Level	  2=7%;	  Level	  3=8.5%;	  	  Level	   4=10%	   (the	   maximum	   percentage	  whether	   all	   the	   forest	   will	   leave	   in	   natural	  evolution)	  
Model	  Code	  	  	  CO2	  7%	  CO2	  8.5%	  CO2	  10%	  	  	  
Number	  of	  threatened	  species	  lost/protected	  
Icons	  
	   (Lehtonen	  et	  al.	  2003,	  Chri-­‐stie	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Jacobsen	  et	  al.	  2007)	  modif.	  Description	  Level	  1=-­‐50	  species	  (S.Q.);	  	  Level	  2=	  -­‐25	  species;	  Level	  3=	  0	  species	  lost;	  	  Level	   4=+2species	   gain	   from	   surrounding	  regions.	  
Model	  Code	  	  BIO	  -­‐25	  BIO	  0	  BIO	  +2	  	  
Landscape	  aesthetic	  view	  
Icons	  
	   (Tempesta	  and	  Thiene	  2004,	  Tempesta	  and	  Marangon	  2005,	  Grêt-­‐Regamey	  et	  al.	  2008)	  modif.	  
Description	  Level	  1=-­‐10%	  of	  grassland;	  	  Level	  2=-­‐5%	  of	  grassland	  (S.Q.);	  	  Level	  3=	  0%	  of	  grassland;	  	  Level	  4=+2%	  of	  grassland	  
Model	  Code	  LAND-­‐10	  	  LAND	  0	  LAND	  +2	  
Recreation	  in	  forest	  
Icons	  
	   (Christie	  et	  al.	  2007)	  modif.	  Description	  Level	  1=	  No	  service	  (S.Q.);	  Level	  2=Touristic	  facilities;	  Level	  3=	  Path	  signs;	  Level	  4=Touristic	  facilities	  and	  path	  signs	  
Model	  Code	  	  recrST	  recrS	  recrSST	  Cost	   Levels=	  0(S.Q.)	  25,	  50,	  75,	  100,	  125,	  150,	  175,	  200€/household/year	   	  	  
Note: picture source: our elaboration; red boxes in the attribute level are referred to status quo situation. 
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3.4. Choice experiment statistical design 
The statistical design is a fundamental step of the Choice experiment method. We proceeded in two 
phases according the procedure suggested by Bliemer and Rose (2009) after we defined the utility 
function as: U!"# = b0  +   b1!viewA!"   +   b2!viewC!" +   b3!viewD!"   +   b4!CO2!"   +   b5!bio!"   +   b6!land!" +  b7!recrST!"   +   b8!recrS!"   +   b9!recrSST!"   +   b10!cost!"   +   ε!"#   (10) 
where the single variables are explained in the table 1. Firstly, we created the statistical design for 
the pilot survey in order to estimate some preliminary betas, also called priors. The priors, estimated 
with Multi-Nominal Logit (MNL), have been used to develop the final statistical design for the 
main survey. In the pilot, we estimated a Dz-efficient design with Ngene software ®©, using priors 
equal to zero (Bliemer and Rose 2005), rather than an orthogonal design. The benefit of this proce-
dure is the possibility to combine dummy coded and continue variables in the same design, as well 
to weight the maximum and minimum values of continue variables4.  Based on the CE answers we 
estimated the MNL model betas used as priors in the final statistical design using the utility function 
(10) (the statistical design of the full survey is presented in Appendix 1). Due to serial non partici-
pant or protesters (von Haefen et al. 2005, Meyerho and Liebe 2008) during the pilot questionnaire, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  For instance, in the case of linear attributes such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity and cost, the higher levels, linked to the effort 
required to implement them, are less representative than the lower levels: this is in accordance with the theory that maintaining or 
increasing provision of forest externalities requires a great deal of effort. 
Table 2: Alternative choice frequency: difference between estimated and real choices 
 Estimated Real Differences 
Choice set Alt 1 Alt 2 S.Q. Alt 1 Alt 2 S.Q. Δ alt 1 Δ alt 2 Δ S.Q. 
1 33.67 30.94 35.39 34.91 22.01 43.08 1.24 -8.93 7.69 
2 59.93 15.34 24.72 65.20 19.44 15.36 5.27 4.09 -9.36 
3 37.88 26.71 35.41 60.69 16.67 22.64 22.81 -10.04 -12.77 
4 16.53 51.29 32.18 14.15 47.17 38.68 -2.38 -4.12 6.49 
5 43.75 23.66 32.59 22.64 27.36 50.00 -21.11 3.69 17.41 
6 23.32 31.58 45.10 16.30 44.83 38.87 -7.02 13.25 -6.23 
7 24.68 38.99 36.34 21.00 52.98 26.02 -3.67 13.99 -10.32 
8 33.49 35.30 31.21 23.51 26.65 49.84 -9.98 -8.65 18.63 
9 24.07 44.83 31.10 22.33 53.14 24.53 -1.74 8.32 -6.58 
10 18.45 47.67 33.88 15.67 28.53 55.80 -2.78 -19.14 21.92 
11 31.94 17.33 50.73 37.30 17.87 44.83 5.36 0.54 -5.90 
12 33.50 20.44 46.06 16.04 30.19 53.77 -17.46 9.75 7.71 
Note: the choice set of block 2 are reported in grey shading; S.Q. = status quo alternative. 
Source: our elaboration 
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more than 20% of the observations had to be dropped from the analysis, and the priors have been 
estimated with the remaining answers, then used to estimate the statistical design (see Appendix 1). 
Finally we checked the presence of dominant alternatives (Table 2). We found limited dominant ef-
fect in the estimated design, while the choice frequencies from the questionnaire showed a similar 
distribution with higher ratio in the ones having higher probability to be chosen in the estimated de-
sign. During the CE session, respondents were asked to answer six choice tasks out of the twelve 
contained in the CE statistical design. In order to split the choice tasks homogeneously, the block 
column has been used. The block column is a further attribute that is introduced in the statistical de-
sign and it is balanced to the other attributes. This helped us to split the design in different parts (the 
same number as the number of blocks) to reduce the amount of choice tasks for the respondent. 
 
4. Results and discussions 
The results of our survey show the 57.9% of the Veneto population goes in mountain at least once a 
year, nevertheless only 29.4% of the respondents stated they visit Veneto’s mountain while another 
28.7% prefer mountains in the neighbouring Regions such as Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-
Venezia-Giulia. Considering that 97.5% of this 29.4% undertake only daytrips, which are not rec-
orded by official statistics, and assuming 4.9 million of Veneto’s dwellers, the total number of user 
in the mountain areas could be at least 1.4 million (considering also the ratio of refuse answers). 
This number is surely underestimated, because it does not consider tourist coming from neighbour 
regions and other countries, but it may indicate a dimension mountain users populantion. 
One purpose of the questionnaire was also to survey the several activities done in mountain areas by 
visitors and the frequency of the use. We identified twelve main categories as reported in Figure 2. 
The results show that trekking and visiting agro-tourism facilities are the only activities for the ma-
Figure 2: Use of mountains for tourism and recreation: frequency graph 
 
Note: Percentage of the sample. Source: our elaboration 
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jority of people (mostly in the summer), while down-hill skiing is the most preferred activity in the 
winter season. Mushroom and truffle picking are also quite frequent recreational activities among 
the mountain users, as well as nature and wildlife photography. The categories on the left-side of 
berry picking (included) in the graph are regulated but free of charge, while on the right-side (berry 
picking excluded) the activities are payment based. It is worth mentioning the lobbying effect of 
hunters, a small group compared to other users’ groups (e.g. hiking and climbing associations like 
the Club Alpino Italiano, mushroom pickers or birdwatchers associations, etc.), but with high influ-
ence and effective power on public decision-makers. 
 
4.1. Results of the CE survey 
Since the pilot phase of the CE we have found a huge knowledge gaps on the majority of the re-
spondents, thus we decided to ask within each attribute explanation what level they would have pre-
ferred in absence of green taxation, in order to study the interest the respondent had for every exter-
nality (Table 3, “Before CE” column). On the contrary we expected not all the respondents chose 
the higher levels (L4) on biodiversity maintenance, carbon sequestration and touristic infrastructure, 
thought they followed the design patterns. Moreover, landscape view attribute has been chosen in 
the opposite trend to what we designed with the priors, so landscapes with more forest area was pre-
ferred instead of open areas and meadows. Open areas are consider more desirable than forest areas 
(Tempesta and Thiene 2004) in the mountain environment, nevertheless, if the landscape aesthetic 
view is evaluated within a larger variety of mountain forest externalities, is less appreciated. It is 
worth mentioning the weak environmental sensitivity of the population. Once the cost attribute was 
introduced (see “CE choices” columns), the choice of status quo dramatically increased in terms of 
frequency. This behaviour strongly affected the model output, especially in terms of attribute signif-
icance. Among the attributes costs have been the most important attributes; looking at the choice 
frequency of the cost attribute (Figure 3) (sum of all cost levels selected in the choice sets), we can 
see the negative slope distribution confirming the marginal utility theory (more it cost less you are 
willing to pay), while from the table 5 we can see more irregular attribute trends either before and 
after CE, though the 88% of the people interviewed declared to have understood the questionnaire 
and only the remaining 12 affirmed CE was difficult. 
Table 3: Attribute level choice before and during CE: frequency table 
 Before CE CE choices Differences 
Attribute L 1 L 2 L 3 L 4 L 1 L 2 L 3 L 4 Δ L 1 Δ L 2 Δ L 3 Δ L 4 Chi-test 
view  9.1 33.0 34.4 23.5 16.6 50.7 15.5 17.2 7.5 17.7 -18.8 -6.4 4.1E-06 
CO2  22.5 19.4 18.2 39.9 44.8 13.8 16.3 25.1 22.3 -5.6 -1.9 -14.7 1.8E-06 
bio 14.8 11.0 33.2 41.1 54.3 16.5 13.8 15.4 39.5 5.5 -19.4 -25.6 3.3E-29 
land 31.8 26.5 26.3 15.5 17.7 45.8 19.4 17.1 -14.1 19.3 -6.8 1.6 5.6E-05 
recreation 17.4 14.6 27.0 41.1 47.5 15.8 19.5 17.2 30.2 1.1 -7.5 -23.8 1.1E-14 
Note: The table is based on respondents who gave acceptable answers: protesters have not been considered. 
The column before CE was compiled directly using the answer frequency, while CE choices were calculated 
summing up the frequency of the chosen alternative that contains the specific attribute level. In grey shadow 
the S.Q. levels. L = Level (followed by a number). The level from L1 to L4 has the same order as the 
attribute levels reported in section 3.2). Source: our elaboration. 
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Protest answers on CE, accounting for 8.9% of all respondents, have been an additional constraint 
on the model estimation. We iden-
tified them as those persons al-
ways opting for the status quo or 
even refusing to answer some 
questions; these respondents were 
subjected to an additional set of 
control questions as reported in 
Table 6: if they answered posi-
tively to at least one out of the 
first four options in Table 4, they 
were considered as definitely pro-
testers and hence rejected from 
the model estimation. The total 
number of protest respondents 
was 61. 
The estimation of a general model 
for the Veneto Region population has been the first step in data elaboration using Nlogit soft-
ware©®.  Applying basic MNL model (McFadden 1974), we initially obtained quite weak results 
(see Table 5) at the aggregated level. This can be explained partially by the answers’ heterogeneity; 
in fact, Model 1.1 (all respondents) shows a general “unwillingness” to pay for the majority of the 
attributes, except for recreation facilities (“recrSST” variable). Slight improvements of the model 
outputs have been obtained by introducing some dummy variables such us “non-protesters”, 
“mountain users” and “mountain non-users”. Once the vector of the attributes was multiply by the 
dummy for the non-protesters better outputs were obtained. Model 2.1 fits better parameters, show-
ing a general willingness to 
change from the present sit-
uation (ASC < 0) and good 
fit of the model with the ma-
jority of the attributes signif-
icant at 5%; only the 
”LAND” variable shows 
unexpected negative sign, 
pointing out a general care-
less about open areas in 
mountain areas. So, moving 
from Model 1.1 to Model 2.1 protesters play an critical role adding important bias on the model fit 
as observed by Holbrook et al. (1988). Following the idea of use and non-use values, we tested the 
differences between “mountain users” (Model 3.1) and “mountain non-users” (Model 4.1) 
(Adamowicz et al. 1998). As expected people having a direct interest on a given good have also 
higher propensity to spend for it; in Model 1.1 we may see an increasing interest on biodiversity 
maintenance and even-aged managed forest, though their main attention is addressed on  touristic 
Figure 3: Cost attribute: frequency distribution  
Note: Values reported under x-axis represent the choice frequency 
contained in the chosen alternatives, excluding protesters. Source: 
our elaboration 
Table 4: Frequency table of protesters answers 
 
Number of 
respondents 
[%] of the 
sample 
It is too costly 55 8.6 
I do not have enough money 58 9.1 
I already pay enough taxes 61 9.6 
I prefer to spend my money on other things 56 8.8 
The programme is not important 35 5.5 
I don’t believe the programme will be implemented 38 6.0 
Other programmes could be better 29 4.6 
I want things left as they are now 31 4.9 
Source: our elaboration 
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facilities; in fact, trekking and excursions are the main recreational activities in the Veneto’s moun-
tains (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the present state of the environment does not push the mountain 
users to have a high willingness to change as the ASC is positive and significant. 
Non-use value is another crucial information for the policy maker targeting ES provision at regional 
scale. Model 4.1 shows the presence of reduced WTP stated by mountain non-users, though it is 
limited to touristic infrastructure and carbon sequestration. Here it is worth to mention the negative 
sign of “recrS” (see variable explanation in table 1), activities linked to active mountain users, so, as 
option-value, they are more attracted to touristic infrastructure (“recrST”). WTP for Carbon seques-
tration could be regarded as the effect of mass media advertise on climatic change, affecting people 
that have lost direct links with the forest (see negative coefficients for outdoor recreation in Model 
3.1). Finally, the interaction with education (years of education) has been tested to verify the role of 
knowledge in the CE (see Model 5.1); basically the differences with Model 1.1 are minimal, though 
education enhances the parameters of costs.  
Moreover, the models in Table 5 have been re-estimated after recoding “CO2”, “BIO” and “LAND” 
in dummy coded variables according to the levels reported in Table 1. We took as reference level 
the status quo for each variable (5.5% for carbon sequestration, -50% species for biodiversity and -
5% for landscape). The results show a non-linear pattern (see Table 6) explaining average respond-
ed behaviour on the single level. For instance, “CO2“ at 8.5% has been the less meaningful attribute 
level; people preferred to choose the lower and the higher “CO2“ levels. Model 2.2 adds infor-
mation about attribute “LAND”, in which people preferred to keep the grassland surfaces as such, 
while in Model 2.1 people choice referred to a forest surface increment. Further information are 
Table 5: MNL Model outputs 
	   MNL	  Variables	   Model	  1.1	  (all	  respondent)	   Model	  2.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	   Model	  3.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  	  protest	  &	  users)	   Model	  4.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  	  protest	  &	  non-­‐users)	   Model	  5.1	  (interaction	  with	  edu	  &	  dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	  ASC	   0.045	   -­‐0.684***	   0.457***	   0.307***	   -­‐0.065	  viewA	   -­‐0.003	   0.106**	   0.103*	   -­‐0.200**	   0.008**	  viewC	   0.030	   0.130**	   0.145**	   -­‐0.105	   0.014***	  viewD	   -­‐0.005	   0.086*	   -­‐0.034	   -­‐0.001	   2e-­‐5	  CO2	   0.052	   0.112**	   -­‐0.143***	   0.297***	   -­‐0.001	  BIO	   0.003	   0.006**	   0.019***	   -­‐0.015***	   0.001***	  LAND	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.010*	   0.001	   -­‐0.013	   -­‐0.823	  recrST	   0.048	   0.119**	   -­‐0.050	   0.204**	   0.004	  recrS	   0.011	   0.065	   0.291***	   -­‐0.400***	   0.011**	  recrSST	   0.223***	   0.441***	   0.211***	   0.270***	   0.025***	  COST	   -­‐0.009***	   -­‐0.010***	   -­‐0.013***	   -­‐0.006***	   -­‐0.012***	  Obs.	   3822	   3822	   3822	   3822	   3822	  Log-­‐L	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.05928	   0.09962	   0.08795	   0.06130	   0.09186	  Adj.	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.05792	   0.09833	   0.08694	   0.06003	   0.09055	  
 
Note: starred values represent the p-value : * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.001. The variables codes are 
reported in table 1. ASC = Alternative Specific Constant, usually equal in the un-labelled CE. Source: 
our elaboration. 
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provide by Model 4.2 where biodiversity is significant at “-25 species” level (in Model 4.1 is 
negative). 
 
Despite the use of continue variables, the recoding has highlighted the respondent’ propensity to 
have higher attention on the extreme levels of attributes.  
Lastly, LCM has been estimated (see Table 7). The results provide interesting information, confirm-
ing partially the major findings of the previous models. Actually the model delivered two groups of 
people differing from their willingness to support the changes. The Group 1 is characterised by 
people willing to have forest left to its natural evolution (“viewD”) as well willing to support carbon 
sequestration policies and an abundant demand for recreation infrastructures, while on the contrary 
considering biodiversity maintenance, policy for keeping grassland and the investment on path 
signs, rather superfluous. Group 2 has a total different behaviour, with a willingness to have more 
path signs and landscape maintenance, with the conversion of coppice forest. Nevertheless, the idea 
to pay for something does not hold, as ASC is positive and significant. The fact can be understood 
looking at the λ values: Group 2 gathers mountain users with and people with high education, while 
the opposite is in the Group 1. This holds also with the previous findings reported in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 6: MNL model outputs for recoded variables 
	   MNL	  
	   Model	  1.2	  (all	  resp.)	   Model	  2.2	  (dummy	  for	  protest)	   Model	  3.2	  (dummies	  for	  non-­‐prot.	  &	  user)	   Model	  4.2	  (dummies	  for	  non-­‐prot.	  &	  non-­‐user)	   Model	  5.2	  (interaction	  with	  edu	  &	  dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	  VIEWA	   0.042	   0.239***	   0.201**	   -­‐0.228**	   0.015**	  VIEWC	   0.159**	   0.175**	   0.032	   0.194*	   0.013**	  VIEWD	   -­‐0.167**	   -­‐0.098	   -­‐0.076	   -­‐0.351***	   -­‐0.010**	  CO2	  +7%	   0.294***	   0.417***	   0.176	   0.464***	   0.030***	  CO2	  +8.5%	   -­‐0.317***	   -­‐0.502***	   -­‐0.383***	   -­‐0.203*	   -­‐0.035***	  CO2	  +10%	   0.263***	   -­‐0.074	   0.109	   1.014***	   0.004	  BIO	  -­‐25	   0.007	   0.094	   -­‐2e4	   0.302**	   0.007	  BIO	  0	   0.151**	   0.508***	   0.451***	   -­‐0.465***	   0.034***	  BIO	  +10	   -­‐0.055	   0.267**	   0.182*	   -­‐0.734***	   0.014**	  LAND	  -­‐10%	   -­‐0.090	   -­‐0.252***	   -­‐0.021	   -­‐0.083	   -­‐0.016***	  LAND	  0%	   0.085	   0.434***	   0.369**	   -­‐0.266*	   0.029***	  LAND	  +2%	   -­‐0.103	   -­‐0.156**	   -­‐0.171*	   -­‐0.062	   -­‐0.011**	  RECRST	   0.013	   -­‐0.174**	   -­‐0.190*	   0.271**	   -­‐0.011*	  RECRS	   0.048	   0.240***	   0.169**	   -­‐0.285**	   0.015**	  RECRSST	   0.289***	   0.417***	   0.302***	   0.452***	   0.030***	  COST	   -­‐0.009***	   -­‐0.017***	   -­‐0.010***	   -­‐0.004***	   -­‐0.014***	  Obs.	   3822	   3822	   3822	   3822	   3822	  Log-­‐L	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	   -­‐4172.47	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.06599	   0.10818	   0.08756	   0.10277	   0.10139	  Adj.	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.06403	   0.10631	   0.08564	   0.10077	   0.09950	  	  
Note: starred values represent the p-value : * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.001. Source: our 
elaboration. 
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A general finding of the paper is the pres-
ence of option and existence values for 
some ES, hence showing a potential per-
ceived scarcity among Veneto’s dwellers for the 83% living in the plain areas. On the contrary of 
target specific valuation (Scarpa and Thiene 2005), where the sample was selected among the good 
or service users, on large scale policy, all the population has to be considered because directly or 
indirectly they may use a given ES.. As stated in several other papers (Scarpa and Thiene 2005, 
Scarpa et al. 2007), LCM helps to define homogenous choices within a certain strata of the popula-
tion. Nevertheless, the outputs are not straightforward applicable in the real policy because there is 
no clear distinction of the groups by variables (see Table 8), due to the difficulty to cluster up peo-
ple belonging to the same socio-demographic strata. Surely the models can be improved and they 
can be used to indicate choice behaviour on ES demand, adding information that are generally diffi-
cult to generate with traditional models (Boxall and Adamowicz 2002).  
After the MNL model estimations, we calculated the WTP marginal values (see Table 9) as ration 
between the coefficient attribute and the opposite coefficient of price as reported above. Only for 
Model 5.1 different approach was needed, due to the education interaction effect. Basically, educa-
Table 7: Latent Class model 
	   LCM	  
	  
Group	  1	  (prob.	  53.3%)	   Group	  2	  (prob.	  46.7%)	  ASC	   -­‐1.114***	   1.489***	  viewA	   -­‐0.112	   -­‐0.111**	  viewC	   -­‐0.050	   0.018	  viewD	   0.722***	   0.061	  CO2	   0.785***	   -­‐0.052	  BIO	   -­‐0.026***	   0.007*	  LAND	   -­‐0.065***	   0.013**	  recrST	   0.030	   -­‐0.063	  recrS	   -­‐0.677***	   0.244***	  recrSST	   1.777***	   0.035	  COST	   -­‐0.051***	   -­‐0.004**	  Prob.	  model	   λ1	   λ2	  (reference)	  Constant	   	  	  1.142***	   0	  Protest	   32.032	   0	  Mount.	  User	   	  -­‐1.014***	   0	  Education	   	  -­‐0.050**	   0	  Obs.	   3822	  Log-­‐L	   -­‐2968.79	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.29296	  Adj.	  R-­‐sqrd	   0.29045	  	  
Note: starred values represent the p-value: * 
= 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.001 
Source: our elaboration. 
Table 8: Characteristics of LCM groups 	   	   	   	   Group	  1	   Group	  2	   G1	  [%]	   G2	  [%]	  
Non	  pr
otester
s	  
	   284	   298	   48.8	   51.2	  
Non	  Us
ers	   	   152	   84	   64.4	   35.6	  
edu.	  [y
ear]	   5	   11	   9	   	   	  8	   70	   29	   	   	  11	   6	   4	   	   	  13	   51	   34	   	   	  18	   14	   8	   	   	  
Users	  
	   132	   214	   38.2	   61.8	  
edu.	  [y
ear]	   5	   4	   9	   	   	  8	   55	   67	   	   	  11	   7	   12	   	   	  13	   55	   84	   	   	  18	   11	   42	   	   	  
Protes
ters	  
	   55	   	   100.0	   0.0	  
Non	  Us
ers	   	   32	   	   	   	  
edu.	  [y
ear]	   5	   1	   	   	   	  8	   18	   	   	   	  11	   4	   	   	   	  13	   8	   	   	   	  18	   1	   	   	   	  
Users	  
	   23	   	   	   	  
edu.	  [y
ear]	   8	   11	   	   	   	  11	   4	   	   	   	  13	   7	   	   	   	  18	   1	   	   	   	  Total	   339	   298	   53.2	   46.8	  Source:	  our	  elaboration.	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tion is not the same through the sample so we needed to weight the attribute coefficient with the 
sample frequency (Hidrue et al. 2011, Martinez-Cruz 2012) (see Table 9 and Table 10). 
 
The overall WTP for the ES provision in Veneto may be calculated as a positive marginal variation 
of each attributes within the given model; the values wave between the 48 (Model 1.1 in Table 9) to 
313 €/household/year (Model 2.2 in Table 10). Hence, the creation of a hypothetical environmental 
fund may generate approximately 51 to 338 M€/year (considering the 8% of the families under the 
minimal income threshold). These values might be considered in line with the results of similar 
studies (Tempesta and Marangon 2005, Goio et al. 2008) for the assessment of the Italian forest 
landscape by asking to respondent whether they were willing to abrogate a law for forest fires pre-
Table 9: WTP marginal values [€/ES unit change] 
	   MNL	  Variables	   Model	  1.1	  (all	  respondent)	   Model	  2.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	   Model	  3.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  	  protest	  &	  users)	   Model	  4.1	  (dummy	  for	  non	  	  protest	  &	  non-­‐users)	   Model	  5.1	  (interaction	  with	  edu	  &	  dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	  ASC	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  viewA	   0	   21.28	   0	   -­‐62.22	   14.46	  viewC	   0	   25.98	   20.91	   0	   24.18	  viewD	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  CO2	   0	   11.21	   -­‐10.30	   46.20	   0	  BIO	   0	   0.62	   1.37	   -­‐2.41	   0.87	  LAND	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  recrST	   0	   23.69	   0	   63.33	   0	  recrS	   0	   0	   41.96	   -­‐124.62	   19.68	  recrSST	   48.43	   88.00	   30.33	   84.05	   44.35	  	  
 
Table 10: WTP marginal values for effect coded variables [€/ES unit change] 
	   MNL	  
	  
Model	  1.2	  (all	  resp.)	   Model	  2.2	  (dummy	  for	  protest)	   Model	  3.2	  (dummies	  for	  non-­‐prot.	  &	  user)	   Model	  4.2	  (dummies	  for	  non-­‐prot.	  &	  non-­‐user)	   Model	  5.2	  (interaction	  with	  edu	  &	  dummy	  for	  non	  protest)	  VIEWA	   0	   27.74	   38.71	   -­‐104.46	   23.30	  VIEWC	   32.71	   20.29	   0	   0	   20.79	  VIEWD	   -­‐34.44	   0	   0	   -­‐160.17	   -­‐16.39	  CO2	  +7%	   60.48	   48.46	   0	   211.95	   46.27	  CO2	  +8.5%	   -­‐65.39	   -­‐58.31	   -­‐73.86	   0	   -­‐55.76	  CO2	  +10%	   54.07	   0	   0	   462.49	   0	  BIO	  -­‐25	   0	   0	   0	   137.81	   0	  BIO	  0	   31.02	   58.96	   86.77	   -­‐212.40	   52.75	  BIO	  +10	   0	   31.05	   0	   -­‐334.87	   21.28	  LAND	  -­‐10%	   0	   -­‐29.27	   0	   0	   -­‐24.96	  LAND	  0%	   0	   50.37	   71.08	   0	   45.55	  LAND	  +2%	   0	   -­‐18.18	   0	   0	   -­‐18.18	  RECRST	   0	   -­‐20.25	   0	   123.48	   0	  RECRS	   0	   27.87	   32.57	   -­‐130.27	   24.22	  RECRSST	   59.52	   48.38	   58.22	   206.27	   46.96	  Source:	  our	  elaboration.	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vention thus reducing the tax load. The results estimated a total economic value of 722.6 €/ha, with 
a non-use value component of 665 €/ha, which correspond to 220 M€/year applying our socio-
demographic parameters. The results may also compare with the actual annual household payment 
for Common Agriculture Policy. According to OECD (2010), the average European household ex-
penditure account for 1200 €/household/year, and nearly one third is used to subsidies the agro-
forestry measure (mainly in the second pillar of Common Agriculture Policy) for approximately 
360 M€ in Veneto Region.  
 
5. Conclusions 
CE is an innovative econometric approach to estimate non market values. The direct utility ES user 
has on the forest service model plays an important role in our models. Higher WTP has been rec-
orded on mountain-users especially on those ES frequently experienced, like path signs, aesthetic 
view along path or roads. On the contrary, non mountain-users react according to the media inputs. 
It is not a case the higher WTP on carbons sequestration has been recorded within this group of re-
spondent, mainly informed by television advertises more and more addressing to climatic change 
issue. The absence of forests in Veneto plains plays an important role for non-users of mountain re-
sources that stated a general positive existence values for some environmental services like biodi-
versity, as well option values for recreational facilities as they used to have along seaside. Unex-
pected outputs may rise as well; for instance several people decided to avoid choosing due to the 
high complexity of choice tasks request to the respondent. 
Small WTP for certain mountain forest services is linked also to the deficiency of respondent’s 
knowledge, opening a field of policy action. The improvement of environment education and the 
citizens’ awareness could be a preliminary step to increase the perceived value of mountain forests 
services. Environmental education is surely a strategic tool to be considered in the future but it is 
also a hot and challenging issue raising some ethical questions: who decides the right level of 
awareness and information? Is it ethically acceptable to invest in education and information with the 
aim of increasing the WTP and hence introducing new market-based mechanisms? Not easy an-
swers. However, only fair awareness on forest-related environmental services could support the in-
troduction of market-based mechanisms to improve forest ES, even though on the perspective of 
household economic account it represent an additional cost. 
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11. Conclusions	  In	  Italy,	  in	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  the	  forest	  sector	  has	  been	  characterised	  by	  a	  negative	  trend,	  in	  term	  of	  wood	  production	  and	  capability	  to	  generate	  income	  from	  wood	  harvesting	  opera-­‐tions:	   sectorial	  GDP,	   employment	  and	  added	  value	  have	  been	  constantly	  decreasing.	  Never-­‐theless,	  it	  covers	  a	  strategic	  importance	  for	  the	  public	  services	  it	  generates.	  In	  the	  five	  papers	  we	  reported	  in	  the	  present	  work,	  forest	  was	  the	  core	  environment	  we	  targeted	  our	  attention,	  due	  its	  capacity	  to	  be	  at	  the	  same	  time	  generator	  of	  traditional	  forest	  goods	  for	  the	  market	  (i.e.	  timber,	  firewood,	  etc.)	  as	  well	  for	  the	  offer	  of	  forest-­‐based	  ES	  (i.e.	  recreation,	  biodiversity	  con-­‐servation,	  water	  quality	  enhancement,	  etc.).	  Not	  considering	  wood	  production,	   forests	  are	  a	  source	  of	  NWFP	  and	  services	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  used	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  ES	  users	  or	  simply	  left	  aside	  for	  future	  uses.	  The	  papers	  describe	  the	  actual	  and	  potential	  forest	  outputs	  from	  the	  most	  known	  to	  the	  less	  notorious	  ES	  as	  well	  the	  factors	  that	  let	  us	  understand	  the	  main	  driv-­‐ing	  forces	  and	  constrains	  for	  PES	  implementation	  in	  the	  Veneto’s	  mountain	  areas.	  Recreational	  wild	  mushroom	  picking	  (RWMP)	  has	  been	  among	  the	   first	  paid	   forest	  services	  widely	  diffused	  in	  Italy	  since	  harvesting	  conflicts	  among	  land	  owners	  and	  pickers	  created	  the	  ground	   for	   introducing	   property	   rights	   regulations.	   RWMP	   represents	   an	   emblematic	   case	  where	  the	  demand	  of	  a	  single	  forest	  externality	  has	  become	  a	  new	  ES	  and	  furthermore	  an	  in-­‐come	  source	  for	  the	  forest	  manager.	  Implementing	  a	  cardinal	  principle	  of	  environmental	  eco-­‐nomics	  (Coase	  1960),	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  source	  of	  income	  regulating	  the	  WM	  harvest-­‐ing	  rights	  thanks	  to	  the	  approval	  and	  refinement	  of	  national,	  regional	  and	  local	  regulations.	  The	  use	  of	   forest	  ES,	  such	  as	   forest	  games	  or	  edible	  NWFP,	  has	  been	  generally	  based	  on	  fee	  implementation	  regardless	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  ES	  manager	  in	  improving	  or	  reducing	  their	  pro-­‐vision.	   This	   behaviour	   usually	   led	   into	   resource	   depletion	   (Marangon	   et	   al.	   2001,	   Thiene	  2001).	  Also	  RWMP	  permits	  have	  been	  implemented	  with	  the	  same	  general	  approach,	  but	  dif-­‐ferent	   scenarios	  occurred.	   In	   fact,	   being	   the	  public	  or	  private	   forest	  mangers	   free	   to	  decide	  how	  to	  manage	  WM	  resources,	  they	  have	  been	  also	  free	  to	  set	  up	  specific	  governance	  struc-­‐tures	   to	   enhance	  WM	   revenues.	   The	   better	   performances	   occurred	  where	   forest	  managers	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  efforts	  to	  keep	  active	  forest	  management	  higher	  or	  targeting	  WM	  silviculture,	  as	  well	  where	   good	   coordination	  with	   control	   system	  and	   local	   tourist	   offer	   is	   ensued.	  RWMP	  demand	  is	  generally	  very	  high	  and	  forest	  manager	  may	  benefit	  only	  for	  the	  WM	  picking	  per-­‐mit	  selling.	  However,	  on	  the	   long	  run,	   income	  may	  become	  marginal.	   In	   fact,	   the	  creation	  of	  new	  income	  opportunities	  from	  forest	  sector	  requires	  today	  more	  complex	  approach	  (Secco	  et	  al.	  2009)	  rather	  than	  the	  mere	  application	  of	  a	  norm.	  The	  involvement	  of	  different	  stake-­‐holders,	  ranging	  form	  public	  authorities	  to	  private	  enterprises	  to	  form	  a	  “net-­‐system”	  does	  not	  only	  improve	  the	  commercialization	  forest-­‐based	  services,	  like	  RWMP,	  but	  also	  increases	  the	  economic	  resilience	  of	  the	  local	  economy.	  Borgotaro	  Consortium	  is	  a	  case	  where	  a	  simple	  for-­‐est	  service	  became	  the	  economic	  driver	  of	  the	  area,	  but,	  more	  importantly,	   it	  represents	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  stakeholder	  network	  to	  create	  a	  lively	  local	  economy,	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  culture	  of	  WM	  use,	  connecting	  different	  operators	  (restaurant,	  hotel	  and	  B&B	  managers,	  small-­‐scale	  processing	   industries,	   shop	  keepers	  selling	   local	   typical	  products),	   at	   the	  end	  enriching	  and	  stabilising	  the	  WP-­‐related	  economy.	  For	  more	  business-­‐oriented	  activity,	  culture	  creation	  was	  also	  the	  successful	  factor	  of	  the	  Dal-­‐la	  Valle	  Company,	  Finnish	  WM	  exporter	  able	  to	  fulfil	   the	  huge	  demand	  of	  WM	  in	  Veneto	  Re-­‐gion.	  The	  massive	  investment	  on	  the	  local	  Finnish	  WM	  pickers	  training	  was	  the	  first	  step	  the	  company	  undertook	  to	  organise	  a	  stable	  supply	  of	  WM	  that	  locals	  have	  scarcely	  used	  before.	  This	  investment	  allowed	  to	  transform	  a	  public	  good	  like	  ceps	  in	  a	  new	  forest	  commodity	  sold	  in	  the	  market,	  which	  meant	  an	  additional	  income	  source	  both	  for	  the	  company	  and	  more	  im-­‐portantly	   for	  Finnish	  rural	  dwellers.	  Other	   factors	   that	  allowed	  the	  company	  to	  succeed	  has	  been	  the	  completely	  tax	  exemption	  for	  WM	  picking	  and	  furthermore	  information	  asymmetry	  
to	  fetch	  up	  better	  price	  in	  the	  Italian	  market.	  In	  this	  was	  Dalla	  Valle	  Company	  was	  able	  to	  get	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  on	  competitors.	  RWMP	  highlights	  all	  the	  key	  points	  a	  potential	  PES	  implementation	  (paper	  2)	  or	  MES	  creation	  (paper	  3)	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  once	  a	  policy	  maker	  or	  a	  private	  agent	  want	  to	  step	  into	  the	  ES	  market.	  The	  clear	  and	  effective	  regulation	  of	  property	  rights,	  the	  implementation	  of	  regula-­‐tions	  through	  the	  development	  of	  proper	  contractual	  agreements	  for	  organizing	  ES	  provision	  among	  different	  agents,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  real	  rather	  then	  fictitious	  or	  built	  demand,	  the	  insti-­‐tutional	  condition	  that	  allows	  to	  operate	  economically	  are	  all	  factors	  that	  should	  be	  added	  to	  the	  five	  principle	  of	  PES	  theory	  (see	  paper	  1)	  (Wunder	  2005)	  to	  accomplish	  ES	  contract	  re-­‐quirement.	  Moreover,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  similar	  PES	  schemes,	  trading	  the	  same	  ES,	  may	  stimu-­‐late	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  market	  for	  environmental	  services	  (MES),	  even	  though	  among	  the	  main	  problems	  the	  ES	  user’s	  utility	  transfer	  from	  one	  area	  to	  another	  can	  result	  impossible.	  An	  ex-­‐ample	  is	  the	  ES	  related	  to	  water	  quality	  maintenance	  and	  improvement	  (paper	  4).	  Despite	  the	  efforts	  to	  underpin	  by	  central	  government	  water	  quality	  enhancement	  through	  national	  act,	  water	  related	  PES	  remain	  limited	  at	  few	  case	  studies	  where	  the	  financial	  efficiency	  hold,	  but	  no	  information	  where	  collected	  about	  consumers’	  demand.	  The	  reasons	  of	  this	  limited	  result	  might	  be	  searched	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  real	  demand	  or	  demand	  information	  the	  water	  resource	  manager	  holds.	  Surely	  the	  accumulation	  of	  norms	  and	  customary	  rights,	  the	  incapability	  of	  landowners	  to	  cluster	  up	  and	  ask	  for	  water	  service	  compensation,	  or	  the	  high	  transaction	  costs	  to	  built	  ES	  contract	  have	  been	  other	  huge	  constraints,	  but	  more	  importantly	  is	  the	  scarce	  knowledge	  people	  have	  about	  the	  complexity	  of	  water	  cycle	  and	  the	  role	  of	  forests	  in	  water	  filtering.	  	  Knowledge	  plays	  also	  a	  key	  role	  to	  mature	  the	  society,	  usually	  unprepared	  to	  drastic	  change	  on	  public	  good	  use.	  This	  statement	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  outcome	  described	  in	  the	  last	  paper	  (paper	  5),	  where	  the	  average	  respondent	  declared	  to	  have	  a	  relatively	  low	  WTP	  to	  compensate	  any	  additional	  provision	  of	  ES	  like	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  carbon	  storage	  and	  non-­‐structured	   mountain	   recreation	   services.	   Nevertheless,	   whether	   the	   respondents	   had	  knowledge	  about	  of	  a	  given	  resource,	  their	  WTP	  resulted	  higher.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  demand	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  consumers’	  behaviours	  about	  their	  preferred	  ES	  and	  it	  highlights	  also	  the	  effect	  of	  education	  on	  WTP.	  The	  survey	  results	  may	  advise	  decision	  makers	  on	  the	  poten-­‐tiality	  to	   implement	  a	  regional	  PES	  scheme,	  but	  at	  the	  present,	  knowledge	  on	  ES	  can	  under-­‐mine	  the	  success	  of	  any	  PES	  implementation	  exercise.	  Utility,	  is	  the	  de	  facto	  the	  engine	  of	  MES,	  strictly	  “interrelated”	  to	  consumers’	  knowledge,	  without	  which,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ES	  demand	  results	  impossible.	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